Cultural Heritage in Postwar Recovery
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HE SECOND ICCROM FORUM of a new series was held in Rome on October 4–6, 2005 on the topic: ‘Armed conflict and conservation: promoting cultural heritage in postwar recovery’. The aim of an ICCROM Forum is to promote discussion on important contemporary issues in heritage conservation. It brings together a small number of invited specialists from different backgrounds to discuss a theme identified by ICCROM as being both topical and important for the better understanding of heritage conservation. A further aim is to publish papers given at the forum in order to help make the content of the meeting more widely available to all those interested in conservation and its related disciplines.

The previous ICCROM Forum was held in October 2003 and papers from it have been published as Conservation of living religious heritage (Herb Stovel, Nicholas Stanley-Price and Robert Killick (eds.), ICCROM Conservation Studies 3, ICCROM 2005).

This forum was held, appropriately, in one of Rome’s distinguished academies devoted to the arts, the Accademia Nazionale di San Luca (founded 1577) in Palazzo Carpegna, located a stone’s throw from the Trevi Fountain. ICCROM is very grateful to its Secretary-General, Professor Architect Giorgio Ciucci, for allowing use of its premises for our meeting.

The present volume publishes all the talks presented at the forum held in 2005, with the addition of the opening paper. Texts of the talks were circulated beforehand to forum participants and were presented in summary form at the meeting so as to allow substantial time to be devoted to discussion. They have now been revised by their authors for publication here. A report on the forum has appeared previously in the ICCROM Newsletter 32 (2006).

The specific goal of the forum was to assemble a convincing body of material that demonstrates that cultural heritage does play an important role in recovery from situations of armed conflict and that it must be built into the planning of post-conflict recovery strategies. Speakers were proposed five topics as guidelines that might help them in planning their papers, namely: the dynamism of identity, records of memory, handicrafts and traditions, landscape and environment, and reconstruction. Some of the papers published here (e.g. Lee’s) refer directly to these proposed topics. The individual papers all contribute substantially to the overall goal of the forum; whether they constitute that “convincing body of material” referred to earlier must be left to the reader to decide. The opinions expressed here are those of the authors, and not necessarily of ICCROM.

The forum on armed conflict and conservation was planned by a small group at ICCROM consisting of Jennifer Copithorne, Robert Killick, Joseph King, Valerie Magar, Rosalia Varoli Piazza, and the present writer. I am indebted to these colleagues for their hard work in ensuring a well-defined programme and a successful outcome to the event. I owe a particular debt to Jennifer Copithorne who undertook the major role in preparing the forum, both in organizing its logistics and in helping define its content. Her background research on relevant literature and potential speakers and her skill in organization were major factors in its success.

Sincere thanks are also due to all ICCROM staff for their contributions to the forum’s planning and organization and for their discussion preceding and during the forum as participants and session chairs. To them, to all the contributing authors, to the two referees who reviewed the draft text of this publication, and to Robert Killick and his team for designing and seeing this volume through to publication, I am deeply grateful.

NICOLAS STANLEY-PRICE
January 2007
Cultural heritage must be recognized as a crucial element of the recovery process immediately following the end of an armed conflict, and not be considered a luxury to await attention later. It is argued that re-establishing the thread of continuity in people’s daily lives is a priority goal. The restoration of nationally symbolic monuments or the recovery of looted collections is only one element in the revival of cultural identity; instead, the significance to people of their home and its lands — and a popular desire immediately to revive traditional practices — are well documented and must be incorporated in primary recovery strategies. By means of examples, the paper aims to document the evident role that cultural heritage at a popular level plays in postwar situations. It ends by calling for better preparation by cultural heritage professionals to confront such situations of conflict.

The thread of continuity: cultural heritage in post-war recovery

Introduction — the thread of continuity

The impact of war on a people’s cultural heritage is a difficult topic to broach. In times of death and destruction, people come first. With the end of active combat and the start of recovery, the immediate human needs of shelter, food and health have priority. So does proper respect for the memory of the dead. None of this can, nor should, be denied. A concern for cultural heritage at such a time runs the risk of appearing to be indifferent to these priorities.

The contents of this volume accept this premise but aim to modify it by arguing that the role of culture should be recognized as an important one from early in the recovery phase following a period of war or armed conflict. Not only do the needs of shelter, food and health stand a better chance of being successfully met if the cultural context of their beneficiaries is understood; but also a people’s ability to recover from such extreme situations owes much to their own cultural resilience. Actively including cultural heritage in the agenda for recovery can have a positive force both for social reconstruction and for eventual reconciliation.

In many postwar situations, there is evidence of a popular concern to restore immediately war-damaged heritage and to revive traditions that before the war had been obsolescent. This concern seems to answer to a strong psychosocial need to re-establish the familiar and the cherished following a phase of violent disruption of normal life. It can be distilled in the concept of a ‘thread of continuity’ that people search for when the rhythm of everyday life has been shattered. In such situations, the crucial role of culture must be recognized and incorporated early in the recovery process.

1 An early use of this well-worn phrase is in the study of bereavement by Marris (1974: 17; quoted in Loizos 1981: 197): the impulse to preserve the thread of continuity is thus a crucial instinct of survival.
The aim of the Forum organized by ICCROM in October 2005 was to bring together experiences that demonstrate that cultural heritage does play an important role in recovery from situations of war or armed conflict. A certain time-perspective is required to determine how culture has been important. For this reason, most of the cases selected for discussion at the Forum, and published here, reflect at least a decade of experience since the end of the armed conflict to which they refer.

As the papers make clear, the contribution of cultural heritage in postwar situations is seen as being much more pervasive than the restoration of war-damaged buildings or the restitution of stolen objects, which is how it is often conceived. War damage to buildings and museum collections and their subsequent restoration (or restitution in the case of looted works of art) have been the subject of many general reviews (e.g. Nicholas 1994, Greenfield 1996, Lambourne 2001, Bevan 2006). Damage caused by armed conflict in the 20th century to libraries and archives is well documented in a report produced for UNESCO’s Memory of the World project (Van der Hoeven and Van Albada 1996). The application of international conventions has also been reviewed (e.g. by Boylan 1993, Toman 1996, Boylan 2001, Chamberlain 2004). The continuing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have kept the issues of cultural heritage destruction in the public eye.

Reviews of the kind referred to are valuable in demonstrating the sheer scale of loss of cultural heritage (though they give most attention to Europe) as a result of armed conflict, and the highly symbolic value attached to it. Most limit themselves to documenting the scale of the phenomenon; some draw conclusions about lessons to be learnt; others go further in propounding a particular thesis. Bevan (2006) does this in arguing for the deliberate destruction of architecture to be viewed as a form of cultural genocide and to be considered a crime against humanity together with that of genocide.

This volume adopts a different approach, with an emphasis on the reconstruction of society following armed conflict rather than, as in the studies cited above, detailing the destruction or seizure of cultural heritage during it. It acknowledges the symbolic value placed by society on buildings and museums of national significance; but it also stresses the social and spiritual significance of much humbler places and objects, whose value is often a personal or familial one.

It is on this basis that it argues for the importance of cultural heritage in rebuilding society, while recognizing too that culture is itself transformed by conflict. As the anthropologist Valene Smith has written: ‘Wars are without equal as the time-markers of society. Lives are so irrevocably changed that culture and behavior are marked by three phases: “before the war”, “during the war”, and “after the war”’ (Smith, V. 1998). It is sobering to reflect how often these or similar phrases must be used around the world today.

## Armed conflict and the home

The experience of war is intimately connected with questions of displacement from the home and the land that goes with it. Some survivors of war are determined to reject their pre-war lives and long only for a new life elsewhere, for instance through voluntary emigration; others are forced to become refugees in other lands. But even the emigrants and refugees carry with them their culture, which sometimes flourishes more vibrantly in the diaspora than in the homeland (see Lee, this volume). Some may never wish to revisit the country that they fled, because of its association with the horrors of war; others find that even short return visits to see family members may produce mixed feelings and even resentment. In studying Australian immigrants, Read (1996: Chapter 2) found that many Jewish survivors of Nazi Europe had never returned to their homelands and had no desire to do so. Other immigrants who had fled wars in, for example, Croatia or Viet Nam, reported varying feelings of either longing for the homeland or rejecting it. (The data on refugees and their attitudes towards returning to their homeland have to be interpreted, of course, in the light of the political circumstances prevailing there.)

It is not only the house itself but also the land that goes with it that are vital to a people’s identity (the attention now paid to the concept of cultural landscapes acknowledges this intimate linkage). In predominantly agrarian societies, it is issues of land...
ownership that come immediately to the fore when people displaced by conflict attempt to return to their homes. In Mozambique, approximately six million [sic] small-scale farmers were displaced from agriculturally productive lands during the sixteen years of the most recent conflict. The return by these people to working the land has been on the largest scale ever known in Africa, a process complicated by competing claims to plots of land which have changed hands as a result of changing political regimes, and also by the presence of numerous landmines (Unruh 1998: 90).

Other experiences of return to the homeland were reported at the Forum. After twelve years of a bitter civil war, one-third of the 2.7 million refugees who had left El Salvador during the conflict have returned, 80% of them to their place of origin in the country. Remittances from the large numbers of emigrants had propped up the Salvadoran economy during the years of conflict. With the return of some 800,000 of them, new skills have been introduced to the local economy and culture is being revitalized (Sermeño, this volume).

The case of the Hmong people is different. A minority people within Laos, they found themselves divided and fighting on both sides in the war (Lee, this volume). Many of those who fought for the Royal Lao Government sought asylum in the West following their defeat in 1975. Lee reports that a few have found life in the diaspora so unappealing that they have returned to the Lao P.D.R., where they can lead a quieter life and continue cultural traditions which have been difficult to maintain in the West. Many others return annually to Lao communities in the Lao P.D.R. or in Thailand to celebrate the New Year. Cultural factors have been strong in influencing the preferred type of work (notably horticulture) and the environment in which to live outside the homeland; hence the choice by some emigrants of French Guyana and, among the Australian immigrants, of northern Queensland as places of tropical environment that reproduce the climatic conditions at home.

If due concern for cultural heritage is an essential ingredient for the post-conflict recovery of society, will not the experience of the victors be different from that of the vanquished? The answer nowadays is only hesitantly in the affirmative, mainly because of the changing nature of contemporary wars in which there may not even emerge a clear ‘victor’. The context in which force is used has changed. A former commander of the UN forces in Bosnia opens his analysis of conflict today with the following words: ‘War no longer exists. Confrontation, conflict and combat undoubtedly exist all around the world…and states still have armed forces which they use as a symbol of power. None the less, war as cognitively known to most non-combatants, war as battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a deciding event in a dispute in international affairs: such war no longer exists’ (Smith, R. 2006: 1).

Instead, characteristic of the second half of the twentieth century have been long-term armed conflicts whose origins lie in ethnic or religious differences, many of them in the form of civil wars rather than wars between nation-states. Some civil wars eventually become international in nature after spilling over borders to involve related ethnic communities living in neighbouring states. (The changing nature of war was one of the impulses towards revisiting the 1954 UNESCO Hague Convention, leading eventually to the Second Protocol of 1999; see p. 12 below and note 2.) Such internal, civil wars may eventually be concluded by Peace Accords. But typically, in a culturally diverse society, many of the issues — especially ethnic/religious ones — that contributed to the outbreak of war remain influential after ‘peace’ has been established. They may have played a major contributing role in starting the war, but they continue to do so in the recovery phase. Thus, ‘rather than war and peace, there is no predefined sequence, nor is peace necessarily either the starting or the end point’ (Smith, R. 2006: 17).

One example (and one less frequently cited) of a conflict that has been formally ended but in which ethnic/religious issues continue to prevail comes from the repression of the guerilla movement in Guatemala that finally was the object of peace accords signed in June, 1994. The twelve-volume UN-sponsored truth commission enquiry into the decades of internal conflict in Guatemala concluded: ‘The massacres, scorched earth operations, forced disappearances and executions of Maya authorities, leaders and spiritual guides were not only an attempt to destroy the social base of the guerillas, but above all, to destroy the cultural values that ensured cohesion and collective action in Mayan communities’ (UNOPS 1999, 23, quoted in Manz 2004: 4; emphasis added). If the cultural values of the Maya community in Guatemala (viewed by its Government as an internal enemy) could be a principal target for destruction, as the Commission concluded, then inevitably they must play a leading role in the recovery and reconstruction of society following the formal end of the conflict. In fact, the return of refugees to Guatemala has been characterized by a revitalization of traditional culture (Montejo 1999).

As already mentioned, one of the fundamental of human ties is to the house and to the land that goes with it. So strong is it that people will remain in their houses in even the most dangerous circumstances (to
the extent of being buried or burnt alive). Such is the bond with the family hearth and with everything that constitutes a people’s cultural heritage. This can be a powerful force in encouraging people to remain where they are during conflict. It is argued here that this is one of the strongest strands in the ‘thread of continuity’ that people seek in such situations.

If the home must be abandoned, what do people choose to carry with them when faced with forced flight under fire to an exile of unknown length? Few formal studies seem to have been done on this question. But a concern with maintaining identity as expressed in family memorabilia such as favourite personal possessions and photographs may not provide a full answer. The useful and practical may be as important as the personal souvenir. Barakat (this volume) refers to Palestinian refugees in neighbouring countries caring for house keys, even those to the door of the house from which they were first displaced as far back as 1947. Displaced people in the divided island of Cyprus have similar stories of keeping the key to their former home or having hidden it in a safe place for the day when they would return. After the crossing of the Green Line in Nicosia was made easier in April 2003, there were reports of Greek Cypriots who, returning for the first time to visit their houses, found their door keys where they had hidden them twenty-nine years earlier.

Barakat also describes Afghan refugees arriving in Pakistan: ‘If at all possible they bring livestock, as a means of economic survival, but also carpets as a form of portable wealth. In addition, multiple experience of displacement has taught them that wooden beams are difficult to replace and therefore they need to be salvaged for the new home in exile’. Such ‘portables’, as he points out, would not usually feature in an outsider’s assumptions as to what has cultural (and economic) value for the people concerned. Different considerations motivated some of the Moslems in Crete when forced to leave the island during the exchange of populations in the 1920s, who removed from their houses the distinctive kiosks (the projecting wooden enclosures around the upper windows) so as to avoid either leaving them behind or giving them to the Christians from Turkey due to take over their houses (Herzfeld 1991: 64).

A final example of the bond to the home is the personal experience reported here of recovering a family estate in the difficult conditions of East Germany following reunification in 1990 (von Pückler, this volume). Only a very strong impulse to reclaim what was a family’s inheritance forty-five years earlier can explain the author’s determination in the face of numerous obstacles and a dangerous environment. Its rationale lay not only in a keen personal desire for the restitution of a family property but in the important role, documented vividly in the family possessions, played by the von Pückler family in German and European history. It is also notable for underlining a point made earlier that it is the land that goes with the home (the estate) that contributes as much to von Pückler identity as the main house itself (which remains in public ownership as a museum) (Fig. 1).

These examples attest the popular desire to maintain a ‘thread of continuity’. They are on a different — and more human — scale compared with the continuity represented by such national symbols as religious monuments, museums and libraries. But it is the latter especially that have been vulnerable to being deliberately targeted in war, on the assumption that this would help shatter that thread of continuity.

**Deliberate cultural destruction**

In situations of armed conflict, buildings and places that are symbolic of the enemy’s cultural heritage are sometimes the target of deliberate attacks. The tacit goal in destroying symbolically important objects or places is to sap enemy morale. As a strategy it has a long record in the history of war (Ascherson, this volume; Bevan 2006). The UNESCO Declaration (2003) concerning the intentional destruction of cultural heritage has been developed in response to this phenomenon, as reflected in the bombardment of Dubrovnik in Croatia, the destruction of the Mostar Old Bridge in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the demolition of the statues of Buddha at Bamiyan in Afghanistan.

In most discussion of this phenomenon, the emphasis has been on the deliberate destruction of places of ‘high art’ — monuments of historical
and religious importance, libraries, and museums containing portable works of art — in other words, those places that are of high symbolic value and whose destruction is believed would cause the greatest despair. Ascherson draws a distinction — though without wishing to overstate it — between a collective identity which has been formed around such high art and a ‘social or anthropological identity, the living tissue of familiarities accumulated around language, custom and tradition through which a community recognises itself and in which it finds continuity — the culture of daily life, if you like.’

He argues that, despite its long history, there is very little evidence that the deliberate targeting of the collective, or community, identity as expressed in ‘national heritage’ has succeeded in its aim of diminishing enemy morale. In fact, it has tended to have the opposite effect. Perhaps, as discussion at the Forum proposed, ‘the real locus of lasting damage to identity through cultural destruction is not, in fact, the community. Instead, it is the inhabitants of the family house’. Or, as Bevan (2006: 76) has put it with regard to the effects of aerial bombing on civilian life in World War II, there is no evidence that demoralization led to defeatism nor affected the outcome of the war despite the devastation caused.

In all discussion of this highly charged topic, it is important to be sure that it was uniquely the cultural value of a place that was being targeted. Many of the cities in Britain and Germany that were subjected to aerial bombardment during the Second World War were targeted not primarily for their cultural symbolic value (Bevan 2006, citing Lambourne 2001), even if cultural destruction was widespread. On the other hand, it does seem to have been the outrage in Britain at the devastation caused to Dresden as a city of art that brought about a rethinking of the Allies’ policy of area bombing (Bevan 2006: 84). In other words, although this is a controversial question, it was the results of the area bombing policy (its ‘collateral damage’) that caused outrage, not a policy of deliberate cultural targeting.

Conversely, a policy of deliberate avoidance of damage to culturally important sites seems all the harder to maintain in the modern era of local conflicts with their multiple commands and militias. In fact, the adherence to all conventions governing conduct in war has diminished. Conspicuous by their rarity are statements nowadays such as that made by General Eisenhower when entering Italy with the US army in World War II, recognizing the cultural value of its heritage and the obligation to avoid destroying it so far as war allowed. On the contrary, cultural sites (in their broadest sense) have suffered from a diminished level of protection, as the improved means to identify and protect them have, paradoxically, sometimes turned them into targets.

Since the Second World War, the phenomenon has grown: the wars in the former Yugoslavia have provided ample examples. But the accusation of targeting for cultural reasons alone is still one that has to be proven. Many culturally important buildings have been used for military purposes — the Hague Convention and other international agreements notwithstanding — and thus attracted enemy fire. In West and Central Africa, museums, mosques and churches have been attacked while serving as military control points or as places of refuge for civilian populations; sacred forests are targeted under suspicion of sheltering the clandestine meetings of opposition forces (Diamitani, this volume; compare, however, Ascherson (this volume) on references in Classical literature to the deliberate felling of sacred groves in an attempt to shatter supernatural protection in times of war). Regrettably as it is, their destruction cannot be attributed solely to a deliberate targeting of cultural symbols.

Libraries and archive repositories have also been the object of accusations of deliberate destruction (Fig. 2). The record of destruction is indeed appalling (Van der Hoeven and van Albada 1996). Archives are especially crucial as the repositories of people’s identities (census data, landownership records, transactions, etc). As a result, they are often deliberately destroyed during a conflict as a means of undermining a people’s claims to land and thus the evidence of its historical presence in an area (Ascherson, this volume, gives the example of Georgians in Abkhazia). On the other hand, Magar (this volume) refers to their concern to protect the municipal historical archive when the Zapatistas took over control of the town of San Cristóbal de las Casas in Chiapas, so that land tenure records would remain safe.

In other cases, the degree of intentional destruction may be open to debate. The attack by the M-19 guerilla group on the Palace of Justice in Bogotá (Colombia) in 1985 resulted in not only the deaths of eleven judges of the Supreme Court but also the destruction of court records of extraditions for drug-related offences. An official enquiry suggested that this was one of the motives behind the attack.3

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3 This assertion will presumably be reviewed by the Truth Commission that has been created in 2005 by the Colombian Supreme Court on the twentieth anniversary of the siege, and that officially started work in November 2005. This and the following example from Bolivia may not meet all definitions of armed conflict but it is the vulnerability of archives in such armed confrontations that is being illustrated.
The violent riots that erupted in La Paz (Bolivia) in February 2003 were provoked by a proposed increase in income tax, and led to an armed confrontation between the police (joining the citizens’ strike against the tax) and the national army. In the ensuing clashes, more than thirty were killed and fire destroyed much of the archives and libraries of the Permanent Tribunal of Military Justice and of the former Ministry of Planning and Coordination. In addition, the Municipality of El Alto — on the outskirts of La Paz — was attacked and lost all of its records of twenty years’ work (Gómez Zubieta 2003).

In such cases, the degree of intentionality is uncertain. What is not in doubt is the central role that the loss of cultural heritage increasingly plays in armed conflicts. But, even granting this point, to what extent should cultural heritage be given priority attention in recovery, compared with what are generally considered to be the primary needs?

‘Culture must wait’

Many of those who work for humanitarian relief agencies recognize the important role that culture plays. However, for many others, attention to culture is not a priority in a post-conflict situation in the same way that health, food and housing are. So ‘culture must wait’.

Why is culture, and specifically cultural heritage, not a priority? What are the reasons for its being demoted to a support role, once primary needs have been met?

A number of reasons could be put forward. One is that cultural heritage, rather than being viewed as a positive force, is considered an obstacle to rebuilding. There is often a temptation in a disaster situation to start afresh with a tabula rasa, installing those modern facilities and administrative systems apparently best suited to a new situation. Existing but damaged stock is viewed negatively as outdated and an obstacle to progress (Fig. 3).

Another reason may be that it is difficult to quantify recovery in cultural terms. Compared with tabulating statistically the number of rehoused individuals or the number of medical cases treated, it is hard to document what are the immediate benefits of recovering cultural heritage.

Equally problematic may be the absence of qualified personnel in cultural heritage matters (see p. 13 below). In defence of cultural heritage specialists, this may be due to their presence not having been considered necessary by the authorities (‘culture must wait’). A shared view of the importance of cultural heritage cannot be assumed and usually has to be established.

Moreover, assessments of the priority needs in a post-conflict situation may differ widely. Within the cultural sphere, as pointed out above, refugees may select to carry with them items that would not have occurred to a government administrator as important. Yet they reflect the refugees’ view of priorities.

At all events, each situation is different; imported models and a standardized response to a set of ‘basic needs’ that takes little account of local realities may well not work. ‘Imported and externally-imposed models ignore the two most important basic needs for human recovery in the aftermath of conflict: to reaffirm a sense of identity and to regain control over one’s life’ (Barakat, this volume).
So a vision must be established as to what are priorities not only for food, health and housing, but also for re-establishing a spiritual adjustment to a new situation. In such circumstances, religion may well play an influential role. Attention to rituals, customs and the places where they are celebrated therefore assumes a considerable importance. For a population of several faiths, the establishment of a community centre may seem a good compromise solution that avoids assigning preference to any one faith (reflecting the international emphasis on multiculturalism and neutrality, as Barakat notes). But it underestimates the probable importance to the adherents of each faith of being able to continue practicing it in that sacred place with which they are familiar. Restoring that place (the temple/mosque/church or equivalent locale) to its original function would be preferable (e.g. the example of the mosque at Teunom in Aceh, quoted by Barakat, this volume).

Another reason why the role of cultural heritage is under-rated is the common experience of something being valued only after it has been lost or is threatened with destruction. To give expression to a concern for places and buildings rather than to people runs the risk of appearing callous. Suad Amiry recognizes this feeling when reacting emotionally to the news of the destruction of the historic soap-factories in Nablus rather than, initially, to the human toll that it had caused (Amiry 2005: 164–6). Wijesuriya (this volume) cites the study that analysed media reports on the bombing of the Temple of the Sacred Tooth, which concluded that it resulted in ‘unprecedented news coverage — greater even than bomb attacks with a much higher human or economic toll’.

Both Ascherson (this volume) and Bevan (2006: 26) cite the Croatian writer Slavenka Drakulić who, à propos the destruction of the Mostar bridge, asks — and tries to answer — the question: ‘why do we feel more pain looking at the image of the destroyed bridge than the image of massacred people?’ These are difficult questions (see Lambourne 2001: 5–6), but ones that cannot be ignored in the context of conflict and recovery.

Any adequate answer is likely to refer to the theme addressed earlier of the vital importance to people of the home and its landscape. An anthropologist who studied the same Greek Cypriot villagers before and after the war in Cyprus in 1974 that caused them to flee their homes writes: ‘ “homes” could not be replaced by “dwelling units”; the latter could provide shelter, but not the symbolic associations of the houses in Argaki…The refugees talked, obsessively I thought, about the things they had lost — the orchards, the houses, their contents — and rather less about any disruption of social relations…I was initially puzzled, because it seemed as if they valued “things” more than people’ (Loizos 1981: 200). The author goes on to clarify that what had changed was the key relationship between the people and the place (meaning not only the houses but also the lands that they had had to abandon, see pp. 2–4 above, emphasizing the home together with its land).

To stress the positive role of culture in recovery is not to deny that sometimes the cultural legacy of conflict can be negative or even undeserving of the priority that, rarely, it has been accorded.4 Divided cities are a case in point, in which culture has had a divisive effect rather than an integrating one. The experience of physical separation barriers, as found in divided cities such as Nicosia and Belfast, suggest that they are a symptom of severe social breakdown between communities and tend only to exacerbate prejudices in the long term (Calame, this volume). The construction of physical barriers, either to separate groups competing for the same land or to control immigration, has to be viewed as an ominous development whether it takes place in Palestine or along the USA–Mexico border, to cite two current examples (Fig. 4).

4 As an example of culture having been a debatable priority can be cited the hugely expensive, and controversial, reconstruction of the ancient site of Babylon undertaken by Iraq in the midst of its long war with Iran, and the ‘priority project’ of a monumental war memorial erected in Basrah immediately after the war ended (Barakat 1994: 107–8).
Constructed barriers may be effective in physically separating culturally different groups, but they are a sign of failure by most other criteria. Instead, mechanisms that comprehend culture and use it to promote understanding are needed. For mediating in conflict situations in West Africa, greater use of traditional customs (alliances and *parenté à plaisanterie* — good-natured teasing) has been proposed for the management and resolution of conflicts (Diamitani, this volume). The region provides an example relevant to museums everywhere for whom the representation of different groups in a multiethnic society has to be handled sensitively. In Côte d'Ivoire, the Museum of Civilizations in the capital, Abidjan, is contributing to postwar national reconciliation through promoting the exhibition of Islamic cultural heritage in museums. This new policy has come about in response to political claims as to the source of the civil conflict in the country (Zagbayou, this volume).

The case for integrating cultural heritage into the recovery process should be made on its own merits. But it goes without saying that there is a further argument in its favour on the basis of the economic opportunities made possible by postwar restoration projects (see Amiry and Bshara, and Sermeño, this volume). East Germany, following reunification, provides another example of restoration projects providing badly needed income-generation activities.

Arguing for the importance of cultural heritage in recovery is not to ignore that its nature is changed by war. Culture will take on new forms; but often it is actually strengthened post-conflict with the revival of forms and traditions that had previously been obsolescent.

### Revival of cultural traditions

Contrary to the view that ‘culture must wait’ in postwar recovery, there is ample evidence that a concern for culture and for cultural heritage is intricately associated with the earliest responses to the termination of armed conflict. This takes different forms, some of them personal as people seek solace in that which is familiar and cherished by them, and others official as the national authorities move quickly to re-establish visible symbols of national identity.

The revival of traditional but obsolescent cultural practices following a war (or following a natural disaster) is a well-known phenomenon. It can take the form of the revival of crafts, often with a return to the use of natural materials which had been in the process of replacement by synthetics. A common feature too is the revival of festivals and ceremonies that had been dying out. As noted above, craft practices and festivals may be transformed as a result of changed circumstances following the war; for instance, the arrival of new immigrant communities may lead to a blending of previously distinct traditions. Nevertheless, the revival of such cultural practices plays an important role in reaffirming identity in conditions of uncertainty and perhaps even of continuing danger.

Several examples are referred to in the papers in this volume. Lee’s account of the Hmong illustrates not only the strength of Hmong culture in the diaspora but also the new forms that it has taken on (for instance, in costume and music) when encountering other societies. Since the end of the conflict in Laos, it has thrived on adaptation and emerges the richer, rather than — as might have happened — becoming gradually absorbed as many Hmong people embrace modernity in their adopted countries of the West. At the same time there is a veritable industry of ‘recomposition’ of Hmong identity by means of the media (books, audio, video and the Internet) — but also through the traditional Hmong craft of embroidery.

Despite being minorities in all of the states in which they reside, they have nevertheless managed to create a dynamic and transnational...
culture and a common identity. A complicating factor in achieving this common identity, as Lee observes, is that Hmong identities are assigned to Hmong by others and not only by the Hmong themselves. Thus ‘in their modern settings, the Hmong are no longer just Hmong, but Lao Hmong, French Hmong, or Hmong Americans as those in the USA prefer to be known. The Hmong identity has become secondary in the face of external pressure.’ It is interesting to contrast this development with the reverse situation (due to different external incentives) described by Magar (this volume) in which the indigenous communities in Chiapas, Mexico, have tended to adopt a common ‘Maya’ identity, replacing their traditional separate identities (e.g. Tzotziles, Choles, Lacandones and so on).

A revival of traditional crafts and festivals has also been actively promoted in El Salvador following the end of twelve years of civil war, encouraged by the passage of new legislation for protection of the cultural heritage (Sermeño, this volume). Many of these had already died out or were in danger of dying out, for instance religious festivals held in villages which had been completely depopulated during the civil war. Private, non-governmental initiatives have also aimed at recovering Salvadoran culture: the Museo de la Palabra y la Imagen was founded at the end of the war in 1992 as a citizens’ initiative to promote truth and reconciliation, drawing upon the recent cultural history of El Salvador.5

For the restoration of the Temple of the Sacred Tooth in Sri Lanka, traditional crafts such as stone carving, which had almost died out in the country, were revitalised. In this case, this was due to the insistence of the monks of the temple community who refused to countenance the import from abroad either of craftsmen or of raw materials such as timber for the repair of the temple following its bombing (Wijesuriya 2000 and this volume). It seems undeniable that it is the experience of war, and the destruction and displacement that it causes, that stimulates the kind of cultural revival described here. Other events (and especially natural disasters such as earthquakes) can have similar effects; they all testify to a similar phenomenon at work. To what extent, though, is it a spontaneous response by people in a time of crisis or the result of national policies developed with broader objectives?

Both factors are at work, though the speed with which traditional forms of cultural behaviour re-appear seems to confirm the validity of the first hypothesis (the spontaneous popular response).

Loizos (1981: 210–11) has described well the relationship between the two. Referring to the two years following the war of 1974 in Cyprus, he remarks on the one hand on the major exhibitions of refugee poetry, of paintings by refugee children and on the number of books being written about every aspect of the war; and, on the other hand, on the encouragement by schoolteachers and the insistence on refugee themes in the mass media. But, he continues, ‘these emphases were from the heart, and not the results of more self-conscious and manipulative cultural commissars, who, although they may have approved, could not have succeeded in stimulating what was not, in an important sense, already there’ (emphasis added).

Similar observations could be made on the role of museums and other cultural institutions in the immediate post-conflict phase. Many would argue that they have a key role to play in promoting reconciliation between former combatants (Zagbayou, this volume; also Manzambi Vuvu 2003). This may take the form of promoting exhibitions that emphasize the common cultural heritage, perhaps choosing a theme in archaeology or history that predates the emergence of cultural differences that underlie the conflict. Tackling head-on the issues of the recently concluded conflict is a much braver strategy and one more in line with what many would describe as the museum’s obligation to be engaged with contemporary issues.

Counter to this spirit is the commemoration of military victory in the form of war museums which so often involve the demonization of the former enemy. The result is the opposite of reconciliation. The growing interest in peace museums, sites of conscience and projects such as the Garden of Forgiveness proposed for the centre of Beirut is a promising counterweight to the predominance of war museums. Memories of war both positive and negative deserve to be commemorated, but museums have an obligation to strike a balance between competing versions of history. The ICOM Code of Ethics stated that ‘the museum should seek to ensure that information in displays and exhibitions is honest and objective and does not perpetuate myths or stereotypes’ (ICOM Code of Professional Ethics, adopted 1986, paragraph 2.8).6

As confirmation of a widespread concern to protect cultural heritage during and following armed conflict, one need only mention the devotion of curators to ensuring the safety of collections, often at great personal risk. Anecdotes abound, whether


6 The recently revised edition (ICOM 2006), under the title ICOM code of ethics for museums, does not use this phraseology while retaining the principle.
they concern museums or libraries and archives, and whether they are located in Sarajevo or Grozny, Baghdad or Beirut. Similar experiences of professionals protecting historic buildings while under fire are also well documented (see p. 14 below). In the recovery phase, the restoration of damaged buildings — and the restitution of stolen collections — receive attention sooner or later. Since these are often the only contexts in which armed conflict and cultural heritage are linked in the popular mind, they deserve a separate section.

Building restoration and restitution of collections

As noted above (p. 2), the contribution of cultural heritage in post-conflict situations is more pervasive than the restoration of war-damaged buildings or the restitution of stolen objects. But both these actions can be components of recovery and have the potential to bring about reconciliation if concerned with heritage that is truly felt to be held in common. If not, they can exacerbate rivalries and build up resentments that can last forever (or certainly until the next outbreak of war).

Both topics (the restoration of war-damaged buildings and the restitution of stolen collections) have been much studied (see references cited on p. 2 and their bibliographies). The point to be made here is the rapidity with which the determination to rebuild (or to claim restitution) is made apparent and the time it takes to realize. Even though the needs of shelter, food and health are pressing, there is also often an immediate recognition of the value of cultural heritage that has been lost and a strong desire to regain it.

Hence the emotional response and immediate calls to rebuild the cultural jewels of cities destroyed in World War II. To take only three examples, all of them reflecting genuinely popular campaigns:

- Warsaw, where, in the same year that the war ended (1945), the newly created Office for Reconstruction organized an exhibition with the National Museum on the reconstruction of the Old Town, arguing that ‘living symbols without which a nation cannot exist must be rebuilt’ (quoted in Ascherson, this volume);
- Coventry, in the English Midlands, where it was decided to rebuild the mediaeval cathedral the morning after its destruction in 1940, an undertaking that led not only to an inspired architectural solution but also to the Cathedral’s Ministry for Peace and Reconciliation that is active in areas of conflict throughout the world (Fig. 5); and
- Dresden, whose citizens wished immediately to rebuild their Frauenkirche destroyed in 1945 but, when stymied by lack of funds and political opposition until after the reunification of Germany, made the bombed church a focus of popular protest against the communist regime and ultimately, like Coventry Cathedral, a symbol of reconciliation with former enemies.

In Warsaw a ‘Program and principles for the conservation of our cultural heritage’ was announced in 1946: ‘not accepting that our cultural monuments should be wrested away from us, we will erect them, reconstruct them in order to relay for future generations at least their form, alive in our memories and records, even if it is not authentic’ (Professor J. Zachwatowicz, quoted in Barański 1994: 48). In post-World War II West Germany, a similar search for identity led to citizens playing a fundamental role in influencing policies of how and what to rebuild (Diefendorf 1996: 10–11). Diefendorf gives the example of churches being ‘reconstructed in parishes even where the number of parishioners was inadequate to support them because they served as cultural identity markers’.

The ability of reconstruction projects to promote the idea of reconciliation is put to the test in multicultural societies emerging from civil war. Whose heritage is to be preserved? Only the victor’s? And who is to choose — the national authorities alone or with the mediation of international parties? The latter will promote the interests of reconciliation.
(working against pressures that may possibly result in partition (see pp. 7-8 above on divided cities)), and advocate an even-handed approach to what should be viewed as a shared heritage. But this is easier said than done and requires agreement by all parties. Thus, in post-conflict Kosovo, restoration efforts undertaken under international and bilateral agreements aim to strike a precise numerical balance between Christian and Moslem monuments (together with several important secular buildings), all within a context of changing population ratios, an overall desire to promote reconciliation between the communities, and the attendant publicity emitted by all parties involved.

A different, and lower-key, approach has been followed in Cyprus, still divided after more than thirty years. From the earliest years of partition, there has been ample evidence of the destruction of cultural heritage. On the positive side, since 1981 there has been functioning a bicomunal Nicosia Master Plan team to coordinate essential services in the city; and now for several years a Bi-Communal Development Programme (funded mainly by UNDP and USAID) has been fostering joint projects between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in which they have a common interest (such as a bi-communal sewer system). In the cultural sphere, the projects have included the renovation of historic quarters on both sides of the Green Line in Nicosia, as recommended by the Master Plan team (Fig. 6); a survey of the dilapidated

buildings in the buffer zone that separates the two communities in Nicosia; and the restoration of a well-known Moslem mosque (the Hala Sultan Tekke) in the south and the Orthodox Apostolos Andreas Monastery in the northeast of the island.7

Amiry and Bshara (this volume) refer to a similar example in Israel/the Palestinian Territories of the restoration of buildings belonging to the ‘Other’s’ cultural heritage. In another divided country, that of Korea, the reconstruction of the Buddhist Shingyasa Temple which was destroyed by American bombing during the war of the 1950s is viewed as a cultural contribution to eventual reunification that complements the political and economic approaches. The temple lies in the tourist development enclave in the Kumgang mountains of North Korea (where religion is officially banned). Its reconstruction is a joint project of the Ministry of Unification in Seoul and the Jogye order, South Korea’s largest Zen Buddhism sect (Fifield 2005).

It is striking that all the restoration projects cited here have been completed only many years after the end of the hostilities that caused their destruction. The restoration after a conflict of damaged buildings of symbolic importance cannot be rushed, and must be seen as part of a long-term development process in which the actual restoration work forms part of a much broader reconciliation strategy (Barakat, this volume). Successful restoration projects do not themselves mean that reconciliation has been achieved, as the Cyprus case demonstrates; but they can be important confidence-building measures, and indicators of progress having been achieved towards that reconciliation.

The restitution of collections seized from museums, libraries and archives during armed conflict can also be a long drawn-out process, as the recently revived interest in the restitution of works of art looted during the Nazi era testifies. Only in 1997 did Shevadnadze, as President of Georgia, voluntarily return to Germany 20,000 volumes of books which the Russians had removed during World War II (von Puckler, this volume). On the other hand, thanks to UN mediation, the collections of the Kuwait National Museum and the Dar al-Athar al-Islamiyya were returned to Kuwait within little more than one year after the Iraqi invasion and the transport of their collections to Iraq (Norman 1997). The renovation and re-opening of the two damaged museums has taken much longer, however.

To repeat, both restoration and restitution can contribute substantially to healing the wounds of


**FIGURE 6** Renovation of streets and facades, Arabahmet Quarter, Nicosia. Far end of the street is blocked by the Green Line dividing the city. Photo 2005.
war but they are processes that take time and that must be integrated with larger social reconstruction projects. Notable is the emphasis placed on the restoration of religious buildings (and the restitution of museum objects valued with a near-religious intensity), testifying once again to the key role played by religion in many societies in recovering from war.

The role of the professionals

‘If only they could see!’ Thus did Albert Einstein encourage all students in the world to visit the war-devastated ruins of the Dormans region of France during his tour of them four years after the end of World War I (Roth 1997). Einstein’s reaction was similar to the emotion that underlies the widespread urge to preserve untouched war-damaged buildings to serve as a moral admonition. In other words, the visible effects of destruction should act to remind us of the horrors of war (while serving also as memorials to the dead). Some sites have been preserved untouched. For more than forty years, the ruins of the Frauenkirche in Dresden (see above, p. 10) played this role quite dramatically. But in the end the even stronger popular desire to see the church rebuilt has prevailed (Fig. 7).

How effective have been the exhortations of Einstein and other intellectuals to learn from the experience of war devastation? It is undeniable that they have been more concerned with promoting the ideals of Ascherson’s ‘collective’ or ‘community’ identity than his ‘social’ identity (see p. 5 above and Ascherson, this volume). The record of international normative instruments concerning war is a long one. The international conventions prescribing a respect for rules in war and for those caught up in it have contributed substantially to the evolution of an international humanitarian law. UNESCO, as the heir de facto of the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation, was founded in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War; not surprisingly, the ideals of ‘peace’ featured prominently in its founding philosophy and continued to influence many of its programmes and statements (Hoggart 1978: 26–7 and passim).

Appropriately enough, cultural property received attention early in UNESCO’s work because of the destruction caused by World War II, and became the object of its first specialized convention (the 1954 UNESCO Hague Convention). The Second Protocol (1999) to that convention has now supplemented it in taking account of developments in warfare since the post-World War II period, especially the type of ethnic conflict that erupted in the former Yugoslavia (Chamberlain 2004). Both the Second Protocol and UNESCO’s Declaration (2003) address the intentional destruction of cultural heritage.

Another significant development at the intergovernmental level has been the precedent established by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in 2001 in including offences against cultural property among the possible indictments for war crimes. The tribunal — and the Statutes of the International Criminal Court — can bring charges under the 1954 Hague Convention and the additional Protocols of the Geneva Convention referring to cultural property. Continuing the tradition of peace treaties that include attention to cultural property, the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995 demanded the protection of the cultural heritage of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Culture and cultural property have also received steadily more attention from the International Committee of the Red Cross, which devoted a special issue of its newsletter to celebrating 50 years of the Hague Convention (International Committee of the Red Cross 2004). In the meantime, the International Committee of the Blue Shield (ICBS) was founded in 1996, the Blue Shield being considered...
the cultural equivalent of the Red Cross. The ICBS brings together four international NGOs in order to coordinate better their response to crisis situations affecting cultural property. The Second Protocol of the Hague Convention assigns an important role to the ICBS in advising the Intergovernmental Committee for Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. Loosely affiliated with the International Committee, a growing number of national committees are active in risk preparedness, of which armed conflict is one aspect.

The year 1996 in which the ICBS was founded was notable also for the launch of the political initiative known as the Ottawa Process that resulted in the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (sometimes referred to as the Ottawa Convention). As mentioned earlier with respect to the postwar reoccupation of land, unexploded landmines often represent a major threat to agriculturalists; their presence also tends to delay the abolition of zones of ‘no man’s land’ in divided cities. In March 1999, the Treaty became binding under international law, the process having been quicker than that for any other treaty of its kind. As of March, 2006, 150 states had ratified or acceded to it, a rate of success to be envied by the ICBS which cannot demonstrate a similar achievement.

National legislations have generally to be in conformity with the principles of such intergovernmental agreements before states can accede to or ratify them. Indeed, the impact of war, both in destroying cultural heritage but also in often stimulating a revival of traditional crafts and customs, can actually lead to the introduction of new national legislation for its protection and promotion. Thus, in El Salvador in 1993, the year after the end of the twelve-year civil conflict, the Assembly for Legislation approved a Special Law for Cultural Heritage Protection of El Salvador. A pioneer in this respect was the 1950 Law for the Protection of Cultural Properties in Japan, a Law that has since proved a model for other countries, especially for its attention to the intangible cultural heritage. Approved in 1950, Japan’s experience of the Second World War must have helped to catalyse its preparation (though the disastrous fire in the Horyu-ji Temple at Nara in January, 1949, has also been cited in this connection). Sekino (1992: 48) explicitly makes the connection between the postwar social and economic changes in Japan, the shortage of traditional technicians and experts and the passage of the new Law. The disappearance abroad after the war of Japanese movable national heritage was another significant argument for tighter legislation.

The developments described so far are mainly concerned with the protection of what has been recognized to constitute national heritage or even, exceptionally, world heritage. They contribute to the protection from armed conflict of culture deemed to be of national and symbolic importance, even though this sometimes entails several paradoxes (Gamboni 2001). But how well integrated is the recovery of cultural heritage in overall postwar reconstruction theory and practice?

The ICCROM Forum discussion was self-critical in this respect. One participant experienced in reconstruction work identified a number of recurring deficiencies within international policy and implementation that have limited the effective integration of cultural heritage in post-conflict work (Barakat, this volume). Another argued that, especially for working in highly contentious and polarized situations, most professionals in the built environment — including conservators — do not have the necessary training in negotiation skills and social analysis, nor an ability to work under extreme conditions (Calame, this volume).

I suspect that most cultural heritage professionals would readily agree that they have not received such training. Thirty years ago, anthropologists would have maintained a similar stance. Loizos (1981: 195) noted then that, with some honourable exceptions, they tended to ignore war, almost as if they assumed the normality of peace and the abnormality of war. That situation has changed (though note the criticisms by Manz (2004: 6–9) of anthropological work in Guatemala that is not morally engaged). Cultural heritage specialists might also refer to the argument often made to them that, in times of armed conflict, ‘culture must wait’ (an argument countered in pp. 6–7 above). Moreover, the official institutions responsible for culture may wish to avoid giving attention to a war-affected minority ethnic group if national policy recognizes only a single national identity (see Magar, this volume).

This self-criticism, while constructive, must however be kept in perspective. Ten years ago, museum conservators were challenged in a similar way, under the deliberately provocative title: ‘War and the conservator: are we doing enough?’ (Stanley Price

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8 The four international NGOs are the ICA (International Council on Archives); ICOM (International Council of Museums); ICOMOS (International Council on Monuments and Sites); and IFLA (International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions). In addition, UNESCO has a working relationship and ICCROM has consultative status with the ICBS. See <http://icom.museum/emergency.html> (accessed 1 November 2006).

The experiences reported on that occasion from Beirut (Skaf 1997) and Kuwait (Norman 1997) could now be added to, not necessarily in published form (though see Gerhard 1999) but with unsung accounts of conservators and curators (see p. 10 above) who have been equal to the task in situations of post-conflict recovery.

In fact, many specialists in cultural heritage, both built heritage and movable collections, have shown the needed skills even if never formally taught them. While much has been lost, there is also much of what has been deemed to national heritage that has been kept from harm, thanks to the prior planning and dedication on the part of cultural heritage professionals (Fig. 8). Frequently, it is not the ‘world heritage’ sites nor the outstanding museum exhibits that are the beneficiaries of this care, but the mass collections — and I include those of libraries and archives — that are as much a part of the nation’s memory. It is especially with such collections that preventive measures can be taken in advance, and negotiations for their protection conducted discreetly between parties, avoiding the public controversies that frequently attend the fate of the highly publicized heritage that is the object of media attention.

Discreet negotiation over contested heritage between the parties concerned is, in the end, more conducive to eventual reconciliation than are attempts to moderate between polarized positions in the full glare of publicity. Many examples of the quietly negotiated restitution of objects between museums attest to this. Moreover, such negotiations acknowledge that, more often than not, the culture of everyday life is of no less concern to most people than the culture represented by places or objects that have been elevated into national symbols. Or, put another way, Ascherson’s social identity weighs as much as, if not more than, his community or collective identity in times of conflict.

Conclusion

This latter assertion is a conclusion that is open to further debate, but the aim of the papers published here is to help stimulate it. In particular, they aim to report experiences that reflect values based on a cultural heritage that is much humbler but no less important than the one epitomized by national icons. In the process of recovery from armed conflict, it may well be, as Calame writes in concluding his paper (this volume), that ‘success is measured in incremental improvements to psychological well-being rather than in the restitution of contested symbols’. A successful restitution of symbols may well eventually contribute to that feeling of wellbeing but, as noted above, it can be a long drawn-out process. Re-establishing the thread of continuity in people’s daily lives should also be a priority goal in the recovery from war and in helping to bring about the ultimate objective of reconciliation between those who have been at war with each other.

Biography

Nicholas Stanley-Price has held positions at ICCROM (1982–6) and the Getty Conservation Institute in Los Angeles (1987–95), specializing in archaeological conservation and professional education. After two years at the Institute of Archaeology at University College London where he introduced a new MA programme in site conservation and management, he returned to ICCROM as Director-General (2000–5).

10 The occasion for the debate under this title was a Plenary Session of the Triennial Meeting of the ICOM Committee for Conservation, held in Edinburgh, UK, in 1996.

11 After completion of this essay, I find many of its themes have been recently addressed, in a provocative and humane way, by Jan Pronk (2006), at the time Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN in Sudan.
He is the founder and editor-in-chief of the quarterly journal Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites published in association with ICCROM. He is now an advisor on cultural heritage preservation.

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Acknowledgments

This chapter has benefited from the bibliography prepared by Jennifer Copithorne for the Forum and from comments on an earlier draft by Rosalia Varoli Piazza, Gamini Wijesuriya and two anonymous referees; responsibility for the opinions expressed remains my own and not ICCROM’s.

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War can damage two different, though related, types of identity: a social identity belonging to people within their community, and a collective or group identity which has been constructed around "high art", considered to constitute a national heritage. There is a long history of the monuments or objects that constitute collective identities being deliberately targeted in times of war. A review of cases of the deliberate destruction of culturally important places up to and including the Second World War finds little evidence of it successfully undermining a particular collective identity, which in fact seems strongly resistant to such assaults. On the other hand, the physical reconstruction of destroyed buildings in the postconflict period has been one response to assaults on collective identities by deliberate targeting.

Cultural destruction by war and its impact on group identities

‘Ein helles Licht ist erloschen’ (‘a bright light has been put out’)

(GERHART HAUPTMANN, ON HEARING OF THE DESTRUCTION OF DRESDEN IN 1945)

To begin with, I need to explain the target of this paper. The topic suggested to me was 'the effects of armed conflict on cultural identity in Europe in the twentieth century'. This opens an inviting door to digression which I must at once shut. If I were to examine what armed conflict, or the whole experience of war, has done to European self-awareness, continental, national and local, I would be writing a very long book. So I have narrowed the subject to certain aspects of cultural destruction brought about by war: the interpretations put on that destruction by combatants and victims, and its impact on the self-understanding of nations and communities.

My second prefatory remark, meant to clear the ground a little further, is to suggest that war—through its destructions and also through its removals of portable items of culture—can damage two different, though not entirely distinct, forms of cultural identity. One form is social or anthropological identity, the living tissue of familiarities accumulated around language, custom and tradition through which a community recognises itself and in which it finds continuity—the culture of daily life, if you like. The second form is the collective identity which has been constructed and often unquestioningly accepted around objects of so-called high art—our cathedrals or mosques, our monuments, libraries, portable antiquities, famous paintings and so forth.

These two forms are not, I repeat, entirely distinct. The artificial and recent concept of national heritage can overlap with daily-life awareness of community, but much less often and less effectively than ruling elites would wish. At the extreme, there have always been suggestions, some prescient and some in hindsight, that deliberate cultural destruction and collective physical extermination may go together—the first at once a warning and an initial phase of the second. Heinrich Heine prophesied a hundred years before the Holocaust that ‘wherever
books are burned, men too are burned in the end’ (Heine 1821: line 2245). Robert Bevan writes of the fatally intertwined experience of genocide and cultural genocide (Bevan 2005: 11). This is a tempting hypothesis, but nothing like a universal law. For the purposes of this paper, I want to maintain the distinction between the two categories of cultural identity.

**Collective identity and deliberate destruction in war**

The second form of cultural identity, rallied round the flag of high art, obviously relates to the construction of modern nationalism, the deliberate building of imagined community (Anderson 1983: 15) which reached its peak in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The mobilization or conscription of selected artefacts (architectural, monumental or portable) as symbols of collective identity is an activity associated with the modern nation-state. But in reality it is far older, in the same way that the notion of nationalism as a phenomenon which only emerges with the social upheavals of modernisation ignores the existence of what has been uneasily termed ‘primordial nationalism’ throughout the recorded past (Kellas 1991: 34–5). It would be very wrong to assume that the conscious use of monuments and relics as popular mobilizers dates back only to the nineteenth century, and to the final stages of nation-state development. The story that really concerns us here—the story of how such objects have been used in times of war either to create and enhance bonds of collective identity or to dissolve those bonds of identity through their destruction or removal—is a very old one indeed.

The Old Testament has many references to the almost routine connection made between conquest and the destruction of enemy cult objects (Exodus 23, 23–4, for example, on the commandment to overthrow the images worshipped by Amorites, Hittites, Perizalites, Canaanites, Hivites and Jebusites, following the decision of Jehovah to cut them off through military defeat by the children of Israel). Classical literature, from accounts of the fall of Troy onwards, abound with instances in which war is accompanied by cultural destruction intended to undermine enemy morale and cohesion. This could take the form of attempting to shatter supernatural protection, as by the felling of sacred groves. It could also involve attacking objects which symbolised or personified political identity, as when Xerxes removed from Athens the statues of the tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogeiton (they were recaptured in Persia and returned by Alexander in 323 BC (Arrian 1976: 174)). The destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem by Titus in 70 AD had both aspects.

Another aspect of these early campaigns against enemy culture concerned legitimacy—the theory that the loss of certain key ritual objects or sites would undermine political authority. This theory was to become prominent in the European middle ages. In Britain, it was put into practice by Edward I, king of England, during his campaigns at the end of the thirteenth century to subdue and assimilate Wales and Scotland. In Wales in 1284, he seized the so-called Crown of King Arthur and the coronet of his dead adversary Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, and presented them to the shrine of St Edward the Confessor in Westminster. He kept for himself the Cross of Destiny, supposed to be a portion of the true cross, which had been the awesome heirloom of the royal family of Gwynedd for many generations.

The removal of the regalia and the cross were overtly political measures. Even more political was his decision in 1296 to capture and remove to Westminster the Stone of Scone or of Destiny, the slab of sandstone on which the kings of Scotland were inaugurated. Without the Stone, he reasoned, no future Scottish king could claim lawful authority or kingship over Scottish subjects (Barrow 2003: 200–1). Compare Ireland in 1602, in the aftermath of Hugh O’Neill’s failed rebellion, when Lord Deputy Mountjoy, the English commander, smashed to pieces the inaugural stone of the O’Neill’s at Tulach Og in Ulster (Fitzpatrick 2003: 111). Yet another example is offered by the adventures and travels in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of the Hungarian so-called Crown of St Stephen, without whose presence in the country—so Hungarian patriots claimed to believe—no Hungarian regime has authenticity (Lendvai 2003: 232).

Cultural destruction intended to undermine political authority occurred throughout the nineteenth century colonial empires, and during the onslaught of European settlers against indigenous populations. In West Africa, British punitive military expeditions often ended with the burning or removal of cultural artefacts forming the equipment of traditional authority, especially the stools (thrones) of local rulers. Often enough—as in the case of Benin City in 1897—colonial war ended in the plundering of almost all movable artefacts, but this generally belongs to the category of greed-driven looting rather than to that of either planned cultural destruction or unplanned so-called collateral war damage.
Many of these objects ended up in the ethnological galleries of museums in Europe or North America. These museums became in effect hostage-cages, incarcerating a strange assortment of objects originally removed in order to dilute an indigenous sense of identity during the early colonial period. There these objects were presented to the public initially as something close to trophies, a status later adjusted to that of scientific specimens. Such, for instance, was the fate of the genitals of one of the Kabakas of Buganda, removed—probably on political grounds by a member of the British protectorate administration—from the royal tombs at Kasubi and for many years displayed in a glass case in the Downing Street Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology at Cambridge. They were discreetly returned to Uganda in the 1970s (personal communication from the Museum staff). Today, as we all know, the ‘trophy’ label for such objects is unthinkable, while the ‘scientific’ label has in many cases peeled away and become unconvincing. Indigenous demands for the return of body parts or skeletal remains do not usually meet with determined resistance.

The destruction of high culture in twentieth-century warfare

In early twentieth-century Europe, as it slid towards two catastrophic general wars and a series of smaller but equally savage conflicts, the identification of a nation with the official inventory of its own high culture had reached its peak of conviction. The term ‘civilization’ was sometimes used in a broad, supranational sense, as in ‘Western Christian Civilization’. More often, it was held to imply a national set of attributes: sometimes an abstract standard of ethics and behaviour, sometimes that concrete inventory of art achievements. (The second usage is the ancestor of the more nationalistic and authoritarian term ‘heritage’). Inevitably, and especially in France, the word ‘civilization’ became at first competitive and then exclusive—a technique for identifying ‘otherness’. If France has civilization, then what other nations have must be barbarity—admittedly, in varying degrees.

This mobilization of cultural objects into symbolic components of national identity first became noticeable during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. The Prussians bombarded Strasbourg, several times (but almost certainly without intention) hitting the cathedral and their artillery also destroyed a museum. The French proclaimed that Germans were barbarians; Latin civilization might be militarily inferior, but it was culturally superior. A French editor wrote: ‘This is the way the sons of noble and philosophical Germany, in the grip of an uncontrol-

able frenzy, carry out the promise, made solemnly and before the whole of Europe on their entry into Alsace, to respect religion, humanity and civilization’ (quoted in Lambourne 2001: 14).

Soon the image of the German soldier as a Teutonic subhuman, lusting to loot and burn churches in villes martyres, became international. But there were two other developments, both still operating in our own day. First, as Nicola Lambourne has written, ‘a change in the status of this particular effect of conflict had occurred. This aspect of war [i.e. cultural destruction] was established as something worth commenting on’ (Lambourne 2001: 17). Secondly, cultural destruction in war, once taken with a shrug, was elevated to a crime, or at least a sin. ‘There is a commonly held assumption that it is contrary to military concepts of honour or, more generally, morally wrong to mistreat works of art and architecture during a military conflict …’ (Lambourne 2001: 6). The Brussels Declaration of 1876 called for the protection of historic monuments from wilful damage, while the Hague International Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 established rules for the protection of cultural property in times of war.

The First World War renewed and amplified the propaganda attitudes invented in 1870. In Western Europe, the damage to cultural objects was relatively local. Reims cathedral for example, which found itself on the front line, was heavily damaged (Fig. 9), and the magnificent library at Louvain was burned out in 1914. Once again but far more loudly, the French and Belgian victims exploited the destruction for highly successful propaganda against the ‘barbaric Huns’. The Germans, their own reinvented cultural identity founded on definitions of superior German civilization, were acutely embarrassed. They claimed that the French had deliberately put the front line near Reims, that Louvain had been an accident (which is possible), and that they had taken trouble to protect monuments in occupied areas (which appears to be partly true).

The discourse of the victim nation whose cultural monuments had suffered was now firmly couched in these ‘civilization versus barbarism’ terms. But the truth was that, up to and during the First World War, no major European Power had set out deliberately to target monuments of the past or lieux de mémoire as a way of cracking enemy morale. (As an exception to prove the rule, Austrian aircraft bombed the historic centre of Venice during the First World War—an often forgotten episode—and hit several irreplaceable
Deliberate destruction in the Second World War

The Second World War and its prelude changed this pattern. It may help to reiterate those two forms of cultural identity. The first is primary: social cohesion as a daily-life community bonded by living language and custom. The second is a construct: the promotion of national unity by labelling treasured objects as a common national heritage or ‘our civilization’.

The 1939–45 war produced an onslaught on both forms of identity. It brought the deliberate obliteration of a variety of ethnic groups through expulsion, cultural suppression and genocide. At the same time, the combatants exploited the fate of scheduled objects to further the purposes of war. The Germans did so in Poland and the Soviet Union by deliberate destruction of the enemy’s high-cultural inventory—a sharp contrast to their behaviour in France, Greece or post-fascist Italy. Much more often, however, the combatants on both sides dramatized the fate of their own monuments or art objects in order to encourage resistance to the barbarous enemy.

The idea that progress could demand the elimination of particular cultures or populations belonged to the ideologies of Stalin and Hitler. But its ancestors included the doctrine of racial homogeneity as precondition for a strong nation, a nineteenth century idea formulated by political thinkers like Roman Dmowski in Poland and first put into practice by the Kemalist regime in Turkey.

The Ottoman Empire set terrible precedents by annihilating its Armenian minority after 1915. The Kemalist Turkish state which succeeded the Ottomans pushed the doctrine of ethnic homogeneity further towards the goal of a ‘Turkey for the Turks’ by expelling the Pontic Greek population in 1923—the first great population transfer, or ethnic cleansing. Hitler was to copy the first measure—‘who now remembers the Armenians?’ The second method—removing cultural identity by expulsion and deportation—was subsequently copied by Stalin, Hitler, Churchill and—most recently in the Balkans—by Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic. It is striking, all the same, that the Turks did not carry through a comprehensive campaign of destruction against Armenian or Greek objects of culture. There were many demolitions of churches, but on the whole Christian buildings were either adapted to Moslem use or left to decay.

As far as material culture is concerned, the Second World War in Europe caused devastation on a scale never imagined before. Popular identification with objects of national high culture may well have peaked during the 1914–18 war, and declined in the less deferential climate of the 1930s. None the less, combatant governments revived earlier themes of wartime cultural propaganda in both Germany and Britain. As before, this propaganda was overwhelmingly from the victim side—from the governments whose cities were being bombed. St Paul’s in London (that dome rising out of the smoke) and Cologne Cathedral were both made to personify nations sorely wounded by barbarians but determined to fight on until victory.

Once more, combatants accused each other of deliberately targeting objects of culture and civilization. But once more the evidence that military commanders or their civilian masters did so is extremely sparse, at least in western Europe. Hermann Goering, perhaps mindful of the German public-relations disaster in the previous war, took pains to preserve historic buildings and objects during the 1940 campaign in France. More vaguely, commanders sometimes issued directives that cultural places should be treated with respect, or that cities such as Rome or Paris should as far as possible not be bombarded. At the level of ordinary soldiers, of course, plenty of deliberate destruction did take place. There was the American tank gunner who

FIGURE 9 The Cathedral of Notre-Dame de Reims in France after being shelled, October 1918.
decided to shoot away the colossal statue of Kaiser Wilhelm I above the Rhine-Mosel confluence at Koblenz. What were his thoughts, as he altered the silhouette of a whole city? Probably unpolitical.

A borderline case, for many people, is the Allied—and especially British—area bombing offensive against German cities. From the crushing attack on Lübeck in 1942 to the apocalypse at Dresden in February 1945, the night squadrons took out countless majestic and ancient buildings and works of art, as well as taking tens of thousands of civilian lives. The Lübeck raid planners, some historians consider, may have consciously chosen a city for its cultural as well as for its strategic importance. If so, they opened the first Western breach in the somewhat unreal rules of engagement accepted by the main belligerents in 1939 (rules which had been entirely ignored by the Germans during the September 1939 campaign against Poland, especially during the bombing of central Warsaw). At all events, the Nazis, preferring to dwell on cultural rather than human loss, at once proclaimed that historic architecture was being deliberately targeted, and propaganda referred to ‘England’s assassination of European culture’. Goebbels described the American aircrews as ‘upstarts from another continent who turn against their old ancestor because he is richer in soul and spirit...’ (quoted in Lambourne 2001: 106).

There is no evidence to show that Air Marshal Harris, in command of the British air offensive, seriously thought that the loss of monuments and heritage would crack German public morale. Instead, he believed that the devastation of city centres and residential areas by firestorms would eventually break German civilian will to go on supporting the war. As Nicola Lambourne writes, ‘In the absence of a positive stated Allied policy of bombarding buildings of historic and cultural importance in Germany, the strongest impression given is more that of a lack of interest in avoiding them on the part of air forces and governments...’ (Lambourne 2001: 163). Meanwhile the British, much like the Germans in 1914–18, promoted tales of how some famous buildings—Cologne Cathedral, above all—had been carefully spared by skilled RAF bomb-aimers. (In the 1960s, I came to know one of those airmen, who insisted that he had aimed at the Cathedral on every raid but—to his rage—had always missed).

On the other hand, it is fairly clear that the Nazi leadership did believe in the morale-shattering effects of cultural destruction. The raid by German bombers on Gernika during the Spanish Civil War may have been one example; the so-called Baedeker raids on venerable English cathedral cities in April 1942, announced as vengeance for the destruction of Lübeck and Rostock, were another. But it was in the German treatment of Poland, a state and people destined for extermination by Hitler, that the deliberate use of cultural destruction to disintegrate identity—alongside the methods of expulsion and mass killing—reached its extreme. Warsaw, the capital, suffered two main blows. A massive 1939 air raid completely destroyed 782 out of 987 historical monuments in the area around the Old Town. In the aftermath of the 1944 Warsaw Rising, Hitler ordered that the city be razed to the ground by fire and explosives, an order carried out in the central districts. The Royal Castle in Warsaw had already been blown up in 1940. In the bombing, and then after the Rising, libraries, archives and museum collections were deliberately burned and historic buildings dynamited. Selected paintings, archaeological material, documents and other art treasures were removed to Germany in nine trainloads in late 1944.

The Poles were in no doubt about the nature of German plans. The 1945 guidebook to the exhibition of the capital’s reconstruction states: ‘The destruction of the symbols of our national state existence, the wiping out of those components of our national civilization which constituted the splendour and the distinctiveness of that civilization...was to make possible the introduction of architectural elements quite foreign to us, the Germanisation of the city landscape which...was to kill culture and the nation. In other words, a gigantic Oświęcim [Auschwitz] for the whole nation, perfected by German humanism...’ (National Museum Warsaw 1945: 26).

The brochure goes on: ‘The first practical conclusion from the exhibition is: living symbols without which a nation cannot exist must be rebuilt, while epochs must be brought back to plastic life, the epochs which were to be wiped out from the records of our civilization’.

Here is a fairly clear piece of evidence for the Robert Bevan thesis: what he terms ‘cultural genocide’ was being used as a prelude for the real thing. That was to have been the permanent abolition of the Polish state and the reduction of its people to a condition of ignorant slavery before they were biologically exterminated. Some will argue that this was also the policy pursued by the Serbs during the Bosnian war and the siege of Sarajevo. Mosques were systematically destroyed and Moslem houses and cultural centres burned, as the prelude to expulsion or massacre. There is much argument among veterans of the siege about whether the Serb gunners deliberately aimed at the Library and the National Museum, but the fires lit by their shells did lead to the fire which consumed the archives containing the memory,
the collective and individual history, of the Bosnian Moslems.

Planned and aimed shelling to destroy the archive would be consistent with Serbian actions against enemy memory elsewhere. Another example occurred in the Caucasus in 1993, at the end of Abkhazia’s secession war against Georgia. Just as the Georgians were evacuating the Abkhazian capital of Sukhum, a group of militiamen drove up and threw incendiary grenades into the building housing the Abkhazian archives. These were not merely documents concerned with Abkhaz ethnic identity, but—even more importantly—the archives of the Greek, Jewish, Armenian and Russian communities whose multicultural coexistence had formed the real nature of Abkhazia before the conflict. All were destroyed (Ascherson 1996: 253–4). That message was not hard to read.

Are these acts exceptional? The world is moving into a period in which the social significance of heritage and identity is exalted, and it may be that the deliberate destruction of archives in particular, in order to erase collective memory, will become more common. Until now, the professional military mind has not assumed that an enemy will surrender in order to save some churches and art galleries. Correspondingly, respect for art, although enjoined upon generals, is a low priority in war. In conventional war, the destruction of historic monuments is almost always a sin of omission, not to say indifference. But in the new era of low-level war, as conducted by ethnic militias under local warlord leadership, the priority given to destroying the enemy’s culture is rising sharply.

Does cultural destruction undermine collective identity?

I now come to the closing section of the paper, in which I want to turn this whole discussion on its head. A question needs to be posed. We can, I hope, agree that combatant governments lay heavy emphasis on the destruction of culture, above all their own. They do so mainly to blacken the image of their opponent but also to heighten the solidarity and loyalty of their subjects at war. They also put some energy into public relations exercises intended to show that ‘our’ soldiers and airmen respect the culture of others and make efforts not to harm it in conflict.

All that should be evident enough. But now follows a very natural question. Where is the evidence that a national or community sense of cultural identity can be dissolved by the destruction of monuments or cultural objects?

Such evidence is remarkably scarce. It is now widely accepted that the area bombing of German cities in the second world war, though flattening whole districts and killing tens of thousands, did not break down popular solidarity and in some ways reinforced it. The British legend about indomitable Cockneys (‘London can take it!’) during the Blitz has turned out to be less true than it was once held to be, but still contains a core of truth. Nazi efforts to fillet ‘Polishness’ by terror and by blowing up or burning evidence of the Polish past were entirely counter-productive.

It may well be, as discussion between the ICCROM Forum participants suggested, that the real locus of lasting damage to identity through cultural destruction is not, in fact, the community. Instead, it is the inhabitants of the family house. Sultan Barakat mentions in his contribution that it is common in Palestinian refugee camps to meet elderly women who have kept the keys to long-lost homes (Barakat, this volume). Others among us have met survivors of many other nationalities, expelled from family homes occupied by others or demolished, who have kept their keys. The family dwelling is surely at least as intense a centre of culture as a cathedral or mosque. But the damage done to individual identities by its permanent loss is, in contrast, beyond healing.

Community identity is more resilient. In fact, deliberate assault on memory can change identity in an unintended direction, by introducing a tougher and more resentful element of victimology and providing a society with a lasting grievance around which to rally. By removing the Axum obelisk and other talismans of Ethiopian continuity, Mussolini’s Italy centred the future self-awareness of Ethiopia—its view of itself as a nation among other nations—around the demand for their return. When Edward I took the Stone of Destiny, he entirely failed to damage the authority of Scottish kings, who continued to be inaugurated—Robert the Bruce among them—without the Stone. Instead, Edward provided Scots with a nourishing grievance against England, which fed into nationalist feelings for seven hundred years.

Assaults on group identity through cultural destruction, in short, very seldom work. But this is not to undervalue the hurt and the fear that they can cause. In multi-ethnic communities (Bosnia for instance), the presence of certain monuments can seem to affirm the right to space through their presence across time. When they are knocked down—as when a mosque is blown up—the resulting fear and insecurity can be intense (Figs. 10 and 11).
Restoration, the rebuilding of a mosque or the reopening of a graveyard when expelled families dare to return, may offer pegs of safety hammered back into time, suggesting that those who return will not be faced with two fatal alternatives: either integrate with us, or get out.

This brings up another aspect of the theme: the importance of the time dimension in cultural identity. After the Bosnian town of Zvornik had been ‘cleansed’ in 1992, the new Serbian mayor said to foreign journalists: ‘There were never any mosques in Zvornik!’ (New York Times 21 August 1992, quoted in Bevan 2005: 1). This lie, left by itself, would eventually have turned into: ‘There were never any Moslems in Zvornik’. Here again is the function of certain objects as pegs, affirming the cultural existence of a group in time. When the peg is pulled out and the group murdered or expelled, identity may indeed begin to wither. The statement: ‘There used to be mosques and we Moslems did live in Zvornik’ is not very affirmative, because everything is put in the past tense.

Politicians compare the loss of a well-known cultural object to the way an individual is diminished by the loss of a possession. But in reality, the popular sense of personal material loss may be slight, when the lost item is connected to the individual only by a thread of imaginative identification. Having a cathedral bombed hurts, but it is not the hurt of having a gold watch stolen. The cartoonist and critic Osbert Lancaster put it in a very English way: ‘It must be admitted that for 99 per cent of the public the grief felt for any individual architectural casualty is largely esoteric: such losses fall into the same category as the death of poor Aunt Agatha, whom the family had always referred to with deepest affection, but no-one had ever actually seen’ (Lancaster, quoted in Lambourne 2001: 101).

But the qualification ‘may be’ is important. There are instances in which that imaginative identification is so powerful that the loss feels agonising—even, perhaps, to people who never saw the object before it was ruined. The bridge at Mostar is the inevitable reference. The Croatian writer Slavenka Drakulić asked herself why the fall of the bridge hurt more than a death. She suggested: ‘Perhaps because we see our own mortality in the collapse of the bridge. We expect people to die …the bridge in all its beauty and grace was built to outlive us…A dead woman is one of us; but the bridge is all of us for ever’ (Drakulić S., in The Observer, 14 November 1993).

The thought can be put in duller words. When a well-known building or work of art is destroyed by violence, the injury done is usually to continuity. A deep sense of insecurity and alarm is aroused when a gap appears in a familiar landscape or narrative.
This is a wound in time, the disappearance of some familiar object—like the bridge at Mostar—whose sight has always granted a reassuring feeling that some things are changeless whatever happens to the mortals around them.

When this gap in time appears, there is often an instinct to plug it. I know of two not entirely separate ways of plugging. One is literal reconstruction. I remember the debates in West Germany over the rebuilding of bombed-out opera houses. In Frankfurt and West Berlin, the decision was for a totally modern building, to be designed by a cutting-edge 1960s architect. The citizenry were not much consulted. In Munich, by contrast, they were consulted and their opinion coincided with that of the city fathers. The Munich opera house was rebuilt in its old detail down to the last twist of gold leaf. The Muncheners proudly stepped back into their ‘old’ opera which had merely been absent for some years. Similar but not identical approaches to healing wounds in time were taken in Warsaw, Dresden and many other places.

The second technique for plugging the hole is sheer denial—the manipulation of linear time into required new shapes. The Poles have been especially good at this; their cultural and political identity has been preserved at shocking human cost over the last two centuries. The Royal Castle in Warsaw, for instance, was reduced by the Nazis to a single fang of brickwork. Not until the 1970s was restoration begun, but again it took the form of an utterly literal and detailed replacement. For most of my life, the castle has been a piece of sky. Now I enjoy that sense of vertigo when the guide says: ‘If you lean out of this window and look across the courtyard, you can see the only Renaissance window to survive the Baroque redesign …’.

Take another example. In 1980, just 25 years ago, the Solidarity strikers erected a huge steel monument outside the Gdańsk shipyard gates, to commemorate workers killed in the rioting of 1970. Solidarity was suppressed a year later by General Jaruzelski’s martial law, but the monument was too big to pull down. Soon an ancient custom sprang up. After weddings in the Mariacki church, the bridal party would go straight across town to the monument and lay their bouquets at its foot. Watching this one day, I said to a Polish friend: ‘This really is the invention of tradition!’ He replied: ‘Not exactly, because in a sense that monument has stood there for many centuries’.

**Conclusion**

To conclude, wartime damage to collective cultural identity, on a scale wider than that of the family, is remarkably hard to identify. The fact of destruction often hurts individuals. But communities and nation-states have developed many ways of translating such loss into new forms of self-assertion, or even—as I have just tried to show—into denials of the temporary absence of something deemed too important not to be present.

Genocide and deportation can certainly reduce a cultural identity to a distorted remnant. But the destruction of cultural objects during or in the aftermath of war does not appear to have this effect. Soldiers and militias who deliberately blow up mosques, sack abbeys and torch ancient libraries plainly get immediate satisfaction from what they are doing. They imagine their foes collapsing in grief and losing the will to persist in their horrible Otherness. But conquerors have been wrong about that since history began.

**Biography**

Neal Ascherson, born in Scotland, is widely known as a journalist, writing particularly for the Observer (1960–90) for which he reported from Central Europe, Asia and Africa. Among the events that he covered were the Prague Spring, the birth of Solidarity in Poland, and the coups against Allende in Chile and against Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. Voted Journalist of the year in 1986, he is the author of a number of books including The struggles for Poland (1987), Black Sea: the birthplace of civilization and barbarism (1995), and Stone voices: the search for Scotland (2002), an exploration of Scottish identity. He is the founding editor of the journal Public Archaeology (http://www.earthscan.co.uk/).

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**References**


*Guide book to the exhibition arranged by the Office of Reconstruction of the Capital together with the National Museum in Warsaw*(Ministry of Culture and Art, Warsaw).
While internationally-led postwar reconstruction has grown exponentially in terms of global relevance and available resources, the protection and recovery of cultural heritage has received relatively little attention. Moreover, efforts to protect and recover cultural heritage in the aftermath of modern warfare have proven ineffective. Towards realizing the salience of cultural heritage within postwar reconstruction and a more effective response, this chapter first examines the dynamic inter-relationship between war and cultural heritage. Drawing on fifteen years of multidisciplinary research in as many postwar contexts, the author then focuses on recurring deficiencies and formulates nine critical lessons, which seek to advance the academic discourse and act as guidance for good practice. He argues that cultural heritage is an integral and essential component of a holistic approach to postwar reconstruction and that its recovery should be based upon a clear vision of future recovery scenarios as seen by local groups as much as by external actors. Since postwar reconstruction is essentially a development challenge, it should follow best practice in development, in which the local affected community must actively play the key role. Experience shows that locally generated, development-oriented approaches tend to work whilst top-down, externally conceived solutions do not.

Postwar reconstruction and the recovery of cultural heritage: critical lessons from the last fifteen years

Warfare has been a traditional and often dominant theme of historical discourse, yet postwar reconstruction remained a minority interest for many years, occupying only peripheral space in the consciousness of international humanitarian and development actors. However, this situation has altered dramatically in the last decade, with the postwar reconstruction of nations becoming increasingly recognized as a key element in achieving global stability, security and the eradication of poverty in the twenty-first century (Barakat 2005). As a consequence of this ‘delayed awakening’ and the ensuing scuffle to address adequately the intellectual and pragmatic complexities posed by warfare, the protection and recovery of cultural heritage has received insufficient attention. In other words, cultural heritage has been overlooked by mainstream postwar reconstruction practice and policy—perceived and treated as a luxury that cannot be afforded by societies emerging from the devastation of war. For this reason and others, cultural heritage has not so far received due
scrutiny within the interdisciplinary fold of postwar recovery studies.

Explanations aside, we are faced with a paradox: the destruction of cultural heritage as a consequence of war is universal and longstanding but our understanding of this social phenomenon remains rudimentary in academic discourse and in international policies and practices. Moreover, in a society that has experienced violent conflict, death and injury, the destruction of infrastructure and the built environment is often the most visible impact. Less tangibly, amongst the ruins it is often clear that buildings or monuments that represent particular religious, historical, or ideological traditions have been both indiscriminately and deliberately targeted.\(^1\)

Therefore, it is imperative to investigate how the protection and recovery of cultural heritage can be improved by clarifying its deeper relationship with modern warfare, and by identifying the main recurring deficiencies within international policy and implementation that have limited effectiveness in the field over the last fifteen years. To these ends, I propose here a more deliberative and assertive approach that links robust theory with best practice, in the belief that such an approach would begin to counteract the reductive logic of war, which has so far been allowed to prevail in the protection and recovery of cultural heritage.\(^2\)

After analysing the inherent interconnectedness of war and cultural heritage, this chapter unearths nine specific deficiencies in the relevant policy and practice and their implications. It then draws upon the efforts to date to protect and recover cultural heritage and on broader processes of postwar reconstruction to offer ways forward in the form of corresponding critical lessons, which seek to advance the academic discourse and to act as guidance for good practice. These lessons emphasize the need for: a shared vision of recovery; the integration of cultural heritage into the wider physical, economic and social responses; sustained political and financial support; the capacity development of local people and institutions; the active participation of indigenous actors in the design and implementation of recovery; the recognition of the complementary relationship between replacement and conservation approaches; the prioritisation of quality over speed of recovery; more practical ways to implement conservation codes and legislation; and finally, the appreciation of belief and religion within postwar societies. All the assertions made in this chapter are grounded in fifteen years of multidisciplinary research in as many postwar contexts and have been regularly tested and refined during this period.\(^3\)

Accordingly, it is proposed that these nine deficiencies are the most important ones and that the critical lessons suggested here are applicable to other, comparable war-torn societies. Before examining them, it is important to elucidate the war/cultural heritage correlation.

### Correlating Cultural Heritage and War

There are three fundamental, interconnected flaws that recur in the understanding of war and cultural heritage. First, within academic discourse and in international policy and practice, the definitions of both tend to be absolutist and fixed. Second, and as a consequence, the two concepts are coupled as direct opposites: the creativity of cultural heritage against the destructiveness of war. While these characteristics pinpoint the essence of each, they are too simplistic and prove restrictive by instilling a sense of isolation. Alternatively, it would be more accurate to frame cultural heritage and war as highly mutable and interlinked processes of social transformation. Third, it would be erroneous to assume that the interrelationship, although fluid in nature, is too random and variable to warrant correlation. The value of recognizing these flaws extends beyond theory as they in part explain the timidity of international efforts to protect and recover cultural heritage when it comes to tackling its interconnectedness with war. At the same time, the three flaws provide insight into the tendency of wider international postwar reconstruction and development activities to devalue or exclude the recovery of cultural heritage in the aftermath of war.

Accordingly, it is essential to clarify some of the main linkages in this interrelationship. Primarily, we should appreciate that the impacts of war on cultural heritage are diverse and far-reaching, ranging from the physical to the psychological, with effects that are both direct and indirect in nature. Although impacts and effects often stem from the indiscriminate nature

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1. I adopt the broader conceptualisation of cultural heritage as the monumental remains, in addition to the intangible, ethnographic or industrial, and ‘humankind systems upon which creations are based.’ It is also defined as an open concept, ‘reflecting living culture every bit as much as that of the past’ (UNESCO, 2006).
2. War creates and thrives on deep divisions and zero-sum goals. This reductive and unproductive logic is shaped and perpetuated primarily by belligerents and their constituencies but also tends to be strengthened unintentionally by interveners, as this chapter argues.
3. Much of this experience and evidence base is synthesized in Barakat (2005) and in the other sources listed in the references.
of violence, the twentieth century reminded us that the destruction of cultural heritage also forms a deliberate and planned strategy of modern warfare. Despite the collective appreciation by states by means of the 1954 Hague Convention of the need to protect cultural property in advance of and during armed conflict, the actual protection and, moreover, the recovery of cultural heritage have proved weak. This was demonstrated most clearly in the many years of Israeli occupation of Palestinian land, in the fate of Angkor in Cambodia, in the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in late 1989 and in the numerous manifestations of violent identity crises that erupted during the 1990s. Many of these wars were premised and thrived on the politicization and ethnicization of cultural identity, with subsequent blatant and insidious assaults on cultural heritage on a scale that had not been seen since World War II. Cultural symbols tied to belief, identity, power and empowerment were valued most. The break-up of the former Yugoslavia and, in particular, the naval bombardment of Dubrovnik in 1991 became the dramatic turning point and catalyst. The outcome was a heightened awareness of the ways in which cultural heritage is vulnerable to contemporary armed conflicts, while international efforts were galvanised in the pursuit of a response that took into consideration the changing nature of warfare and, in particular, the collapse of the state. Specifically, the case of the Dubrovnik Four (four former Yugoslav army officers) brought by the Hague Tribunal promised to be a watershed in the protection and recovery of cultural heritage, since it was the first time since the Second World War that military commanders had been charged with an attack on cultural property as a war crime (BBC 2002).

Nevertheless, as the twenty-first century starts, the interrelationship between war and cultural heritage has continued overall to be characterized by the deficiencies already mentioned. Furthermore, three distinct trends in security have emerged, which have so far complicated protection and recovery in the aftermath of war. First, formal ceasefires and macro-level peace accords have been agreed in many key allies in the war on terror because of the broadening of the interpretation of the principle of self-defence since 11 September 2001.

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4 Through a blend of human instinct and psychological strategy, the deliberate destruction of societies’ cultural heritage by opposing groups is a firm historical trend.

5 One hundred and sixteen states have signed (not all have ratified) the Hague Convention, which entered into force on 7 August 1956. See <http://www.icomos.org/hague/hague.convention.html>.

6 A detailed survey of the effect of contemporary armed conflicts on cultural heritage is beyond the scope of this paper. The past decade and a half has witnessed immense losses in the cultural heritage of many countries, such as the former Yugoslavia, Kuwait, Iraq, Georgia, Palestine, Chechnya, East Timor, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and many others.

7 Such destruction is often justified by the excuse that terrorists are using civilian infrastructure as a shield. Although not part of the ‘war on terror’, as was the case in Afghanistan, the disproportionate response by Israel to the kidnapping of its soldiers in south Lebanon in the summer of 2006 was, I suggest, more easily tolerated by the United States and its key allies in the war on terror because of the broadening of the interpretation of the principle of self-defence since 11 September 2001.
Hague Convention. More broadly, it is reasonable to conclude that attempts to protect and recover cultural heritage have been made significantly more difficult, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq where unclear aims and objectives of the war and an absence of effective pre-war planning for the postwar period present a vision of never-ending violence.

In conclusion, the consistently salient role of cultural heritage in forging identities during and immediately after war stands out as the main factor that reinforces their interrelationship. In stark contrast to natural disasters, war and particularly civil or inter-communal violence, such as that experienced in the Balkans, tend to target the identity of the enemy by destroying symbolic and historic buildings, and by deliberately displacing communities and destroying their vernacular environments. This tendency has implications for the social and psychological recovery of the affected communities and their task of rebuilding.8 Just as destruction of cultural property may be the vehicle of conflict, so is the continuing thread of cultural behaviour and traditions that provides the basis for reconciliation and recovery (Warren 2005). This is why the recovery of cultural heritage should be central and not peripheral to postwar reconstruction.

Having established a wider understanding of the dynamic interrelationship, I now identify what I consider the nine main deficiencies in the policies and practice of cultural heritage recovery after war, and propose how they might be corrected.

A shared vision

Perhaps the greatest lesson to be learnt is the importance of achieving a clear comprehensive vision for the postwar recovery of cultural heritage. It is also appropriate to begin with this emphasis, as it stems from my holistic and deliberative approach to postwar reconstruction as a concept and through to policy and practice. Postwar reconstruction is thus: ‘...a range of holistic activities in an integrated process designed not only to reactivate economic and social development but at the same time to create a peaceful environment that will prevent a relapse into violence’ (Barakat 2005: 11).

In this way, postwar reconstruction is conceptualized as a set of interconnecting social, cultural, political and economic components within a multidimensional process, which is located at the local, provincial, national and international levels. This philosophy is premised on the understanding that postwar reconstruction requires a multidisciplinary problem-solving approach to address the complexities of recovery. In sum, the recovery of cultural heritage demands a shared vision, which then connects to the wider vision of postwar reconstruction.

The starting point for articulating a shared vision for cultural heritage recovery should be an attempt to understand and synchronize the many perceptions and expectations of cultural heritage held by different groups both within and outside the affected country. In particular, the shared vision must not be assumed by outsiders; instead, it needs to be grounded in the local political, social, cultural and economic circumstances within the national and regional context. However, current trends in postwar recovery assistance to affected populations tend to move in the opposite direction, towards a standardized response to a set of basic needs, using imported economic and urban planning models at the expense of cultural identity.

Failing to build a shared vision primarily occurs because of the constraints of responding to immense needs and within tight time-frames. Furthermore, in countries emerging from conflict (the majority of which are underdeveloped), the daily challenges of the management and conservation of cultural heritage are amplified by the legacy of the conflict (war-induced displacement, physical destruction of housing and infrastructure, lack of financial, material and human resources, institutional fragility, political volatility and psychosocial trauma). These problems are often compounded by the simultaneous challenges of the delivery of humanitarian assistance by a multitude of national and international actors in an environment that suffers from a serious lack of security and an absence of the rule of law. The large number of actors - ranging from the media, donors, various authorities, and national and international bodies to the different interest groups at community level - in turn often creates a conflict of perceptions, concerns and values, not to mention differences of opinion within the technical community.

Consequently, local perception is often not the same as the international or global view. What people choose to preserve from their past is dictated by circumstances and by the experiences that they associate with particular artefacts and monuments. Furthermore, it is always instructive to remind ourselves that ‘not all societies use the remains of the past as a means of substantiating their identity’ (Layton and Thomas 2001: 1). In some cases where the past has only negative associations, it is ‘the modernist drive
towards the future’ that defines identity. In other cases, poverty, as well as the effects of war already mentioned, leads to the looting and exporting of cultural property to satisfy the demand of a few rich individuals and a growing market of collectors. Meanwhile, the past has a continuous in-country role as ‘a precedent for contemporary developments’ and so ‘different interests draw on different epochs to create their own past’ (ibid.: 2).

For many, what they salvage from their old home may have both functional and cultural importance. In Peshawar, Pakistan, one can observe that a typical Afghan refugee family arrives in the city with very little. If at all possible, they bring livestock, as a means of economic survival, but also carpets as a form of portable wealth. In addition, multiple experience of displacement has taught them that wooden beams are difficult to replace and therefore they need to be salvaged for the new home in exile. Another scenario can be sketched from the Palestinian Diaspora. All around the Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan, Syria and particularly South Lebanon, it is very common to come across elderly ladies who have kept the old, rather large keys of their former homes and cared for them ever since the first wave of displacement in 1947 (Figs. 12 and 13). Of course for these people, their perception of what is an important object of cultural identity and continuity is very different from the perception of elite politicians, historians and patrons of the arts whose ‘monumental’ perception of cultural heritage is often influenced by the global definition of their own culture and motivated by their need either to forge an identity that is in line with the objectives of the conflict itself or to defend an identity as perceived by the attacker.9

While specific challenges may appear intractable, the building of a shared vision can be strengthened by more general and progressive changes in practice and mindsets. As Diefendorf asserts (1998: 13), ‘postwar reconstruction is an evolutionary process’. That is, in advance of war, international efforts must be more proactive in the protection of cultural heritage (using the strategies identified below) and thus not wait to act until the war and the resulting media headlines have commenced. Engagement and assistance through instilling best practice and encouraging early warning mechanisms at the local level can

9 A clear example is the destruction of the Sri Dalada Maligawa Temple in Kandy, Sri Lanka, (a UNESCO World Heritage site, which hosts the sacred Tooth Relic), on the 25th January 1998 by a Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam suicide bomber (see Wijesuriya, this volume).
perform crucial conflict prevention roles. Second, and in reversing this process, international mindsets need to be sensitive to the life-changing experience of war. The war-affected are inevitably forced to prioritize survival, but this may be at odds with international priorities for cultural heritage recovery. When proposing a vision for recovery, it is important to accept that local priorities may not be those that seem obvious or even desirable to external actors, nor do all internal stakeholders share the same interests. In sum, the shared vision needs to be built sensitively while realizing that compromises and negotiations over the reconstruction priorities and projects can be a means of opening channels of communication and offering opportunities for conflict management and reconciliation. What is critical to the achievement of a vision for recovery is not only the what of recovery of cultural heritage, but the how.

**An integrated approach**

Over the past fifteen years, it has become increasingly apparent that the challenge of postwar reconstruction is essentially a developmental one, which takes place within the particular environment and amid the specific circumstances of a war-torn society (World Bank 1998, Stiefel 1999, Jeong 2005). War is not a single catastrophic event but a devastating way of life closely associated with chronic poverty and social injustice. It includes the usual economic challenges of growth, inclusiveness, stability and sustainability, as well as the political-development challenges related to the restoration of relationships among people, and between people and local/national institutions. The long-term recovery process can equally demand social and psychological readjustment in order to reactivate the conservation and development processes that have been disrupted by the conflict. Each of these challenges will be magnified and compounded by the legacies of conflict, and the continuing problems associated with an unstable security environment.

Given that this is so, it is the understanding of best practice in development that must underpin responses to the plight of cultural heritage in war-torn countries. In other words, the recovery of cultural heritage is not a quick fix limited to physical restoration but forms an integrated component of a development (and protection) process that begins and can be nurtured long before ceasefires are brokered, and that needs to be sustained through years of postwar recovery. Therefore, the planned integration of activities may include: restoration of the physical buildings, infrastructure and essential government functions and services; institution-building to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of existing institutions; and structural reform of the economic and social role of cultural heritage. As the scope, type and level of integration will vary from context to context, it is essential to develop tailored models, which in turn requires a non-elitist and prescient design.

Clearly the design and implementation of such an integrated approach will prove arduous. Nevertheless, as a feasible way forward, there are many simple but important opportunities for greater collaboration that tend to be overlooked in postwar situations. For example, in Bosnia and Croatia during the 1990s, there were many occasions on which internally displaced persons and other vulnerable groups went without shelter since they were not allowed to make use of local buildings that were protected in the name of cultural heritage (personal observation). Instead, on such occasions it would have been more beneficial for all stakeholders if displaced populations had been granted access to the buildings, under the responsibility of the international agencies and non-governmental organizations whose vast resources could have been used to preserve or repair them. (In this context, an integrated approach towards greater protection and recovery should come from a better-empowered International Committee of the Blue Shield (ICBS).)

**Political and financial support**

It cannot be assumed that political and funding support will be maintained throughout the period needed for recovery. Financial resources for reconstruction are invariably limited and usually dependent on attracting external assistance or investment, which is then tied to donor or investment interests and funding deadlines. Of the resources that are available, cultural heritage tends to attract humble amounts, whose expenditure then tends to be limited to technical assistance missions and evaluation reports. Moreover, the international political and financial support for the recovery of cultural heritage

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10 For example, in the wake of the 1999 Gulf War, I witnessed Iraqis in Basra using antique wooden screens for firewood in order to keep warm and to survive.

11 In this regard, initiating work on a small project that is universally agreed and readily achievable can be an excellent starting point to build capacity and mutual confidence. By demonstrating the benefits of recovering cultural heritage, a momentum can be created for a more comprehensive vision of recovery.

12 In particular, there is a need to link livelihoods to the recovery of cultural heritage, for example, creating positive relationships by employing locals in recovery activities.

13 Having been involved in the early stages of development of the ICBS in the mid-1990s, I became disheartened by the elitist ethos behind the development of the concept and by the initial reluctance to explore more opportunities to maximize its resources and authority, in particular, by not seeking a more formal integration with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). <http://www.ifla.org/blueshield.htm>.
Cultural Heritage in Postwar Recovery

is at its highest in the immediate aftermath of war and will gradually decrease over time. But this tendency is in direct contrast to the needs of reconstruction, which tend to increase as better and more detailed assessments are made of the damage to cultural heritage (Fig. 14). Although strategies vary greatly, this restriction of financial support can narrow the interpretation of cultural heritage to cultural property solely in the form of buildings and townscapes of recognized historic or architectural interest, especially if they can attract investment with an eye to promoting tourism, as in Dubrovnik or Assisi.

This reality leads to a number of implications: 1) the planning of recovery should be incorporated into the day-to-day planning of preparedness in days of peace in order to maximize the resources available; 2) priorities have to be established, for instance among different monuments, between the urban centres and their peripheries, between housing and places of worship, and between economic activities and the aesthetics of the public space; 3) ways of maintaining media interest must be found, but without allowing the media to dictate the reconstruction priorities; 4) swift action is needed for developing a recovery plan and a reconstruction vision in order to capitalize on the political and financial capital available; 5) the interest of the various influence groups must be retained by developing a greater understanding of the strong relationship between recovery of cultural heritage and economic recovery of the community; and 6) the use of multilateral trust funds can lead to improving the provision of long-term financial and political support, as several ongoing postwar contexts have showed.

A phased approach may be dictated by technical considerations, such as the need to conduct research for historical restoration and the sourcing of appropriate building materials, which in turn may require reopening local quarries or kilns, etc. It takes time and money to prepare and plan these. Thus the first phase may concentrate on consolidating and protecting monuments, taking time to develop local skills and materials, rather than hastily restoring them using external resources which may eventually prove unsuitable and will in any case not assist in the local recovery of livelihoods.

Local institutional and human capacity

A feature common to most conflict-affected countries is the dramatic change in institutional and human capacities in general, which has direct relevance to the protection and recovery of cultural heritage. While war can make local capacities inadequate for effective recovery, it is a fundamental mistake to assume that human and institutional capacities are lost. Instead, I suggest that capacities are invariably transformed in order to cope with the impact of armed conflict, and are thus fragile while readjusting to the postwar phase.

The causes and impacts of violence (not forgetting crime) are mostly concentrated at the micro-level, while at the same time there are typically less expertise and resources to resolve them. Employment, trade relations, education, social services, industries and physical infrastructure can all be affected. The coverage and quality of social, political and economic structures can be disrupted. For example, professional capacities are shaped by the migration of intellectual and entrepreneurial sections of society, and those that remain endure the psychosocial trauma.

Conversely, Diaspora groups both during and after conflict can provide a much-needed source of remittances for family members. In contrast to those who remain, the more educated members of a Diaspora are able to escape the isolation that war creates, gaining exposure to new ideas and opportunities. Consequently, a Diaspora community represents a significant resource for most countries.

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14 This pattern occurs for several reasons, either because donors develop new priorities elsewhere, and/or donors realise that the new postwar context cannot absorb the aid, or simply because pledges are made but never materialise.
recovering from war, in relation to investment in reconstruction, professional capacities/qualifications, and networking with the wider world. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that their perspectives will have inevitably been affected by their experience abroad and may not necessarily coincide with the perspectives of those who remained and experienced the war.

In terms of institutions, postwar countries tend to inherit public administrations and institutions that require major reform. Compounding this problem, these institutions are expected to act suddenly, quickly and effectively, with new structures springing up in response to the conflict (for example, a Ministry of Reconstruction or Rehabilitation, a Ministry of Refugees, Relief etc.). The main stumbling block is that these institutions may lack the requisite experience to facilitate the necessary actions for recovery. Furthermore, their power and authority may also have to contend with the prevalent neoliberal model of reconstruction. In this scenario, the role of the state becomes minimized and its bureaucracies are deemed bloated, corrupt and inefficient. Consequently, the vital role that the state can and must play in the process of rebuilding after conflict is underestimated and undermined, whether for assuming responsibility for security, the rule of law, regulatory functions, and priority-setting or for defining rebuilding strategies as they emerge from participatory and consensual processes. In its place, non-governmental organizations are promoted and allowed to maintain the predominance they had in the relief phase. Civil society is important and needs to be strengthened, but the state is no less important and its weakness should not be exacerbated by conveying negative images of it.

For these reasons, it is essential that the institutional and human capacities for cultural heritage recovery are developed. In echoing the earlier emphasis on integration, it is beneficial to integrate the capacity for cultural heritage recovery with that for planning other economic, social and political aspects of the society. When integrated into the wider emergency and development response, the restoration of cultural heritage can capitalize on a wide range of capacities and funding opportunities to secure, stabilize and, in some cases, restore damaged structures. For example, schools are often taken over to provide collective shelters or community centres in the immediate aftermath of war. With a little more proactive engagement and foresight, restoring and converting a historic building (possibly already out of use) may be a better way to restore the collective life of a community, thus freeing the school for use as a school, while simultaneously protecting the historic building. There are those who argue against such an approach, quoting the many examples of misuse of historic buildings by displaced communities. Ultimately, it is a balancing act and decisions need to be made on a case-by-case basis. Capacities can also be developed through policy transfer, learning from other countries’ experience to identify good practice and avoid repeating mistakes (Barakat 2005). While postwar training and education can help address the gap, there is no substitute for investment in skills and resources prior to or during the war (though it has always proven difficult to raise funds to train specialists during war). 15

**Local participation**

Connected to the development of local capacities and the formation of a shared vision, the experience of reconstruction in every postwar society in which I have been involved reinforces the importance of local participation in the design and delivery of this increasingly global issue. Too often, local people are portrayed simply as victims and passive recipients of international assistance or as a liability to be neutralized rather than an asset to be utilized. In reality, their creativity, pragmatism and resilience are of critical importance in the process of rebuilding after conflict. Correspondingly, imported and externally-imposed models ignore the two most important basic needs for human recovery in the aftermath of conflict: to reaffirm a sense of identity and to regain control over one’s life. Therefore, in any discourse on the restoration of cultural heritage damaged by war, it is critical to acknowledge that, from the perspective of those affected, cultural heritage becomes much more than mere tangible manifestations. As does architecture, so do historical artefacts and archival documents start to assume a complex role in forging their post-conflict identity. The process of defining post-conflict identity takes place in a wider context of social, economic and political upheaval with a high degree of uncertainty and apprehension. Local responses and solutions have the significant benefit of harnessing local materials, skills and know-how, and thereby help in the process of restoring dignity, confidence and faith in local capacities. For these reasons, they are more effective and more sustainable, and frequently cheaper, than externally imported solutions.

In this regard, the participation of local people can be enhanced if there is a champion with the capacity to facilitate the community’s articulation of their needs, set their priorities and start planning

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15 Even at the international level, there are a limited number of people who are specialists in the recovery of war-damaged cultural heritage.
regardless of immediate prospects for implementation. There is a need to dream and to have a plan ready to take advantage of funding opportunities when they arise. In an ideal world, this champion would be a local civil society organization, but international agencies with in-country experience can be as valuable in playing this role.

Unfortunately, both national governments and international actors have often failed to seek out or build on local initiatives—either because of ignorance or because such initiatives do not fit with externally conceived and designed programmes and timetables. The short-term, quick-fix, pre-planned project culture that characterizes many donor-funded interventions is particularly unsuited to most post-conflict scenarios. Participatory reconstruction is not merely consultation; it requires time and flexibility, as the recovery of war-damaged buildings demands new expertise beyond what was previously needed for their maintenance—it is to a certain extent experimental. It may be best, therefore, to develop this capacity with less important buildings, take time for research, build up funds, etc. The decision about where and when to start can often be simplified by understanding that the first stage of reconstruction is to build the capacity to do it. Therefore, it is important to allow space for solutions to evolve as people recover their confidence, understand their changed circumstances and identify possible courses of action.

The lessons learned in respect of postwar recovery in general are equally applicable to the recovery and conservation of cultural heritage, whose survival will ultimately depend on the existence of locally supported conservation institutions. The haste of donors to see recognizable organizations in place also often ignores pre-existing institutional capacities instead of building on them. While formal organizational structures may indeed have broken down as a result of war, some form of social structures and capacities will inevitably survive and can provide the basis on which to build new institutions.

Nevertheless, there is a question of how far people can participate in planning the recovery of their built environment and whether some aspects do have to be dictated in the interests of the overall environment and public utility. For example, after years of unplanned displacement and squatting, once economic conditions improve, people if unrestrained are likely to erect more permanent structures without regard for environmental or urban planning concerns. The answer often lies in approaching the problem at the neighbourhood level through elected representatives, thus providing the basis for community-driven development of a wider framework based on a collective vision.

Replacement and conservation approaches

As the sixth critical lesson, successful reconstruction can incorporate both replacement and conservation approaches in the recovery of cultural heritage. When planners and conservationists approach the reconstruction of war-damaged cities, there is commonly perceived to be a conflict of interest between conservation and replacement: whether to restore as far as possible the pre-war built environment or take the opportunity to clear the area for improvement. This dilemma has been debated in every case of postwar reconstruction of cities since the end of the Second World War.

At one end of the spectrum are preservationists who wish to restore the built environment of the pre-war society as a means of restoring a sense of identity and thus healing an injured population. This requires knowing which culturally significant structures would justify costly restoration; and whether to replicate symbolically important structures or much loved urban centres that are totally destroyed, or to accept that they have gone and that replicas will not compensate. Another approach is the meticulous restoration of damaged buildings of special significance or their consolidation and maintenance as ruins within the new townscape. These options are costly but often justified in historic cities where income can be derived from tourism, for example, in the case of Dubrovnik discussed above. They may involve exactly replicating destroyed buildings, based on documentary records, or replicating the external townscape with façades coupled with modern interiors that remove the original property divisions, as was done in Warsaw and Gdansk (Dominiczak 1998: 17). Alternatively, others wish to preserve the remaining ruins as a memorial to the disaster.

At the other end of the spectrum are those for whom the destruction provides an opportunity for improvement. In these cases, for example in Coventry, planners advocated a clean sweep of all but a few historically significant landmarks in order to build a completely new urban landscape (Barakat 1989: 180). More recently, and in a completely different cultural context, the same approach was adopted in Hanoi (Logan 1998: 25). This option is
again often promoted externally, when much of the urban landscape is perceived as of little cultural value or quality, illegally occupied or prohibitively costly to repair. The perception often arises when destruction by war follows a long period of neglect and decline in which historic neighbourhoods are abandoned by the elite and given over to multiple occupations by the poor. They are then associated with poverty and backwardness.

A recent example is Kabul (Fig. 15), where the neglect of basic utilities and lack of vehicular access prompted many families to move to modern suburbs; the planners then think in terms of wholesale clearance. Nevertheless, despite the lack of services, the population continues to grow in the old city neighbourhoods, because they provide not only shelter for the poor but the security of living in a traditional way, in family-based communities, and in close proximity to jobs (Najimi 2004: 78-80).

These cases remind us that the cultural legacy is not necessarily always positive. Deep divisions and unjust economic or political relationships in a society are often expressed in the built environment, for instance by constructing housing built to different standards or even erecting a dividing wall between communities, as visibly in Berlin, Israel, Northern Ireland and South Africa. More commonly, as already noted, poor neighbourhoods that were later devastated by war were already centres of social deprivation and environmental degradation. Post-conflict planning has to redress these injustices without undermining the positive cultural legacies of communities that have grown up in these conditions.

As well as such negative inheritances that may have given rise to conflict in the first place, society is also transformed by the violence itself. The feeling of normality and acceptance of the war and its outcomes adds an additional dimension to the relationship between the community and its heritage. Without the benefits of seeing an end to the conflict and with no hope of reconstruction, the destroyed or damaged environment becomes the most familiar surrounding. In Beirut, a whole generation would have known nothing but war by 1991. For this younger generation their parents’ dream of rebuilding the city centre and other places is not recognizable and as such is not shared. Furthermore, young people in Beirut actually expressed a sense of alienation or loss as the ruins that they had grown up around were removed (Charlesworth 2003).

Between these two extreme approaches are many cases of a ‘workable compromise between modernisation and historic preservation’ as in much of the post-World War II urban reconstruction in Germany (Diefendorf 1998: 12-13). Most postwar reconstruction also uses different approaches in different areas of the urban context, depending on their function and perceived importance. This policy is now being advocated in Kabul (Breshna 2004: 37-41). Recognizing that through its ‘historic development various zones develop with their own character’ and that ‘the borders between the zones are fluid,’ a ‘flexible development framework’ is advocated. In this scheme, reconstruction of the historic centre should be a ‘revival of the traditional elements and principles,’ while an intermediate zone between the centre and the modern suburbs ‘has the largest potential for development.’ Other areas include the green belt, which surrounds the old town, and ‘special places’ or ‘symbolic sites’ whose restoration can become the focus for regeneration of particular areas.

Thus, once again, while there are theoretically difficult choices to

Figure 15
The old city in Kabul–Bala Hissar, once a thriving neighbourhood, was destroyed by twenty years of war and neglect, prompting its population to desert the area.
be made between apparently irreconcilable needs, the cultural, social and economic needs of the surviving population can be simultaneously accommodated, if an understanding is reached in defining their cultural priorities in terms of both what they inherit and what they aspire to for the future.

Pace of recovery

Based on a combination of the deficiencies described above, the first instinct of outsiders is to restore the built environment, including significant monuments, as rapidly as possible, often using imported plans and materials. As already noted, swift action in preparing recovery plans helps to capitalize on the existence of political will and the availability of external resources. This is particularly true when external actors begin reconstruction at the most important monument selected on their own initiative or at the invitation of the local communities. However, other than undertaking measures to limit further damage and to restore necessary basic facilities, haste is not a good policy. There is always a real risk of compromising quality and authenticity when rushing restoration of cultural heritage in the immediate aftermath of war, when there exists an environment of insecurity, delays in decision-making, ownership problems, lack of codes and regulations, lack of building materials and expertise, and so on. The willingness of those on either side of a conflict to participate in postwar reconstruction activities is usually a pragmatic first step, which should not be mistaken as a sign that deep-seated resentments no longer exist. Therefore, it is necessary first to understand the society whose cultural heritage has given rise to the built environment, to question what led to its destruction, and to appreciate the impact of conflict on the society.17

Apart from problems of timing, postwar recovery of cultural heritage can still prove ineffective and unsustainable if it is not also guided by a conflict transformation perspective that directs the protection of cultural heritage towards peace-building, with its threefold goal of offering hope, healing and reconciliation. The healing of bitter memories and the restoration of trust is a delicate, highly complex process that cannot be rushed and may take generations to achieve. Building peace requires sound foundations based on a commitment to righting wrongs and achieving an acceptable level of social justice and accountability. From this perspective, the recovery of cultural heritage too should have a corrective dimension that promotes socio-economic change and not merely the restoration of the status quo, if it is not only to implement successfully initial restoration activities but also to sustain that investment into the future. Nor can the re-establishment of a legal or justice system by itself bring about healing, although it can help to create an environment in which responsibility for crimes is attributed and the perpetrators of indiscriminate destruction are punished. Reconciliation requires the capacity of both sides to forgive and to repent, which is partly the product of time.

In sum, the rapid recovery of cultural heritage is not without risk to both quality and authenticity, as well as to peace-building.

Conservation codes and legislations

Conservation codes and legislations are important but are difficult to enforce in the immediate aftermath of war. Government officials and politicians regularly make the dangerous assumption that to regulate is to control, especially when it comes to addressing vernacular heritage and in particular housing. To initiate building codes, conservation laws or even land-use planning controls is one thing, to enforce them in the aftermath of conflict is another. Survival during war is often dependent on ignoring legislations or bending the rules and it takes time for communities to depart from this habit.

It will be particularly difficult to ensure the obedience of poor and displaced families who cannot afford the extra expense of the building code requirements or who have no ownership of the building that they inhabit. One option to encourage adherence to codes and controls is to link them to some form of subsidy or incentives, together with training for the public and inspections to ensure that compliance is being achieved. Nevertheless, it would still be optimistic to assume that marginal settlements and most rural areas will benefit from cultural heritage codes and controls without comprehensive planning that incorporates a wide spectrum of their economic and social needs.

Belief and religion

One of the most significant aspects of culture is religion, and religious belief is of great importance to people within many war-torn societies. Indeed, for those bereft of everything they held dear, religion is often their psychological lifeline. Therefore, attempts at grafting western-conceived notions of secularism onto deeply religious societies should be resisted. In some situations, religious differences may have been emphasised by ‘conflict entrepreneurs’, in a bid to exploit and exacerbate conflict. The result is that much of the cultural heritage targeted during conflict is often of a religious nature (for example, mosques, churches, temples, schools, graveyards, etc).

17 Conversely, a slow and unplanned response could result in the public taking its own actions to repair or rebuild without proper guidance and control by the authorities.
In these contexts emphasis needs to be placed on promoting inter-community dialogue, helping people to re-connect with those traditions of tolerance and inter-dependence that have often characterised for centuries their highly diverse communities. Recognizing and valuing the core beliefs of different communities need not be divisive if mechanisms are established to ensure that members of different faith communities meet together frequently to discuss matters of common concern—focusing on that which unites them in their common humanity rather than that which divides. It is only on this basis that they are likely to participate fully in a collective reconstruction process.

Unfortunately the international emphasis on multi-culturalism and neutrality makes humanitarian agencies shy away from recognizing the central role of religion. For example, agencies often offer to create community centres instead of restoring the religious centre, the mosque, church, or temple, that was the heart of the community and its meeting place. A recent example is the rebuilding of war-torn Aceh after the tsunami, when the mosque which survived at Teunom became a symbol of protection for the population, with many taking temporary shelter in and around it. But people’s desire to restore the mosque was ignored by relief agencies for a number of reasons when it came to making reconstruction priorities. Some agencies thought that religious buildings were beyond their mandate, while others with a heritage mandate discounted the cultural importance of the mosque as it was a relatively modern building. This was a missed opportunity to combine the recovery of cultural heritage with humanitarian relief.

Conclusions

Enormous international energies and resources have been devoted to postwar reconstruction in the past fifteen years; on balance, this is vastly preferable to international inertia. One should not forget the many instances in which international resources, together with local inputs, have had a positive impact on material conditions in postwar communities (for example, Mostar, Pocitelj (see Figs. 16 and 17), the Babur Gardens in Kabul, the revitalisation of the Old City of Jerusalem, and the Hebron City Centre). Unfortunately, however, the overwhelming experience of the last decade suggests that little real thought is given to the value and future role of cultural heritage in the reconstruction of many countries emerging from conflict. All too often, the starting point of

FIGURES 16 and 17
The village of Pocitelj in Bosnia Herzegovina was devastated in 1993, and its mosque destroyed. The village has now been successfully reconstructed.
the international response for postwar reconstruction appears to be one of opportunistic self-interest, related to concerns over Western security, terrorism, access to oil/natural resources, control of narcotics and so on, rather than a coherent vision of how to reintegrate the affected countries into the world community of nations, while helping them to preserve their own cultural identities. Related to this failing is the premature withdrawal of international interest and assistance from postwar societies.

As I have argued here, the challenge of addressing war-torn cultural heritage is infinitely more difficult and complex than is generally recognized. Primarily, it is imperative to realize that there are no quick fixes. Postwar recovery is a long and arduous process, particularly when it attempts to address the need to restore cultural heritage; in contrast, the attention span of the international community is notoriously short. Compounding this problem, there are no templates for postwar recovery. Each situation requires a tailored approach and needs to be sensitive to intra-regional cultural differences. Since normal actions for the protection of cultural heritage have been halted or reversed during violent conflict, the reconstruction process should reflect special conservation strategies. This will require theoretical underpinning, analytical methodologies, participatory policy-making processes and resources. Most of all it demands a synchronized effort from both international and local actors.

Towards realizing these complex goals, this chapter has attempted to marry theory with best practice, and to identify a set of nine critical lessons for the international postwar recovery of cultural heritage, based on in-depth field research of reconstruction within an extensive range of war-torn contexts. First, with reference to outsider expectations, it is wrong to assume that there is an automatic shared vision for the recovery of cultural heritage needs. In order to realize this long-term vision, it is also incorrect to assume that the continuation of political and financial support is a given. Similarly, an adequate level of competency to undertake rehabilitation and reconstruction work has often proven elusive. Fourth, conservation codes and legislation are important though difficult to enforce in the immediate aftermath of war.

As for recovery models, replacement and conservation approaches are not mutually exclusive in effective reconstruction. However, as I have argued, cultural heritage recovery usually needs to go beyond physical restoration and address the wider economic and social dimensions. Accordingly, the rapid recovery of cultural heritage is not without risk to both quality and authenticity, as well as to peace-building.

The last two deficiencies focused on an inability to secure local support for recovery. As its central pillar, the recovery of cultural heritage demands the active participation of affected communities. All the evidence of the last decade and beyond suggests that locally generated, developmentally oriented approaches prosper, whilst top-down, externally conceived solutions do not. Finally, and less tangibly, recovery of cultural heritage cannot avoid addressing issues of belief and religion.

Biography

Sultan Barakat, born in Kuwait of Palestinian/Jordanian parents, trained as an architect. He is the founding Director (in 1993) of the Postwar Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU) and Professor in the Department of Politics at the University of York (UK). He has been advisor to numerous governments, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, and has field experience in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Colombia, Indonesia (Aceh), Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kosovo, Lebanon, Nepal, Northern Ireland, Palestine, Philippines (Mindanao), Somalia (Puntland), Somaliland, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey, UAE, Vietnam, Uganda, and Yemen. He has recently edited the volume After the conflict: reconstruction and development in the aftermath of war (I.B.Tauris, 2005).

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Cities that have been internally partitioned along ethnic lines serve as warnings for all cities where inter-communal tensions exist. The paper summarizes key findings from research into five partitioned cities, namely: Beirut, Belfast, Jerusalem, Mostar; and Nicosia. They suggest that the process towards physical partition tends to be a relatively slow one, but that the prejudices and conflicts that develop during the process create a legacy that is hard to eradicate. The costs of partition are high in economic, political and social terms, with the lack of collective security a fundamental one. Comparative analysis of the five cases suggests that the probability of eventual partition can to some extent be predicted, and a call is made to professionals to equip themselves better with the necessary skills to intervene in such situations.
prior to unification would amount to the sanctioning of ethnic segregation. These excuses left most large-scale decisions about how the reconstruction would proceed to a small number of foreign donor agencies whose activities went largely unregulated and unquestioned.

Long treated as anomalies, divided cities are linked to each other by clear and coherent patterns. Urban partition results from concerns found in almost every city, such as ethnicity tied to political affiliation, institutional discrimination, physical security, fair policing, and shifting relations between majority and minority ethnic communities.

Our discussions with urban professionals, politicians, policy-makers, critics and residents in these five cities suggest that mistakes were made that might have been avoided. We learned that the symptoms of discord in the urban environment—most specifically, the physical partitions that encourage and tutor one ethnic community to disdain and violate another—constitute, in turn, a disease with its own pathology and symptoms, none of them especially desirable, nor totally unpredictable.

The heavy toll of living in a physically segregated environment calls for a concerted effort to understand the logic that governs divided cities. Divided city residents grapple with life under siege. Unlike soldiers, destined to leave the battlefield in one condition or another, the inhabitants of war-torn cities confront their terrors at home without means of retreat or escape. Even after politicians have secured a peace, the citizens struggle with losses that are beyond compensation and regret missed opportunities. A social contract is broken along the path to urban partition, and the costs of renegotiation tend to be high.

This study focused on the social impacts of partition with the assumption that urban space shapes collective behaviour and is shaped by it. More than simply the expression of inter-ethnic disturbance, partitions reinforce and encourage prejudicial thinking. Even after their removal, they endure as a psychological state, a temporal boundary, and a latent threat. For this reason, all agents—both passive and active—play a role in the shaping of a contested urban environment and bear an awful responsibility for the social impacts of division.

Yet urban planners, architects, historic preservationists, and other professionals have routinely shied away from intervention. In their effort to avoid complicity, they have lapsed in their responsibility to defend the public interest in ethnically segregated cities. In addition, many traditional urban planning tools prove inadequate in the face of protracted inter-ethnic, intra-urban disputes. Beyond examining evolutionary patterns linking divided cities, this paper will seek to explain this professional abdication and explore opportunities for future engagement.

**Five Warning Beacons**

Because its development is marked by institutionalized fear and suspicion, the partitioned city acts as a warning beacon for all cities where inter-communal rivalry plays a potentially prominent role in social interactions. They can dismantle themselves, split,
and submit to almost limitless siege within their own boundaries; they construct interior borders, wrestle internal enemies, and convert natives into strangers.

Running contrary to conventional wisdom and gathering speed, old forms of fraternal violence are lodging themselves in cities where security can no longer be guaranteed. Jerusalem is increasingly divided, as the Israelis frantically forge a hermetic seal against threats from the Palestinian hinterland; Serbian and Albanian residents of Mitrovica have split themselves on either side of the Ibar River; riots between the Hausas and Yorubas of Nigeria have ravaged Lagos; Hindus and Muslims clash routinely in Ahmedabad; sovereignty in Kirkuk is contested by several ethnic groups in the wake of regime change; Cincinnati’s racial fault lines were activated by police brutality; Singapore is nervous; even Brussels, capital of the European Union, may be sundered by a purely local racial separatism movement called the Vlaams Blok. The list is long and growing.

The five divided cities that have been examined in detail are commonly perceived as products of inscrutable internecine conflicts that are antithetical to normal urban culture. Contrary to such perceptions, this paper suggests that divided cities are neither aberrations nor anomalies; every city, no matter how sick or how healthy it is with respect to inter-ethnic relations, can be located along a continuum from integration to partition. Every city contains ethnic fault lines reinforced by volunteers. At the far end of this gradient, where the ‘urban contract’ is broken, we find the divided city. Evidence gleaned from the five cities examined here suggests that, given comparable circumstances and pressures, any city could undergo a comparable metamorphosis. It offers guidance to urban managers who seek to avoid the enormous costs of physical segregation.

A profile of the divided city

Comparative analysis of the five cities points to the following generalizations:

1. The activation of inter-ethnic boundaries in an urban domain is an incremental, slow, and predictable process in which the appearance of physical partitions constitutes a very late phase. In each city examined, initial episodes of intercommunal violence did not lead inexorably to widespread violence and mandatory segregation in cities that ultimately became physically partitioned. Frustration and bigotry were often promoted by sectarian political entrepreneurs, paramilitary organizers and foreign governments with much to gain from territorial redistribution.

2. The divided city diverges from a normal development track due not to an unusual predisposition to violence and bigotry but to the presence of certain catalysts, destabilizing circumstances, and interested third parties. For example, urban partition often accompanies a power vacuum at the regional or national level when now fallen governments had previously held nationalistic ambitions in check. In the case of Mostar, a vacuum of devastating proportions was created with the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia, followed by a hailstorm of ethno-nationalist propaganda reminding Bosnians of historic animosities that had long been dormant. In the case of Palestine, World War II and the Holocaust accelerated the development of an international consensus for the creation of an Israeli state in the Middle East, provoking feelings of insecurity that under normal circumstances might have been dissipated through a more incremental process of assimilation. Other major instances of a regional destabilization corresponding to divided cities are listed in the table on the following page.

3. Inter-ethnic violence in a divided city is sparked off by relative deprivation, rather than by conditions of hardship measured in objective or absolute terms. Legal restrictions on employment, housing and education that were imposed on disenfranchised ethnic minorities preceded and intensified ethnic tensions in Belfast, Beirut, and Jerusalem. A useful example is the exclusion of Catholic students from secondary schools in Belfast, a policy that automatically disqualified them from substantial political participation and white-collar jobs. Twenty-four years after the Education Act was finally passed in 1944, the first generation of university-educated Catholics in Northern Ireland initiated a campaign of protest, leading directly to government backlash and the outbreak of The Troubles. Unfair allocation of resources, combined with a new awareness of the scope of the injustice, contributed to a series of violent recriminations.

4. Divided cities result from territorial disputes between one community claiming indigenous status and another comprising newcomers or
settlers. This pattern is easily demonstrated, with the rapid influx of new urban residents from rural areas generally prompting feelings of insecurity and bigotry in native residents. Rural immigrants are usually of a single ethnic identity, retain strong provincial loyalties to their villages, and have less exposure to formal education than their urban neighbours. Problems arise from this type of demographic shift when it is accompanied by poor assimilation. In Beirut, for example, residents of Palestinian refugee camps established in 1948 have yet to be functionally or formally incorporated into Beirut society. These camps provided numerous recruitment opportunities for the Palestinian Liberation Organization when it settled in Beirut in the early 1970s, leading to a rapid escalation in paramilitary violence throughout the city.

5. The long-term impacts of urban partition are negative and continue to harm residents well beyond political reconciliation and physical unification, if these ever take place.

That urban partition along ethnic lines may be predicted is encouraging. The value of a predictive model is high because many cities in the world currently appear to be on trajectories similar to those followed by Mostar, Nicosia, Belfast, Beirut and Jerusalem. As more urban managers and residents cope with the challenge of physical segregation, a firm grasp of the logic of the divided city appears increasingly relevant.

### Ethnicity, politics, and violence

Divided cities are often located at the epicentre of violent contests concerning national identity and sovereignty. They are often the product of a zero-sum game played between neighbouring communities seeking security and refusing compromise with each other. They are a beachhead for sovereignty struggles grounded in irredentism and ultra-nationalism.

Why do some mixed cities resort to physical partition while others do not? One important factor may be the degree to which ethnicity predicts political affiliation: ‘in some places, identity politics came to define the logic of the political game, and in other places, it did not. In those places where it did, the odds of violence were higher...The incentives and constraints offered by political institutions, and the strength of those institutions to follow through, largely determined those odds’ (Crawford and Lipschutz 1998: 3).

Our research indicates that the ethnic rivalries governing urban partitions often obscure more fundamental social tensions, like those felt between the professional and working classes, indigenes and settlers, or powerful minorities and marginalized majorities. Some scholars have even suggested that ethnically motivated discrimination and violence are provoked by 'sectarian political entrepreneurs' whose political fortunes rely on intergroup competition and antagonism. On this important theme the work of Crawford and Lipschutz (1998) is indispensable. Ethnic conflict may appear intractable, but more because it is artificial than because it is endemic.

As they emerge in the popular consciousness, chronic insecurities and a willingness to consider desperate remedies are often harnessed by politicians pledging reform through resistance and segregation. The frameworks that they advocate generally ensure that political affiliation is bound to heredity so that ethnic identity becomes 'the principle of incorporation into the political community' since 'ethnicity is based on a myth of collective ancestry, which usually carries with it traits believed to be innate' (Horowitz 1985: 52). This exploitative dynamic between marginalized minority ethnic groups and racist politicians has direct implications on core issues such as resource allocation and participation in municipal
decision-making. It emerges frequently in the late stages of a divided city’s evolution.

One reason why municipal governments are hesitant to address the subject of partition is that the barricades are a measure of their own failure to fulfill a basic mandate. Another reason is that the walls, whether illicit, scandalous, or ugly, tend to curb intercommunal violence more cheaply and effectively in the short term than does police surveillance. They solve a profound, longstanding problem in a superficial, temporary way.

If such partitions worked over the long term, urban dividing walls could be considered an unfortunate but effective response to ethnic conflict. However, as passive security devices they are a failure for the municipal government, and this is just one of many reasons why their construction should be questioned. In many cases, these partitions also postpone or even preclude a negotiated settlement between ethnic antagonists because they create a climate of dampened violence, sustained distrust and low-grade hostility. Urban partitions seem to reduce violent confrontation while justifying fear and paranoia. If there were no actual danger, this logic suggests, the walls would no longer be standing. In this way, the partition becomes the emblem of threat as much as a bulwark against it.

In reply to such lapses in traditional urban peacekeeping, urban communities resort to riot, revolt, and threats of secession, and to activating paramilitary organizations and spreading uninjected paranoia. New walls between rival ethnic groups are constantly emerging, while old scars are stubborn in healing. The causes for rivalry, along with an awareness of forsaken alternatives, generally go unrecognized.

Politicians—both those embroiled in the ethnic conflicts and those who attempt to intercede on behalf of the international community—often become mired in short-term policy fixes that are designed in response to a crisis. Official advocacy of urban partition as a reply to ethnic conflict was once shunned, but is now common. Physical segregation has emerged over the last fifty years as one of the most popular and most myopic solutions to intergroup violence in the urban environment.

The cost of partition

The negative impacts of urban division are legion. Even where political advantages accrue to rival communities seeking isolation, voluntary and involuntary partitions have brought death, suffering, disorientation, loss, and social anaemia wherever they appear. Composite estimates for loss of life in relation to inter-ethnic violence are varied and difficult to confirm, while figures tied to specific cities are even less common. The most explicit statistics have been generated for Belfast, where most studies cite around 1,500 Troubles-related deaths there, out of a total of 3,500 in Northern Ireland during the years 1969–2001. In Cyprus a total of approximately 2,700 deaths has been unofficially linked to civil unrest during the years 1955–85. In Lebanon, where war deaths were largely concentrated in Beirut, most estimates hover around a hundred and fifty thousand dead during the years 1975–90. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, civil war estimates of total military and civilian dead range between sixty thousand and two hundred and fifty thousand during the years 1992–5. In Israel and the Palestinian territories, the total deaths from the first and second intifadas are estimated at around 2,700 during the years 2000–3.

Walls at an urban scale are expensive to build, maintain and monitor. In some cases, elaborate no-man’s lands must be constructed and patrolled, while in others checkpoints and transit stations track movements at each crossing. New physical and institutional infrastructure must be built on both sides of an urban partition to replace what was left behind, and whole bureaucracies blossom in order to address problems of jurisdiction, compensation, and encroachment. Rather than investing in the growth or prosperity of an urban community, partition-era administrations must spend lavishly to resist the back-sweeping tide of intercommunal violence.

Constrained by this system, the lives of urban residents are disfigured along with the fabric of the city. Family members and friends are often wounded or killed. Property is lost, social networks are shattered, and opportunities are forfeited. Physical safety is constantly open to question, and psychological well-being is universally undermined. Most regret the loss of places where their memories once held sway.

While political struggles determine the behaviour of the city as a whole, residents with little stake in the negotiations pay a high price for long-term destabilization and violence. Psychological trauma is often suffered by those who have least to do with partition: the student, the mother, the pensioner, the soldier, etc.

Individual or household deprivation can be correlated with its proximity to sectarian interfaces in divided cities. Without exception, property values and the quality of life go down along the boundaries of contested areas regardless of, and often due to, the presence of walls. Those who live along these interfaces typically either lack better options or choose to be there in order to assert a political agenda.
There is no easy way to grasp the losses and deprivation that accompany urban partition. In relation to the full spectrum of injuries bound up with the divided city, these voices address only logistical concerns. They reflect the outlook of normal residents with little stake in the political struggles that left their hometown broken. Long after war and partitions fade, as they have in Beirut, countless individuals still find their sense of belonging shaken and their prospects dimmed. For many divided city residents, partition corresponds with a sense of lost time and opportunity that may never be regained.

**Breakdown of the urban contract**

The walls of a city have always been the outward sign and guarantee of a special kind of social contract between the city and its citizens, meant to provide a stable, passive security infrastructure. This infrastructure is a prerequisite for sustained economic and cultural development. Citizens provide their services in a dense, expensive environment in return for the provision of reliable infrastructure, social opportunities and passive security from urban managers. In its most basic form, this might be understood as the urban contract.

When this contract is threatened or broken, the fabric of the city is sometimes tailored until baseline security needs are met, resulting in physical partitions where distinct ethnic groups which are vying for sovereignty live in close proximity. The urban wall has always been the result of an ongoing, sometimes highly volatile, process of negotiation between the city and its enemies, its allies, its elites, and its marginalized residents. Minimizing real and perceived group vulnerability is a primary force shaping city-making and partitioning. Urban apartheid schemes generally signal a failure of governance and diplomacy because they rely on avoidance and intimidation—and not on elements of social cohesion.

Decision-makers who look on as the cities under their jurisdiction slide towards ethnic apartheid are quick to point out that their hands were tied by external powers, or that the violence was imminent, or that their failed attempts at rapprochement were in earnest. The result observed in Belfast (Figs. 20 and 21) is nearly identical to those in the other divided cities under examination here: ‘sustained violent conflict has infused decision-makers in a range of policy sectors with a sense of hopelessness that has allowed them to draw limits on the impact of their brief’ (Neill et al. 1995: 210).

In response, urban residents whose best interests are routinely disregarded sometimes choose to abandon the systems that no longer serve them. They typically replace their faith in the police with their own sectional paramilitaries and their allegiance to political representation with the decision to take direct action.
Under extreme circumstances, one of the first projects of such a group is to erect barricades between themselves and their immediate enemies. Citing threats to their physical well-being, both real and presumed, these communities call the bluff of politicians who defend failed systems of social control or claim impartiality with respect to the rights of minority groups. From this first moment of abandonment, all other episodes of urban division follow according to a rational sequence. It remains only to isolate and understand the steps that lead up to this initial break in order to characterize the process of urban partition in general terms.

The relationship between urban partitioning and failed local government was clarified by a Belfast politician:

Unless you move to manage your society, any area of conflict or potential conflict will end up exactly the same way as us. The reaction to fear—it's the same the world over…Once you have a population that believes that it’s not safe to live among the other side, then they begin to look for other ways to live…they don’t take the risk. Why take the risk? Can I afford to give up my peace of mind? Is that not a human thing, rather than a Belfast thing or a Beirut thing or a Mostar thing? It’s a human thing.

(D. Ervine, personal communication 2001)

Physical partitions indicate a failure to provide security at the municipal scale. They are best viewed, not as the by-product of endemic internecine rivalry, but as symptoms of a broken contract between vulnerable ethnic communities and the city managers. Physical partitions strongly suggest that the need for collective security, especially for minority groups that are already marginalized, can overshadow many conventional social and practical concerns. When considering the problems generated by the divided city condition, the most important questions centre upon how and why the ability erodes of urban managers to meet the security and development needs of resident communities. Walls often postpone the answer, as observed by a community worker in Belfast: ‘We find that peacelines address a symptom, but not the problem. If my windows are being broken every night, putting a twenty-foot fence in front of my windows can stop them from being broken. It doesn’t do anything to address what it is that makes that person want to break my windows’ (C. O’Halloran, personal communication 2001).

Physical partition can be understood as a minority community’s reaction to urban expansion beyond the point where group identity is threatened. In such a scenario, division acts as a tool for the decomposition of the urban whole into defensible social formations composed of integrated, manageable ethnic clusters. The desire to hem in an ethnically distinct community against the forces of assimilation is a defensive impulse and a form of conserving one’s cultural heritage. The enclaves that result provide a sanctuary when interaction with the dominant majority group becomes especially stressful, hazardous or competitive. Urban residents, as consumers of policies generated by urban managers, take the measure of their overall security and prosperity and seek to adjust the terms of their urban contract accordingly. They are the ones for whom passive physical security matters most.

When urban residents find that their vulnerability has reached intolerable levels in the urban environment, a core component of the conventional urban contract is missing. Some form of compensation must then be identified. A common cycle was described by a Belfast interface resident in straightforward terms:

It is frustrating. You have no where to go on it. Petrol bombs thrown into the street…reports about who started it…police saying that the Catholics put scorch marks on the ground to have an excuse for fighting. What would I do? Go to complain at the police station? They would tell me to get lost. If there was a problem, the police wouldn’t come out. The police come and put their spotlights on us. Never arrest any of the Protestants…I think that’s where the problem is. I think if you said, “Look, we’re going to start taking walls down around here”, people would say, “Hm. Who’s going to protect us?” Because nobody trusts the police to protect us. Not that police force anyway.

(P. Mcatamney, personal communication 2001)

Urban managers are obliged to provide positive conditions for personal and commercial prosperity at a cost that does not burden the public budget. Seeking to construct and maintain an efficient social mechanism, they aim to promote the highest levels of prosperity at the lowest social costs in terms of poverty and discord. In most cities, this equilibrium is achieved without disrupting the physical and functional unity of the whole entity.

The ethnic violence that generally characterizes divided cities presents urban managers with an equation that is difficult to balance. They must try
to preserve favourable conditions for the majority of urban residents without leading the city into bankruptcy. In this context, the economic value of dividing lines in relation to limited municipal budgets can be seen to contribute to their popularity as a short-term solution to security crises.

It was necessary. The alternative would have been to flood the area with police: the walls serve the same function. There is very little else you can do as a quick fix. You always hope they will no longer be required. It gets down to security at the end the day...In Belfast, the government pays the insurance cost, so they put in the walls. But they do frustrate dialogue, there’s no doubt about that.

(J. MAIRS, PERSONAL COMMUNICATION 2000)

Where intercommunal violence is rife, partitions are sometimes used as policing tools by local governments that lack the resources to support continuous police surveillance or lack political motivation to devise less socially disruptive solutions.

Likewise, beleaguered residents prefer the stark reassurance of a wall despite its many inconveniences and demoralizing effects. For them, taking the long view is in many ways impractical: ‘Some people want a wall up and some people don’t. I prefer a wall up, but that’s only because I have a young family. I’d be happy in a minute if they just put a wall up and just blocked it up completely. Because there’s nothing that’s going to happen between us and them up there...I prefer a wall’ (P. McAtamney, personal communication 2001).

Some observers have noted that violently alienated and dichotomized ethnic groups ‘strive to concretize the dichotomy by creating a dual physical and social environment’ (Benvenisti 1982: 4).

When breaches or compromises with respect to this security take place, urban residents are forced to accommodate the resulting violence or trauma directly. The urban wall clearly assists with this process of accommodation. This fact is central to a discussion of why urban walls, which are in some ways so dysfunctional, have proven so durable. It points to a pragmatic logic that goes a long way towards explaining the tendency of urban managers to subsidize ethnic partition and can be considered separate from broader questions of causation and responsibility. Urban walls have been utilized repeatedly, as the products of careful deliberation, by many urban managers seeking to shore up chronic injury ethnic violence in their jurisdiction.

Proximal catastrophe

One common characteristic of all five divided cities is a precipitous and unexpected downturn in regional economic prospects during the years prior to the imposition of coercive internal segregation. In some cases, as in Jerusalem and Beirut, local security concerns were rapidly eclipsed by regional power struggles that disrupted a social equilibrium and created power vacuums that were ultimately filled by ultranationalist political entrepreneurs.

Space becomes territory to be defended for its own sake when it has been politicized and converted into a symbolic commodity. In this way political legitimacy is often conflated with urban territory. The infusion of urban space with special meanings is a conscious process that tends to mask or obscure the larger, more essential elements of a social crisis.

In Belfast and Mostar, political instability was compounded by industrial downturns that had severe effects on employment and morale among working-class urban residents. Collective feelings of alienation, humiliation, and deprivation prompted many underprivileged ethnic minority communities to question the benefits that they could expect from the urban contract. In some instances, the terms of the contract had shifted with political events; in others, the contract remained intact while new circumstances shed light on longstanding iniquities.

Many ethnic rivalries stem, directly or indirectly, from broad-based class conflict. The pre-conflict histories of Beirut, Mostar, Nicosia, and Jerusalem show that social tensions were as much a product of economic strife as sectarian rivalry, yet the class conflicts were more successfully forestalled.

This important theme was explored at some length by scholars of early Irish history, one of whom notes regarding Belfast during the mid-1920s:

Working-class leaders sought to advance the political and economic interests of their class by uniting Protestant and Catholic workers in trade unions and challenging the absolute power of the industrialists and gentry. The Tory elite sought to preserve its prerogatives by fostering sectarian strife among its opponents...The Orange Lodge, financed by Belfast industrialists and dedicated to the preservation of Protestant supremacy, had become the dominant institution of the Protestant working class. Fearing the imagined horrors of Catholic power (Home Rule equals Rome rule) and jealous of...
their marginal advantages over Catholics, Protestant workers ignored their real economic interests and gave their support to the Unionist party.

(HENDERSON ET AL. 1974: 209)

Another useful example is found in Cyprus, where Communist organizers on both sides of the island attempted to forge lines of communication and cooperation as tensions grew in the 1950s. An anthropologist in Nicosia described this attempt to create cross-cutting linkages based on shared economic interests in detail:

Another very serious rift is the conflict between the left and the right. The left had created very important bicomunal structures of cooperation in the past, through labour organizing and trade unions. But as the two sides were drifting apart—with Enosis versus Taksim—those who tried to cooperate were deemed traitors by both sides because they were supposed to be the enemies. This is why many leftists were killed by people on their own side, on both sides of the island, and this is why now the two left-wing parties are still in very close solidarity.

(Y. PAPADAKIS, PERSONAL COMMUNICATION 2002)

As in Northern Ireland, early attempts to avoid interethnic conflict failed in large part due to competing political forces, leaving the economic foundation of much social upheaval largely unexamined.

The annals of divided cities are full of similar instances in which promising avenues of negotiation and cooperation were blocked while policy-makers accepted the view that intraclass, intergroup conflicts were intractable. Such shortsighted interpretations consolidate habits of discrimination and encourage the institutionalization of difference within municipal government. Ethnic partition sometimes follows, appearing to affirm a self-fulfilling prophecy of violence, distrust and endemic conflict.

The challenge of professional intervention

Effective and just professional responses to urban partition are rare. For experts trained to solve problems in the built environment—urban planners, architects, and conservators—the divided city presents a nightmare scenario for which sure-fire remedies do not exist. Split, suffocating cities do not frequently appear in textbooks, and the complications of ethnic violence are generally assumed to be the concern of other disciplines. Academic training for planners and architects usually serves these polarized circumstances poorly, since segregation is typically lumped together with other forms of urban blight without considering the specific economic pressures and social weaknesses that divided cities reveal.

In the realm of ethnically divided cities, the absent professional is everywhere in evidence; violence, partition, and recovery proceed without the benefit of coordinated design, planning, or conservation strategies:

Nicosia remains shattered, its buffer zone only surveyed in 2005 after thirty-one years of total abandonment and neglect. Paid little attention by foreign professionals, frozen in place by third-party interventions, monitored by two armies and the United Nations, scarred by blighting and dereliction on both sides of the interface, the capital of Cyprus remains crippled both physically and functionally.

In Jerusalem, deprivation in the eastern neighbourhoods contrasts ever more sharply with suburbanization in the west. Scars of the former Armistice Line remain visible, while landscaping projects along the skirt of the walled city have not succeeded in erasing the memory of partition. New lines—in the form of roads, trenches, and checkpoint—are etched every day between Israelis and Palestinians in the occupied West Bank.

Likewise, peaceline construction continues at a brisk pace in Belfast, where communities still petition for new barricades in addition to horizontal and vertical extensions to existing walls. No city-wide physical security planning complements these micro-engineered remedies, and no peaceline has yet been removed.

Beirut has left postwar reconstruction in the hands of private developers, whose attentions focus solely on the elite financial district.

Mostar continues to stumble through its tenth year of piecemeal rehabilitation as the local economy withers.

Built-environment professionals are easily lost in the gap that separates anticipated problems from actual ones in the context of a divided city. They often lack vital skills, such as being able to negotiate diplomatically among rival groups, and to perform social needs assessments in the absence of a stable central government; the ability to decipher and interpret territorial markers, and to accommodate
irrational security concerns into planning strategies; and the acceptance of bigotry as a baseline condition for planning. The effectiveness of design professionals in the context of a divided city is limited by the extent to which their training and original assumptions bar them from operating under social conditions that they perceive to be distasteful and dysfunctional. Until the dilemmas that result from this are addressed by reforming their professional education and providing them with wider consultation, wasted potential and disillusionment among planning professionals are likely to predominate.

Despite all the disadvantages stacked against them, however, built-environment professionals still retain a significant and mostly unrealized potential to shape policy and assist in the broader process of coping with the negative impacts of urban partition. It seems probable that their lack of on-site training and preparation constrains their effective involvement more than any other single factor. The field of urban planning has been slow to acknowledge post-conflict scenarios as part of its repertoire, leaving that domain in the meantime undertheorized and lacking a professional literature to support the development and critique of strategic approaches to ethnic division.

Some experts attempt to rise above the fray, like the sewage engineer in Nicosia who cleared paths through the political minefield in which he works:

> Both sides are working for the benefits of human beings. We are not working for the Turkish, or for the Greeks, or for the Muslims, or for Christians. We are working for the human beings. If you say, ‘Hey I am Turkish’ or ‘I am English,’ there is no chance to work. You say, ‘I am a human being. And I am an engineer, and I have to work for the benefit of human beings.’

(N. ÖZNEl, PERSONAL COMMUNICATION 2001)

But in most divided cities the notion of public welfare, an anchoring concept for most urban planning strategies, is called into question. Once this moral compass is demagnetized, even veteran practitioners feel the vertigo. For some, the common good becomes difficult to define:

> In divided cities it’s waste, it’s ugly, it’s cruel, it’s unfair, it’s disharmony. The whole thing can be defined as a disharmonious situation. You come to a place, and you say: ‘Okay, so what am I going to do to rectify the situation, to ameliorate the situation, to do something positive?’ And people look at you and say: ‘What do you mean by positive?

Positive for whom?’ And you say: ‘What do you mean for whom? For the good of humankind.’ They say: ‘Humankind? You mean Jewish, or Arab?’ And then you say, for instance: ‘There is a common good!’ And they say: ‘Oh... you are a philosopher!"

(M. BENvenisti, PERSONAL COMMUNICATION 2003)

Because professional engagement with divided cities is fraught, most experts avoid it or continue to work from within discredited political mechanisms, as if conditions were normal. In choosing their course, a dilemma is unavoidable: to participate is inevitably perceived as being partisan, while inaction squanders opportunities to assist traumatized communities. Neither option presents clear prospects for satisfaction and success.

The neutrality and objectivity that are so much part of the professional’s ordinary mindset cannot be sustained. Professionals attempting to avoid taking sides often find that a political affiliation has been assigned to them, since noncommittal behaviour can be viewed by both rivals and critics of the state as a tacit affirmation of the status quo or as ‘instrumental in the exercise of state repression and coercion’ (Bollens 2000: 14). In highly dichotomized circumstances, indifference to sectarian concerns is often equated with callousness and complicity in the minds of local antagonists. The lack of reliable and satisfactory political patronage eliminates a major prerequisite for co-ordinated professional involvement.

The majority of built-environment professionals choose to wait for political solutions and the return of working conditions with which they are familiar: ‘Thinking about that and talking with colleagues who have been working in the area of urban planning for twenty, thirty years, I must say that I am disappointed. I am disappointed by those colleagues’ way of thinking and their vision of the city’ (T. Rozic, personal communication 2000).

Local professionals become marginalized as whole sections of their cities are destroyed and partitions offend many of the basic principles underlying progressive urban development. This approach leaves the divided city without expert assistance at junctures characterized by extreme vulnerability and volatility. It is exactly at these moments—when the traditional patrons of design and urban planning are weakened, and when faith in public institutions is at a low ebb—that thoughtful and balanced physical interventions are most needed. Without such interventions, politicians are left to manage the physical segregation of cities alone, without the practical or theoretical tools required to do the job well. Bad decisions
and hasty solutions create walls that generate new sets of problems and antagonisms, even while they extinguish some immediate and localized brushfires.

There is thus a lack of a systematic response to the dilemma of partition among built-environment professionals. They are typically absent from the political discourse regarding physical segregation as a solution to inter-ethnic disputes. Given the enormous costs of urban partition, the consequences of this kind of professional acquiescence can be grave. New roles need to be carved out by built-environment professionals in order to improve their effectiveness under conditions of abnormal stress, violence, and discord in a segregated urban environment.

How can built-environment professionals, and conservators in particular, find a more meaningful role in these cycles where their skills are so urgently needed? How can they overcome the obstacles inherent in their training and institutional culture to participate in a constructive, appropriate way? Meron Benvenisti may provide a clue when he notes that the efforts of most professionals in the arena of inter-ethnic conflict are ‘ineffective because of the complex relationship between real and perceived environments’ and complains that they all seek conflict resolution: ‘the partisan seeks to eliminate conflict by winning it; the professional, by improving real environment; and the resolver, by a compromise. The endemic and organic nature of the conflict render all their efforts futile, because communal conflicts have no ultimate solution’ (Benvenisti 1982). If this assertion is correct, it illuminates a possible path forward where success is measured in incremental improvements to psychological well-being rather than in the restitution of contested symbols.

Reflections

The problems of divided cities generally appear somewhat exotic; it is difficult to be sure of their relevance since until now so few cities have slipped over the edge. The discussions and presentations made during the ICCROM Forum, however, suggest that the divided city phenomenon is simply part of a much larger one: the urban landscape politically segregated into racially homogeneous sectors. Other contributors to this volume show how this process has scarred the residential quarters of the West Bank (Amiry and Bshara), several towns and cities in western sub-Saharan Africa (Diamitani), ancient sites in southern Mexico (Magar) and a landmark shrine in Sri Lanka (Wijesuriya). It seems that there might be a vocabulary, grammar and syntax that governs the process of involuntary, violent spatial separation and splitting. With further discussion, collaboration, and research, these governing principles may be brought further into the light. This may yield unexpected insights and advantages for the innocent inhabitants who always pay the highest price at the local level.

Biography

Jon Calame studied art history (BA) at Yale University, and historic preservation (MA) at Columbia University’s School of Architecture in New York (1985). After working as Special Projects Manager at the non-profit World Monuments Fund in New York, he was a founding Partner and Operations Officer of Minerva Partners, a New York-based consultancy for cultural heritage conservation and social development. One area of specialization is postwar urban reconstruction; his research on divided cities was supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. http://www.minervapartners.org/html/home.html

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Note

This paper synthesizes some of the research conducted in 1998-2003 by Jon Calame and Esther Charlesworth thanks to a Global Security and Sustainability research grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. It is the subject of a book to be published in late 2007 by the University of Pennsylvania Press. The personal communications cited in this paper refer to a series of interviews carried out by the author between 2000 and 2002.

References


The Lao civil war (1953–73) had a severe impact on the cultural heritage of the Hmong people, some of whom who are still living in Laos but many of whom were displaced by the war from Laos to other countries in Asia and throughout the world. After a historical and geographical introduction, the paper describes how the Hmong have tried to preserve their cultural identity, using as examples their ethnic costume and music. Modern media have played an important role in preserving, disseminating and transforming Hmong identities, which has resulted in a strong transnational and dynamic culture and a shared national consciousness that has survived the post-war dispersion of populations.

This Paper Focuses on the ways in which members of an ethnic community have tried to preserve their cultural identity after going through more than twenty years of war.

The armed conflict in question is the Lao civil war (1953–73) and the people are the Hmong who were displaced by the war from Laos to other countries or who are still living in Laos. The aim is to study the impact that the war had on the Hmong cultural heritage, and the outcomes of the Hmong’s attempts at cultural recovery within the homeland or in the diaspora.

The paper begins by locating the Hmong in their historical and geographical context. It then touches on the five themes that had been proposed by the organizers of the ICCROM Forum and the conservation strategies used by the Hmong, such as formal learning, electronic recording and broadcasting, the Internet, newspapers and books, story cloths, video and film making, and the commercialization of cultural artefacts. It concludes by looking at the resultant new Hmong identity and its implications for an ‘authentic’ Hmong culture.

Geographical and historical context

The Hmong number more than ten million worldwide, if other branches of the Miao ethnic population are included, with more than nine million of them in China. Apart from those in Western countries, the subgroup known as Hmong currently numbers more than five million worldwide, with four million of them in southern China, 600,000 in Vietnam, 400,000 in Laos, 120,000 in Thailand, and 2–3,000 in Myanmar (Tapp and Lee 2005).

The only land-locked country in Southeast Asia, with an area of 236,800 square kilometres, Laos is bordered by Cambodia in the south, China in the north, Myanmar and Thailand in the west, and Vietnam in the east. The Mekong River runs along most of its western border. With many mountainous and forested areas, its total arable land is only about four percent—mostly along the Mekong river valley. The country’s agriculture and transportation are often affected by the tropical monsoon that
dominates its weather patterns from May through October each year (Savada 1994: chapter 2).

The 1995 Laos population census (Lao State Planning Committee 1997) shows the number of Hmong as 315,465, or 6.9 per cent of the total population of 4,574,848—the fourth largest ethnic group after the Lao (52.5%), Phutai (10.3%) and Khmu (11%). The Hmong are found in all of northern Laos down to Bolikhamsay province, with the majority living in Xieng Khouang. They are rural mountain dwellers, although an increasing number now live in Vientiane city as public servants, students or factory workers. On the whole, they continue to engage in subsistence agriculture with some hunting, fishing and gathering.

There are no historical records to show from where the Hmong originated. Some claim that they left Mesopotamia in Biblical times, then migrated north through Russia, Siberia and Mongolia before settling in their present location (Savina 1924 and Quincy 1988: 16–17). Others believe that they have always been in southern China, since well before their territories had been occupied by the Chinese (Ch’e 1947 and Yang 1995). The Hmong first migrated to Laos in the nineteenth century, mostly through Tonkin (North Vietnam).

From 1893, France controlled Laos as part of its Indochina empire. The war to recover Laos from France was started by the Lao Issara (Free Lao) in 1945 and, despite formal independence in 1954, it continued when the USA became involved in Indochina to stop the spread of communism after the French withdrawal. By then, the Lao Issara had managed to control most of northern Laos, the home territory of the Hmong and other hill tribes. From the beginning, the Hmong had been drawn in to fight on both sides of the conflict. Those who were under the French sided with the rightist Royal Lao Government (RLG), while those in areas controlled by the communist Pathet Lao (PL), who replaced the Lao Issara, remained with them. The RLG received support from the United States of America and the PL from North Vietnam and the Soviet Union. After 1961, North Vietnamese troops became heavily involved in battles on behalf of the PL. The American CIA, fearing a communist victory, began recruiting Hmong into the so-called secret army under the Hmong leader, General Vang Pao.

By January 1961, there were 4,300 Hmong in the CIA secret army, gradually increasing to 19,000 in 1964 and building toward a strength of 23,000 (Prados 2003: 97, 100 and 165). Despite a Second Geneva Conference in 1961–2 to end the Lao hostilities, the war continued until the 1973 Paris Ceasefire Agreements halted American military involvement in Indochina, thus hastening the communist takeover and the collapse in 1975 of rightist factions in Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam. Laos is now known as the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) with its own new communist flag.

After 1975, the Hmong on the RLG side fled Laos to seek asylum in Thailand and later found permanent settlement in Western countries. Thus, today 200,000 are found in the United States; 20,000 in France; 1,800 in Australia; 1,400 in Canada; 500 in Argentina and 110 in Germany. The majority who could not flee to Thailand submitted themselves to the communist Lao PDR, but about 16,000 went into hiding with their families in the jungles of Phu Bia, the highest mountain of Laos, and other areas from where they continued to resist the Lao authorities (Lee 1982: 212–14).

Changing Hmong Cultural Heritage

I will now discuss the five themes proposed by the organizers for the ICCROM Forum inasmuch as they apply to the Hmong cultural heritage.

Culture and Identity

A culture brings meaning to the lives of its members, and gives them a sense of belonging, a sense of identity through having a common history, language and other cultural attributes. Culture is thus a unifying force for its members, but it can also be a source of conflict in complex urban environments where many cultures co-exist and compete for recognition, and where a person may have multiple identities through affiliation with more than one role, subgroup and culture. When faced with new and incompatible demands, members of a culture may need to alter some of their cultural attributes to accommodate the new challenges, thereby also changing their cultural identity.

Two cultural items, one tangible (costumes) and one intangible (music), will be used here to illustrate Hmong identity change due to hybridity and external influences.

Ethnic Costumes

Before World War II, the Hmong lived isolated in the highlands of Laos. Apart from a colonial tax that they had to pay in opium and silver coins to the local chiefs, the Hmong did not need to venture from their villages since Chinese traders brought in those items they required from the outside world. In those early days, their ethnic costumes and their language were the most tangible group identifiers. White Hmong women used white hemp skirts and Green Hmong
women wore batik blue skirts; the men put on a black skullcap, and White Hmong men had a black turban wrapped around their head (Fig. 22).

After World War II, Hmong costumes gradually changed. As the Hmong became displaced by the Lao civil war and were unable to afford ethnic costumes or jewellery, they gave up their ethnic attires in preference for cheaper Western casual clothes for the men and Lao women costumes for the women. The Hmong were no longer mere subsistence hill farmers, but now refugees, students, soldiers, government officials, and business people. They were not only Hmong in their isolated jungle enclaves, but also Lao citizens living alongside other Lao people. Hmong costumes were still being used, but mainly for special occasions such as the New Year or weddings.

**Traditional Music**

Prior to and during the armed conflict, Hmong music consisted of singing and the playing of flute, mouth harp and reed pipe. Each instrument was played on its own, and the singing was done without any music. Traditional singing consists of learned or improvised poetry as lyrics which are set to folk tunes that vary from region to region or from one subgroup to another.

Hmong music changes dramatically after 1975 and settlement in the West. A few young men started to imitate modern music with Hmong lyrics set to band music. This new musical experiment went through further refinement and increased in popularity over the years, resulting in a whole new industry being born. It now has recording studios in Laos and the USA, along with a global commercial distribution network through Hmong shops and on the Internet. It has spawned many singers, ranging in taste from easy listening to rap music. This new music shows true hybridity, with tunes and lyrics borrowed from many cultures such as American, Indian, Chinese, Korean, or Thai. Except for the lyrics in Hmong, this modern music can no longer be used as a unique identifier for Hmong cultural identity as it is similar to the music of other cultural groups.

**Hmong Records of Memory**

The Hmong are a people of oral tradition and have no written records of their long history or culture. Books, libraries and archives were not found among them until 1953 when the Romanised Popular Alphabet (RPA), a Latin-based script, came into use in Laos; it is now widely adopted (Niyaj Pov 1991). With this system of writing there developed one of the longest-running attempts at Hmong records of memory in the work of Fr Yves Bertrais (also known in Hmong as Txiv Plig Niyaj Pov), a French Catholic priest. With the help of Hmong students in Laos in the early 1960s, he began collecting Hmong folk stories, religious rituals, traditional songs, wedding and funeral practices. After 1975, he went on to do further research among Hmong refugees in French Guyana with occasional visits to the Hmong in China. This lifetime undertaking has seen the publication since 1964 of twenty-two volumes in RPA, French and English in a collection called Patrimoine Culturel Hmong (Hmong Cultural Heritage), with other volumes in preparation.

Studies of other specialised areas of Hmong life, history and culture in China, Laos and Thailand, have been published in English, French, and Chinese by anthropologists and other writers. Hmong scholars have also started to publish on Hmong history and culture. A rare collection of historic photographs and colonial documents related to the Hmong during the French occupation of Laos is kept at the Musée de la France d’Outre-Mer at the University of Aix-en-Provence in the south of France. Today, large numbers of articles and books are published each year on the Hmong and are listed in online bibliographies by the Hmong Studies Resource Center in Minnesota, USA (see www.hmongstudies.org). A few oral history

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1 The publications by Fr Yves Bertrais are in the series Les livres de l’Association Patrimoine Culturel Hmong. Contact address: Patrimoine Culturel Hmong, P.O. BOX 2642, Quezon City, 1166 Philippines.
projects undertaken by schools in America have also been published. The Hmong Cultural Center in St. Paul, MN, (www.hmongcenter.org) puts out the peer-reviewed *Journal of Hmong Studies* twice a year and a newsletter updating the latest publications.

This recomposing of information about the Hmong has been greatly accelerated during the last ten years with a proliferation of on-line Internet information sources and discussion on a myriad of social issues connected with the Hmong. There are hundreds of Hmong websites on all kinds of subjects, individuals and groups. The homepage of www.hmongnet.org has many links to other websites, projects and community activities. Hmong in the USA also helped set up sites for the Hmong in Thailand, Laos and China, so that on-line contacts can be made or information shared with other Hmong worldwide. In addition, much information recomposing has been made through representation on video and audio recordings in Hmong which are sold commercially. There are video documentaries on Hmong communities in Laos, China, Burma and French Guyana (many of these have been made by Xu Thao of All-Pro Productions, California). They are very popular among the older illiterate Hmong who cannot read books or use the Internet. A popular series is the video reconstruction of Hmong history in Laos and China by Yuepheng Xiong of Hmongland Publishing, Minnesota, USA.

Another innovative method of social memory preservation has been the depiction of personal war experiences in embroidered story cloths and wall hangings. In the past most embroideries consisted only of geometric patterns of various shapes on small pieces of cloths. However, while in the refugee camps in Thailand, the Hmong quickly realised that there was a market for large handmade embroideries that showed Hmong village traditions in Laos or their war and refugee experiences. Today, many of these wall hangings are still produced by Hmong women, and sold through handicraft outlets to be used as decorations in offices, houses and museums in many parts of the world.

**Handicrafts and Traditions**

As a subsistence pastoral people, the Hmong have many handicrafts and well-established traditions, albeit mostly oral until recently.

**Handicrafts**

The Hmong used to do their own weaving, basket-making and blacksmithing. Today these handicrafts still exist in the homeland, except weaving and cloth-making. The latter has fallen out of favour because hemp cloths are coarse and their colours do not last. People prefer to buy modern nylon and synthetic fabrics that are better quality. Hmong women are famous for their multi-coloured embroideries. Those with the most skills in embroideries made the brightest costumes. Today, however, the rich are those with the best costumes since the latest style of ready-made Hmong clothes can be purchased through shops. Needle work has become a lost art for many Hmong women, particularly those in the diaspora where few girls want or need to learn embroidery, being busier going to school or working for wages (Fig. 23).

Embroidery is still carried on by women in the homeland for their own use and to send to relatives in other countries to sell for money. Large handmade quilts, wall hangings, pillowcases and tablecloths were made in great numbers for sale internationally (Cohen 2000).

The reed pipe musical instrument or *qeej*, so necessary to play mortuary music at funerals, is still made in Laos and Thailand for consumption by the Hmong worldwide. Many Hmong organizations have formally organized classes for members to learn how to play the instrument in order to ensure that live traditional funeral music is available wherever the Hmong may settle.

Beyond the Hmong’s own needs in the homeland, these cultural artefacts continue to survive because they have become commercial products in demand by the...
Hmong in the diaspora. The Hmong culture thus lives on through its silversmith artisans, music instrument-makers and needlecraft workers in Laos, and through the transnational consumption of their products by other Hmong across different parts of the globe.

Traditions
While the Hmong remain in Laos, they can practise many of the traditions related to their religion of ancestor worship, shamanism, traditional medicine, funerals, oral storytelling, weddings, and kinship norms. Once resettled in the West, however, the social environment there is very different. There are laws prohibiting the slaughtering of animals in the home as required by Hmong ancestral rituals and healing ceremonies. Shamanic healing is still prevalent, even with those now living in the West, but it may require the slaughtering of a small pig. A Hmong funeral is a major event, lasting up to a week when it involves an elder in the community, and needing four to ten oxen to be slaughtered as food for visitors and as sacrificial animals for the dead person. It is thus difficult to hold proper Hmong funerals in Western countries where funeral homes are quiet places for a quick mortuary service, not for the slaughtering of animals (Fig. 24).

Hmong practice of herbal medicine is another prevalent tradition, but many of the Hmong medicinal plants and herbs may not be available in their current place of residence. They may have them sent in dry form from the homeland, but this often gets them into trouble with local Customs and quarantine officers. The result is that herbal medicine is becoming a lost tradition for the Hmong in the diaspora. With the passing of many of the elderly, shamans and herbalists have also become scarce as few young people want to take up this ancient art of healing.

Landscape and Environment
In Laos, the Hmong used to move villages every few years after the farming land around their settlements had become exhausted. Their houses were simple wooden structures with a shingle or grass roof; they rarely altered the natural landscape with rock-cut or built structures such as shrines or monuments that lasted long-term. Nevertheless, many of those in the diaspora acutely miss the homeland environment. As a pastoral people, the Hmong prefer to live on mountaintops with a cool climate and lush tropical vegetation. For this reason, about 3,000 of them chose to settle in French Guiana and to resume farming in this tropical environment.

In France, a large number went to live in Nîmes where they eventually dominated the vegetable growing business in the region. In Australia, half of its 1,800 Hmong population moved to North Queensland to grow bananas. A return to tropical farming helps to satiate the longing for landscapes and a way of life they had left behind (Fig. 25).

Others prefer venturing back to Asia to search for kinship ties or simply to reconnect with familiar places. They made videos of these places to bring back for viewing by those who could not visit, and eventually a whole video production industry was born from these early personal travel documentaries. Today, thousands of Hmong in the diaspora return to Laos and Thailand to celebrate the New Year in November each year, since New Year celebrations in the West are not as authentic and entertaining as the genuine event in the homeland where young girls in their best ethnic costumes come out in droves to play ball games and to engage in courtship—something non-existent in the West. A few even found life in the diaspora so unappealing that they decided to repatriate themselves to the homeland. They wanted to return to an environment where life is simple, where they feel safe from crimes and unrestricted by official regulations, and where they can resume the practice of old cultural traditions which they have found difficult to do in the West.

Physical Reconstruction
As stated before, the Hmong do not have any enduring icons or monuments destroyed by the war that have to be physically rebuilt. At most, they have cultural items or traditions which became lost or forgotten during the war and after relocation to the West, such as ethnic costumes, embroideries and musical instruments. Attempts have been made for the physical reconstruction of cultural artefacts.

![Figure 24](image-url) Hmong funeral in the West held indoors since outdoor rituals are no longer practiced. In the foreground, the Hmong reed pipe typically used for funeral music.
such as the iconic qeej. Before the new Laos opened its doors to foreign visitors in the late 1980’s, the Hmong in the diaspora used to buy their qeej from the refugee camps or from Hmong villagers in Thailand. Some even tried to make the instrument locally, using plastic pipes, but this proved unpopular as the plastic instrument did not sound as good as the genuine bamboo one. Today, the diasporic Hmong can purchase the pipe without difficulty from Laos so that the only remaining problem is to find people who know how to use it, or who are willing to learn to play funeral music with it.

A few enterprising individuals tried to reproduce Hmong embroideries on machines in Japan, using Hmong patterns on dyed materials, but they looked more like cheap multicoloured fabrics than genuine hand-sewn embroideries, so few people used them.

Traditional costumes did not need to be replicated, as they have always been available (Fig. 26). They are the single cultural item that has been most successfully adapted and transplanted back to the homeland, due to easy access to fine and colourful fabrics and the inventiveness of Hmong women in Western countries. They combine the styles and colours of Hmong costumes from other countries, and mix the skirts from one subgroup with the blouse or headgear from another. Where the items are not too divergent, they use items from another country such as China together with those from Laos, in order to come up with the best and brightest combination.

Conservation strategies

From the above discussion, it can be seen that a variety of conservation strategies has been used by the Hmong to recapture or to promote their cultural heritage for personal use or for commercial mass consumption, where radically different mainstream environments make it difficult to maintain some traditions. This is true especially of religious and funeral practices that require the slaughtering of live domestic animals. Other traditions may weaken or disappear from lack of interest, from lack of skilled practitioners as in the case of needlecraft and other crafts, or from the lack of the necessary resources such as small bamboo stalks to make a good reed pipe musical instrument.

Overall, the strategies used by the dispersed Hmong to meet their cultural heritage needs and challenges have included:

- facilitating the re-learning of ritual chants and performances by interested young people and individuals through classes sponsored by Hmong organizations;
- encouraging the practice of modified religious and funeral rituals acceptable to the new societies in which they now live, rather than conversion to Christianity and abandonment of the rituals;
- making and consuming large numbers of music videos, feature films and video documentaries depicting real heritage items and traditions from the homeland;
- setting up websites to discuss and display information on Hmong history, culture, and other issues of concern;
- recomposing and disseminating cultural
information through books, other communication media such as television and radio broadcasts, and newspapers;

- visiting the homeland in Laos, Thailand or China to get a taste of ‘real Hmong’ people, their culture and everyday life; and

- selling traditional herbal medicine, handmade embroideries and ethnic costumes from the homeland, and publications on the Hmong in the diaspora through shops and personal outlets to those interested in preserving or learning about their Hmongness.

The production and commercial distribution of videotapes and compact disks has been especially successful and pervasive as a means of making available visual images and oral information on different aspects of Hmong cultural heritage for learning or vicarious entertainment, both in the homeland and in the diaspora. Each year, dozens of these media products are issued in the United States of America by enterprising Hmong individuals and media companies. The categories produced range from rock music and songs to kungfu-style action and war movies, and documentaries on rural Hmong life in Thailand or Laos. Thai, Korean, Indian and Chinese films have also been dubbed in the Hmong language for Hmong viewers, thus helping to expand their cultural horizons and influences.

### Identity production

The Hmong culture has undergone much change during the last thirty years. Costumes that were unique as markers of their separate ethnicity are now a mixture of colours and designs borrowed from other cultures and Hmong subgroups, although they are no longer worn as everyday attire. The Hmong language has also been affected. Many young people living in Western countries or in the homeland are no longer fluent in their mother tongue. While some have tried different ways to maintain their culture, others want to embrace modernity and have sought changes by adopting ideas and practices from other cultures that they live with—such as music, fashion, language and religion.

Some scholars see these challenges and differences as a blessing rather than a curse, because they reflect the Hmong’s ability to be flexible with their culture and identity. Schein (2004), for example, argues that these seeming contradictions and disagreements allow the Hmong opportunities to engage in identity exchange and identity production. When Hmong from the USA visit their co-ethnic Miao in China, they are often bewildered by the fact that large sections of the Miao population do not speak Hmong nor do they have customs and myths pointing to a similar origin and culture with the Hmong. Despite this, the Hmong visitors usually identify themselves as Miao with their hosts. When Miao from China visit the Hmong in the USA, they change to being Hmong (Schein 1998). This switching of identity is based not on a common culture and language but on a general notion of fraternity as well as more particularized bonds of kinship and marriage alliance, leading to mutual obligation (Schein 2004: 278). This identity exchange is done mainly for economic and political motives: each side hopes that economic opportunities and political unity will ensue from the encounters.

In this context, there are few cultural attributes involved and no enduring authentic culture on which group identity can be based. Since culture is dynamic and constantly changing, its components will eventually diverge and differ when people move between different locations. Although rooted in the past, identity is dynamic and can be seen as production (Hall 1989: 68), involving ‘questions of using the resources of history, language and culture in the process of becoming rather than being: not “who we are” or “where we came from” so much as “what we might become”, how we have been represented and how that bears on how we might represent ourselves’ (Hall 1996: 4).

For the Hmong in the diaspora and the Miao in China, the reconstruction of their shared identity through economic exchanges and cultural visits reflects this process of becoming and of how they want to represent themselves rather than simply agreeing with how the mainstream cultures have represented them. This attempt at identity production arises out of social, economic and political expediency, carved from “not only linguistic and cultural dimensions, but also political and economic strategies...a multidimensional and potent transnationality that is constructed precisely out of the entangling of the cultural with the economic and the political” (Schein 2004: 274).

Another complicating factor in the shaping of Hmong cultural identity is that, in their modern settings, the Hmong are no longer just Hmong, but Lao Hmong, French Hmong, or Hmong Americans as those in the USA prefer to be known. The Hmong identity has become secondary in the face of external pressure. Juggling for living space with many other culturally diverse groups, they now have multi-layered hybrid identities that demand careful negotiation, depending on what other people assign to them and no longer only on what they give for themselves (Fig. 27). The Hmong identity is determined today not only by the Hmong but also by other people, by factors outside their control, outside their culture and community.
Whether the changing Hmong culture and new identity are authentic or not is not important. A culture is authentic insofar as it is useful for its adherents, including elements that are borrowed from other cultural groups. What is more important is the ongoing search for a culture and its relevance to the group’s needs, the process, the continuing efforts to reinvent culture, to explore cultural options and identity possibilities, and to experiment with different versions, to mix them from a variety of source countries in the hope of finding the best possible model—as Hmong women have done with their costumes (Fig. 28). Erikson (1960: 47–8) notes that transmigration, like all catastrophes and crises, demands the sudden assumption of new and often transitory identities. Adoption of new cultural features in reaction to the new environments is a reconquest of subjective centrality in a world which has made the person a mere number in a dislocated mass.

The Hmong have greatly suffered from the Lao civil war, with many having paid with their own lives. However, the war has also been a positive force for the Hmong in giving them the opportunities to move on to new locations, to experience new cultural ideas and practices through being displaced as refugees and living with many other people. For the Hmong, exposure to a bewildering diversity of cultures and identities, not only within the global Hmong community but also with other groups of people, has made this diversity a positive source from which they can borrow desirable cultural features from these groups, to recuperate and reinterpret their own cultural heritage.

A more acute level of shared national consciousness has been developed, a globalized identity has been forged based on the bringing together, and the adoption, of Hmong cultural items and practices in their various countries of residence. This has helped create a new transnational and dynamic culture and cultural artefacts among the Hmong worldwide, all made possible by hard work, creativity, a strong desire to move forward, access to capital and modern technology, mass communications, the Internet, intra-ethnic consumption and ease of travel. However, like their need to move to new places every few years, the Hmong seem to constantly experiment with and change this culture and group identity so that new costumes and new musical forms are created every year.

Conclusion

This paper has considered how the Hmong have tried to forge a new transnational identity, based partly on the sharing of cultural attributes by those in the West and in Laos, and partly on political or economic dimensions between those in the diaspora and China, the original homeland. Despite this effort, it is still too soon to know if it has helped the Hmong in the diaspora to recover from the effects of twenty years of war in Laos, from the loss to the enemy of their power base and place of birth, and the fragmentation of families, kinship networks and clans in the rush to escape Laos and find asylum in other countries.
As in the past, the Hmong’s future is an unknown landscape and is largely dependent on their ability to maintain their social unity, their strong kinship and mutual support system within the existing clan relations (Keown-Bomar 2004). As shown by Rojo and Paez (2000), cultural heritage recovery can be a social cohesion strategy, if it is done formally as a way to generate and preserve social relations between social groups.

Schein puts this well for the Hmong when she writes that:

the coalescence of interests that impels the Hmong/Miao forging of transnationality has permitted the elaboration of common identity despite communication barriers and cultural disjunctions. As minorities in all of the states in which they reside, the choice to travel what Appadurai (1993) has called the postnational translocal route seems one of their best hopes. An identification forged out of cultural production and what I have called identity exchanges could be for both Hmong and Miao a means not only to reconnect but simultaneously to circumvent marginalization within their respective states.

(Schein 2004: 286)

Bibliography

Gary Y. Lee, a Hmong born in Laos and displaced by the civil war in 1961, eventually moved to Australia for further education under the Colombo Plan, sponsored by the Australian Government. Resident in Australia since 1975, he has degrees in social work and in social anthropology/community development (Ph.D, University of Sydney). After a period of university teaching, he has been involved in settlement work among Lao and other Indo-Chinese refugees in Australia, working currently as a bilingual welfare service coordinator with the Cabramatta Community Centre in Sydney. He is a founding member of the Hmong-Australia Society and board member of numerous organizations concerned with refugees and social services. He has published extensively on the Hmong in the Lao State, in Thailand and in Australia, recently in The Hmong of Australia: culture and diaspora (Canberra, 2004).

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Recovering a family heritage: a personal experience in east Germany

This paper is focussed on the post-reunification phase (i.e. after 1990) of the postwar period in Eastern Germany. It is concerned with the situation of my family property and its cultural value. I shall refer to the estate of Branitz, which is situated in the German Federal State of Brandenburg near the city of Cottbus, 110 km southeast of Berlin. I shall also refer to Muskau, an estate now divided by the German-Polish border, some 30 km southeast of Branitz.

Muskau had already been sold by my family in the nineteenth century. Branitz, on the other hand, was abandoned in February 1945 when we fled before the invading Russian troops. Until 1990 we were not able to return to our home.

What was my motivation, and what was my aim in recovering the family heritage?

My family, and especially my ancestor Prince Hermann von Pückler (1785–1871), had created two very well-known English-style landscape parks: Branitz and Muskau. In July 2004, the Muskau Park was inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List, and Branitz is also a strong contender for these high honours. In fact, Prince von Pückler became famous not only for his innovations in landscape gardening and the volume that he wrote on the topic, but also for the diaries that he kept of his travels in England in 1826–9, as a result of which he became what now would be called a bestselling author. Because of his incisive comments on the English society of that time, he is quoted in almost all studies in the relevant English sociological literature (Fig. 29).

I therefore felt a responsibility to look after and help restore what my family had designed, created, paid for and maintained until 1945 (von Pückler 2004).

Ancestral heritage and commitment to recovery

In spite of the fact that World War II had ended 45 years earlier, we were in 1990 confronted with a typical
of the fittest is even now going on today, because of the high unemployment rate (approximately 18%) in the so-called New Federal States of our country. This has resulted and still results in a rather unbalanced social structure.

So it was, and still is, a rather difficult situation for anyone who decided to invest time and money with the aim of helping to reconstruct their former home, which had been expropriated, and the region in general.

In addition to all this, we had to realise that because of the miserable isolation—not the splendid isolation the East German Government tried to make their people believe—our fellow countrymen had followed a totally different path of development. Although we still spoke the same language, we had at the beginning extreme difficulty in understanding each other socially. So the first hurdle we had to overcome was getting back to common ground. For instance, people such as I, who came from a family of the area that formerly had been well-off, had been discriminated against by the communists, and this showed its effects after 45 years. The fact that my family, and especially my father, had opposed the Nazi regime right from the beginning and had never done anything wrong for the last 300 years in that region, together with my own curriculum vitae, was obviously of no interest to them at all (Walde 1976: 225). We were simply the class enemy, because we were of the possessing ruling class and that was it. Therefore we were not at all welcome. It took several years and the help of those few remaining villagers who had known us from before to regain the confidence and trust of the local people. Once this was done, one could start to sit down and work seriously.

The turn of the tide for me came when in 2001 I was asked by the then head of our Brandenburg Government, Dr. Stolpe, and by all the political parties to run for the office of Lord Mayor of the city of Cottbus, a city with a population of 128,000 (Herbst 2001). This honourable offer I had to reject as I could not abandon my business commitments in Munich. But it showed me that public opinion had turned and that a member of a family which had a strongly identified cultural heritage in the area was again acceptable to them. Another indication of acceptance was that the area around Branitz—some estimated 100,000 hectares—was named Pückler Land. This was all very encouraging, but in view of all the negative factors that I have just mentioned, I think in the first years it needed a special energy in order not to give up. This energy was without doubt generated by emotional ties to my former home.
In the meantime, I had bought back most of our expropriated forest from the German Federal Government. This gave me an additional economic status amongst the mainly rural-oriented local population. They had seen West Germans come and go and they were soon tired of the merely opportunity-seekers. With my repurchasing of land, the local people were convinced that I would stay long-term (Figs. 30 and 31).

The final sign of acceptance was my election in 2001 as head of the Kuratorium of Branitz—a kind of advisory/supervisory body. With this I had reached a semi-official position, which helped me to recover valuables which had ended up in museums and public libraries or with private individuals who often hardly realised what they had in their hands.

In the case of Muskau, none of the former owners of the post-Pückler era—the Arnim family—had returned. The Muskau Park, of course, is maintained in the best of shape, but all other cultural heritage remains are left abandoned. We at Branitz help them out where we can and we have plans to intensify this cooperation in future. Sometimes I have the impression that Muskau hires me out for certain events as a quasi-living cultural heritage figure, as a member of the Pückler family that has brought international fame to Muskau. This amuses me whenever I think about it, but it shows that there is obviously a demand for such figures.

Thus, we can say that, for promoting and recovering cultural heritage in regions stricken by armed conflict, the reintegration of willing and able individuals with emotional ties to the region is of vital importance.

In addition to the importance of the Branitz Park itself, our houses were formerly full of works of art, paintings, books and valuable decorative art. Legally, these movables since 1945 had no longer been considered our property, but they could now be restituted to us under the Federal Law on compensation (approved in 1994) if we could comply with its demanding requirements of proof of ownership.

It was not my principal aim to recover our possessions scattered all over East Germany only for the benefit of my family and myself. It was never my idea to secrete them in our respective houses. My goal was right from the beginning to refurnish our former family home at Branitz with all that we could recover and then exhibit it there to the public. Branitz had already in 1999 been turned into a Pückler Museum, run by a public trust and subsidised by mainly government funds (Fig. 32). I found it more appropriate and satisfying at least to show to the public the kind of cultivated surroundings in which my family formerly lived and the level of culture—apart from the parks—that they had brought to this otherwise rather poor and not at all well-endowed sandy region of southern Brandenburg.
Recovery of the family archives and library

I first started to search in the State Archives of the Federal State of Brandenburg. To my surprise, I found there the almost complete archive of the Branitz branch of the Pückler family, dating back to 1696, when the first member of my family moved from Silesia to Brandenburg. This archive had been taken away from my home by the communist authorities in 1945 and was therefore saved. It was the second largest family archive to be found in Brandenburg. These archives provide not only evidence of family matters but also a vivid picture of the day-to-day happenings in the surrounding villages; larger estates such as ours used to be self-governing entities like local communities, endowed with the rights of taxation, free labour (Hand u. Spanndienste) and even the administration of justice. As only one male member of my family had survived World War II, but had died before the reunification, this archive became the most important source for the recovery of family, regional and cultural heritage. It had remained for more than forty-five years in dark cellars and was more or less untouched.

It was also in the State Archive that I found the first trace of our vanished library, which was thought to be a total loss, when in fact this was not the case. An elderly woman from our village told us that in 1945, under the supervision of Russian so-called cultural officers, she had to pack thousands of books into large wooden boxes. These were later collected by army lorries, obviously to be transported to Russia as was commonly done with cultural valuables in those days—in fact, in both directions, to and from Russia. (I had additional evidence that at least part of our library had found a new home in the Rudomina Library in Moscow.) As it was we, the Germans, who had started World War II which brought endless hardship to Russia, I would never dare to ask Russia to give those books back to us. On the other hand, I am convinced that one day we shall find a way to retrieve also those books still in Russia, because they are part of our heritage. I imagine it will eventually be done on a do ut des basis.

This process already started under Edward Schevadnadze, the former President of Georgia. The so-called Beutekunst (art booty) was shared among the former Soviet Republics, so that all should benefit from what had been removed to Russia. Schevadnadze, however, decided in 1997 to return what the Republic of Georgia had received. Some 70,000 volumes were sent back to Germany where they were stored in a Berlin warehouse under the authority of the German Ministry of Interior (Hamann 1997). As I was on a list as looking for our books, I was informed by the Ministry and thus in December of that year could happily return to Branitz with twelve books in my bag. This was not very many, but it illustrates how heritage can be recovered. In fact, I know that the majority of those books gratefully received from Schevadnadze have never found their original homes again, as the owners could not be identified or had disappeared as a result of the armed conflict.

I also had strong indications that at least some of our books were with the General Scientific Library (Allgemeinwissenschaftliche Bibliothek) in Potsdam, a Government institution. I started to correspond with them and the repeatedly written answer was: ‘we have no books of yours’. The library was Government-owned but still run by a former communist librarian, who did not want to surrender what she, or rather her predecessors, had taken from our home in Branitz in 1945 (I try to avoid the word ‘stolen’). It took another two years of massive pressure, political intervention and the threat of intervention by the state attorney to get things finally moving. (Today, the situation has completely changed: the library has a new, extremely cooperative head.) We now have all the books back in Branitz,
Cultural Heritage in Postwar Recovery

Some 4000 volumes. Every now and then we get a call that additional volumes have been found and that they are ready for collection.

As our books had been kept in a public library, they were not completely lost to the cultural heritage, although they were not catalogued and were unsystematically shelved. But they were lost to the cultural heritage context of Branitz and the region. At Branitz a large library room was installed after 1845 to house the books (Fig. 33). It is in this room—and this is of vital importance—that scholars from all over the world come to study Pückler’s theory and practice of landscape gardening: outside in the park and inside with the help of the library. Moreover, our library is, as far as we know, the only library to have the complete editions between 1859 and 1877 of the then most important German garden journals, namely *Wochenzeitschrift für Gärtnerei-und Pflanzenkunde* published in Berlin, and *Deutsches Magazin für Garten- und Blumenkunde* published in Stuttgart.

Some 78% of the volumes in the library are from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, whereas the other 22% are nineteenth century. Most books are bound in all-leather French bindings with rich gold decorated spines showing the coat of arms and initials of my family.

This example may indicate the effort it takes to recover a whole library, even from the hands of a German Government institution.

The Pückler diaries and the farmer

There were recoveries of other valuable cultural items, which were less difficult but involved more adventure.

One day my local innkeeper gave me a small piece of paper on which an address was written, naming a small village 70 km north of Branitz. I was asked to contact the named gentleman, who had travelled all the way to Branitz by train, as he had heard that I had returned to my home. He had indicated that he had something for me that would be of interest to me. The address gave no phone number. So one day, being by chance in that area, I found at that address an unusual, tidy little farm. When I knocked at the door a farmer about 80 years old opened the door and received me extremely warmly after I had introduced myself. After a rather lengthy conversation, he came to the point and said that in 1945, when we had left our home, his father-in-law had taken several books, which were now lying in a wooden chest in his loft. As it had got late and there was no electricity in his loft, and as we would have to use a ladder to reach it, he proposed that I should come back another day. Since his village was in the middle of nowhere and therefore not easy to reach, I convinced him to allow at least me alone to climb up to the loft and look for the books.

With a candle in my hand, for there was no torch available, I entered the loft through a narrow hatch and was guided by him to the chest he described. I opened the chest and immediately realised that I had found the missing two volumes of Prince Pückler’s diaries, which he had written during his journey to England in 1826–9. These diaries are of immense importance, as they formed the basis of Pückler’s books on England, which became bestsellers in their time and are regarded as important German literature. Nobody less than Johann Wolfgang von Goethe himself wrote a splendid critique of Pückler’s two-volume book about his travels in England and Ireland, *Brief eines Verstorbenen* (Letters from a Dead Man), which was published in 1830. Goethe’s critique encouraged Pückler to carry on as a writer.

At first sight I was immediately fascinated by the contents and the illustrations of the books. Nowadays we would use photographs but in those days, with no photography available, Pückler used lithography, copper engravings or even drawings for illustration. Besides the illustrations the diaries are tightly written with a pedantic handwriting. They demonstrate Pückler’s outstanding ability for critical contemplation of British and Irish society, ranging from the Royal Family and the upper class to the Irish peasants. The description, for example, of Daniel O’Connell, the great Irish patriot and revo-
Recovering a family heritage

Revolutionary, is the best description of him that I have read so far—and this from a foreigner (for an English version of correspondence published in Pückler’s Letters from a Dead Man, see von Pückler-Muskau 1987).

These diaries are full of information which has not yet been fully evaluated. Therefore I have decided to authorize the digitization of the contents so that they can be used for research, as the volumes themselves have to be handled extremely carefully. You may imagine that these books have survived being transported from Branitz to the farmer’s village in a motorcycle sidecar, as the farmer told me, and then stored for more than 45 years in a simple wooden chest under the roof tiles. With no additional insulation layer of wooden panels under the tiles, as would be done nowadays, the diaries had had to withstand temperature differences from + 35 °C in summer to –25° C in winter. We are lucky that they have survived in a comparatively good condition.

We had put the two volumes of diaries onto the kitchen table of the small farmhouse. When I started packing up the books, the farmer’s wife suddenly asked me how much I would pay for them. I tried to make clear to her that those books were stolen and were therefore legally still mine. This did not impress her at all and she asked for a rather outrageous sum. As I happened to have quite a quantity of cash with me (because in those unreal days following reunification the most extraordinary things could happen), I offered her a small percentage of what she had asked; she was satisfied with this, as was the farmer. After all, they had saved these books from being lost and had in addition approached me about them, and therefore I thought I had reason to be grateful. So we parted as friends, but not before the farmer mentioned that he had yet more things that belonged to us. Since his children had them, he said I should return, and so we agreed on a second visit at a later date.

Arriving at home and looking at the other books the farmer gave me, it was clear to me what the method of his selection had been when taking the books from our house during the last days of the War. He went for large books with an impressive external appearance while having no idea whatsoever of their contents. The other books he had taken were Famous Wagner Singers of the Time with a cover printed in gold and others richly decorated but of no great cultural value. So the fortunate circumstance that my ancestor Pückler had used large volumes for his diaries had saved them.

My second visit to the farmer, on a bitterly cold Prussian winter’s day, was adventurous only from the weather point of view. Snow 80 cm deep made it difficult to reach that isolated village. When I arrived, he opened a large box full of historical documents. Among them was the diploma recording my family being elevated to the rank of Bohemian Barons on 5 March 1655, by Kaiser Friedrich II (1578–1637), who was also King of Bohemia. Then there was the diploma of our family being made Viscounts (Reichsgrafen) on 10 May 1690, by Kaiser Leopold I (1640–1705). These diplomas had large graamalogues attached to them and carried the decorative signatures of the respective Kaiser.

In addition, there was the diploma of Hermann Pückler being made a Prince (Fürst) by King Friedrich Wilhelm III of Prussia (1770–1840). The diploma, dated 12.7.1822, is bound in leather with two large grammalogues housed in silver capsules, richly decorated with the Prussian coat of arms (Fig. 34).

These diplomas, the friendly farmer said, would not cost anything, as they were included in the price I paid him during the previous visit for the other merchandise.

I am convinced that these diplomas would never have surfaced again, if I had not criss-crossed the country recovering the family valuables. The diplomas are important not only for my family but also for the region; they have therefore been displayed to the public in the Pückler Museum ever since. They lie in their showcases as if lying in state; nobody knows that they had almost been buried for ever.

Recovery of the religious heritage

In order to establish a home for my family and myself in Branitz, I bought back from the Government one of the small houses in the park, a house which had
been built by my forefathers in 1776 and whose interior had had a rich baroque decoration. The decoration was, however, all destroyed as the house had been given to so-called landless farmers after it had been taken away from us. As the new owner did absolutely no maintenance work on the house after 1945, what I bought was nothing but a ruin. Against the advice of contractors, I nevertheless decided to save this historic building—the reconstruction of other buildings followed—and we and the visitors to the park are happy that we decided to rebuild it rather than tear it down. It was the first building to be reconstructed in the park and I wanted thus to prove that private ventures are more efficient and faster than public undertakings.

As concerns cultural recovery, a major obstacle is that the long-lasting negative impact of the last war, especially for Eastern Germany, has resulted in a region with next to no religious observance. Only 6% of the current East German population are still churchgoing or—one should rather say—registered at church. After almost two generations of atheism—to which must be added the Nazi period—all religious roots have disappeared. So one cannot expect any initiative of a religious nature to be taken by the East German population itself. So a vital basis of our cultural heritage has almost vanished in the East.

The Federal Republic of Germany is constructed as a basically Christian state although with a guaranteed freedom of worship. But no initiative has come from the Government and our Church is too weak to take decisive action. It is therefore up to single individuals or their organisations at least to try to encourage some of our fellow East Germans back to traditional religious life. In my Branitz environment we decided to start at the bottom, with a kindergarten. We established a Christian kindergarten, sacrificing one of my houses for nil income. The result is that our kindergarten is the most popular in the region with a long waiting-list. After ten years of operation, we feel we are on the right track. To revive a religious belief that has almost vanished requires exceptional effort, and one has to start at the very beginning with the children.

When I first arrived in Branitz, late in 1989, I tried to find our family graveyard which I remembered was at a certain place in the park. Having located it, I did not find any trace of the graves. I thought at first that my childhood memory was mistaken; but I later found out the sad truth that our graveyard had been destroyed by the Communist Party in the late 1970s so ruthlessly that no trace of the graves or their stones could be found. But I did soon find the man who had been responsible for this barbaric action. I told him that I expected him and his former Party friends to restore the graveyard within two months at their own cost; otherwise, I would put the state attorney on their heels and would make everything public.

After two months the graveyard was restored—the coffins, or the remains of them, had not been removed, only everything above ground level. Even most of the memorial crosses had been found somewhere and had been put back where they belonged. This action I undertook not mainly because of the graves themselves but because I found it necessary to show the public that East Germany had now returned to the civilized cultured world from which it had originally come. With a fine celebration ceremony, we had the graveyard reconsecrated. Again, the great public interest in all of this convinced me that we had done the right thing.

Retrospect

This paper gives a very personal view on matters that I have experienced in post-reunified Germany, which was equivalent to a postwar environment. My emotionally driven efforts to recover cultural heritage in the region of southern Brandenburg, a region which is very much interwoven with my family’s presence, has been an outstanding experience for me. The recovery of my own family cultural heritage encouraged me and gave me additional energy to undertake all this in addition to my business activities in Munich. But my ultimate aim was to contribute to the revival of the eastern part of our country that had become so completely depressed.

Biography

Hermann Graf von Pückler spent his early years at the family home of Branitz, Germany, until the family was expelled in 1945. He studied law and political science at Freiburg and Munich, qualifying as a lawyer in 1967, and then joined the company Eurotechnik Vertriebsgesellschaft für Industrieanlagen mbH where he is now Managing Director and Partner. He is a board member of many organizations including the Board of Trustees of Brandenburg Technical University at Cottbus. Following the reunification of Germany in 1990, he has worked to reclaim and conserve his ancestral property. He was elected head of the Kuratorium of Branitz in 2001 and re-elected in 2005.

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Current activities aimed at conservation of the built cultural heritage in the Palestinian Territories are viewed within a broad sociopolitical and economic context. The longstanding conflict over control of historically significant spaces has led to the deliberate destruction of heritage places. In the face of a variety of threats and challenges to cultural heritage protection, a number of specialized local agencies have developed programmes at both national level and in individual towns. The successes and constraints of these programmes are summarized. Finally, the potential role of cultural heritage in promoting economic recovery (through job creation and appropriate re-use of buildings), and social development is discussed.

Palestinian cultural heritage in the heart of the political conflict

Nationally contested places in Palestine have been the subject of claims and counter-claims between the Israeli occupying force and the Palestinians struggling against this occupation. This conflict led to gruesome encounters and consequently to the destruction of parts of the valuable built heritage. Targeting cultural heritage in armed conflicts is by no means a new phenomenon. Studies of spaces of memory have so far focused on the hegemonic forces of the state, both colonial and indigenous, and illustrated how states physically construct their visions of the national community (Volk and Bshara forthcoming). These forces influenced not only the built heritage but also public spaces which were re-organized to facilitate control or to convey a political message. Good examples are the British Mandatory Palestine (Benvenisti 2000) and the city of Algeria during the French colonisation (Celik 1997).

Palestine has been an intense case of political conflict, destruction of built heritage and involuntary change to landscape (Benvenisti 2000; Amiry 2004: 164–6; Volk and Bshara forthcoming), anticipating a spatial reality yet to come (Segal and Weizman 2002: 43–6). Direct obliteration or claiming the spaces of memory were the tools in this brutal conflict; hundreds of villages were levelled to the ground after 1948 (between 1948 and 1952) and cities were reorganized or claimed by new owners, for example Jerusalem (Benvenisti 1998), alongside the excessive production of material reminders of the past such as archives, textbooks, museums and public monuments to construct a new national identity (Nora 1996: 1–20).

In a recent confrontation (the Aqsa Intifada of September 2000), the historic centres in Palestine (such as Nablus, Hebron and Bethlehem) were under direct Israeli army assault, causing in some cases irrecoverable damage (Fig. 35). Some valuable monuments were hit such as the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, and others were totally destroyed such as the soap factories in Nablus (Amiry and Hadid 2002: 30–4; Amiry 2004: 164–6).
The discussions about what is to be done in the vacant space created as a result of the destruction have not ended; ideas of reconstruction, erecting new buildings, and memorials are among the scenarios (Bshara 2005a).

The purpose of heritage destruction is not, as claimed by the Israelis, an attempt to uproot the Palestinian resistance but rather to change the towns’ spatial organization so as to serve the Jewish settlers’ needs rather than those of the Palestinian local communities (as the case of Hebron shows). The weakening of the Palestinians’ relationship to their familiar space and history is meant to demoralize them, and hence to diminish resistance to Israeli occupation. As worldwide experience has illustrated, policies of this kind have failed in most cases (Ascherson, this volume).

The ICCROM Forum in 2005 stressed the role of cultural heritage in promoting recovery, rather than as a target in conflict. It is rather difficult to think of such a concept in the present Israeli-Palestinian context, at a time when Israel still sees and uses the remains of the past as a source for its national collective identity and a claim for physical connection with the land (Silberman 2001: 306). Nevertheless, the Forum drew attention to positive examples. In the divided city of Nicosia, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot administrations have restored heritage buildings of the other (a mosque and a church, respectively, which lie under the jurisdiction of the other side). So too, there are similar positive initiatives in the Palestinian-Israeli context: that of the ‘Ein al Deyouk Synagogue in Jericho (under Palestinian jurisdiction) and the ‘Hawa House, an Arab house in Acre under Israeli jurisdiction.

As a result of the Oslo Peace Agreement (1993), the Israelis handed back to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) two ancient synagogues located in the Jericho district. The Israelis were concerned for the synagogues’ future. Ten years later, ‘Ein al Deyouk synagogue has undergone two restoration and protection projects. The Palestinian Department of Tourism and Antiquity preserved the Jewish Synagogue in a sensitive and respectful way, and has allowed free access to the site. In turn, the Israeli Department of Antiquities has restored and rehabilitated the ‘Hawa House which belonged to the al-Tawil Arab family which was expelled from its home town of Acre during the 1948 War. The building is currently been used as an elderly people’s centre for the original Arab residents of the town.

Perhaps these extremely rare examples give us hope that spaces of memory in the Holy Land can become healing agents, rather than generating conflict, thus strengthening the notion of Cultural Heritage in Palestine as opposed to Palestinian Heritage vs Israeli Heritage.

Threats and challenges facing the cultural heritage in Palestine

The protection of cultural heritage in Palestine faces a number of threats and challenges:

- The lack of a national agenda for the protection of heritage. Cultural heritage is still seen as a liability rather than a valuable source of economic and social revitalization.
- The lack of awareness at the local as well as the political decision-making levels of the need or importance of saving the heritage.
- The absence of appropriate laws for protection. Only archaeological sites are considered of value—the existing law protects only sites and buildings constructed before 1700 A.D.
• Historic centres (towns and villages) are located in the heart of A and B areas (under Palestinian National Authority jurisdiction according to the Oslo Agreement of 1993). These densely populated areas constitute only 7% of the West Bank. The urbanization of these areas has caused tremendous pressure on historic centres as well as on historic buildings.

• Most archaeological sites are located in C areas (under Israeli jurisdiction according to the Oslo Agreement of 1993), and, in the absence of monitoring and guarding systems, looting and illegal digging are major threats.

• The lack of human resources in the area of conservation and cultural heritage management remains a prime challenge.

Cultural heritage agencies in Palestine

Immediately following the Oslo Agreement (1993), Palestine witnessed substantial efforts to protect and conserve both the tangible and the intangible cultural heritage. These efforts were manifested in the establishment of many motivated agencies and in the execution of large-scale cultural heritage projects.

As it stands today, there exists a number of cultural heritage agencies in Palestine: the Moslem and Christian Awqaf (Endowments); Riwaq Centre for Architectural Conservation (1991); the Old City of Jerusalem Revitalization Program (OCJRP, 1995); The Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities (MOTA, 1995); Hebron Rehabilitation Committee (1996); Nablus Old Town Conservation Committee; and the Bethlehem 2000 Committee (later known as the Bethlehem Centre for Cultural Heritage Preservation).

Except for the Awqaf, which concentrate mostly on religious buildings, all other heritage agencies deal mostly with secular public buildings as well as private residential areas. While (as their names indicate) most of these agencies work in a specific town, the Awqaf, Riwaq and MOTA work on a national level.

A quick review of these agencies and their conservation work of the past two decades indicates that undoubtedly the main objective of these activities was to resist the continuous attempts by Israel to confiscate or have control over these areas. The conservation projects (especially in the case of Hebron and, to a lesser extent, Jerusalem) could be seen as manifesting a Palestinian determination to protect properties, land and history (Bshara 2005b).

The Old City of Jerusalem Revitalization Program (OCJRP)

Restoration activities of the OCJRP have been restricted to the Old City of Jerusalem. This agency won the Aga Khan Award for Architecture in 2004. Since 1996 it has concentrated its work on the rehabilitation of residential areas and public buildings in the Old City of Jerusalem (Fig. 36).
The two main challenges for the OCJRP have been those of working on a UNESCO World Heritage Listed site (inscribed in 1981) whose jurisdiction lies within the Israeli Municipality of West Jerusalem, and the poor and almost slum conditions of many residential areas in the Old City.

In many cases, the main driving force of conservation projects has been political, i.e. encouraging Arab residents to continue living in the Old City so as to prevent continuous attempts to take over abandoned buildings. Hence, conservation practices have been often restricted by the practical needs of the inhabitants. The urgent need for spaces to live in, rather than choosing the appropriate use for historic buildings, has set the guidelines for restoration.

The Hebron Rehabilitation Committee (HRC)
The work of the HRC, established by a Presidential Decree in 1996, has been one of the largest in scope and perhaps the most impressive. This agency (also a winner of the Aga Khan Award for Architecture, in 1998) works in the Old Town of Hebron, the most politically, socially and economically problematic area in Palestine. In spite of continuous attempts to halt or hinder the HRC’s work, it managed to rehabilitate major parts of the Old Town of Hebron (Fig. 37).

Perhaps one of the most impressive of the HRC’s achievements has been the way it handled the delicate and extremely complicated issue of fragmented ownerships. Through making use of the traditional roles of elders in the community, the Committee managed to convince owners of properties to give the Committee the rights to renovate and to sub-let properties to tenants for a minimum of ten years, after which the owners would get back their renovated property. In addition to its conservation and rehabilitation works, it undertook infrastructural works and (in partnership with Riwaq) the preparation of a protection and development plan.

On the ground, the HRC managed to renovate and rehabilitate more than 600 units (apartments) and hundreds of stores along the commercial Casabas.

One of the major shortcomings of the rehabilitation works implemented by the HRC (whether consciously or unconsciously) was the attraction of a new social system and a new spatial organization that the Old Town offered. The Old Town is becoming a safe-haven for low-income families (some 4,000 newcomers) who will sooner or later become a burden on the Old Town. Nonetheless, the Committee, striving to rehabilitate the historic quarters, was obliged to divide the residential courtyards (built originally for extended families) into small apartments. This meant in practice the new division—for purposes of privacy—of historically interesting open spaces. The introduction of new services and the provision of contemporary infrastructure within a vernacular fabric in many cases resulted in the loss of homogeneity and character.

As in the Old City of Jerusalem, the survival and revival conservation activities were politically motivated, in this case in response to the Israeli settlers’ attempts to live in the midst of Arab neighbourhoods.¹

Bethlehem and Nablus
The rehabilitation of the Bethlehem Prime Zone was a commitment by the world community towards Christ’s birthplace, while also a political commitment towards the Peace Process. One of the important initiatives of the Bethlehem 2000 Committee was the establishment of the Bethlehem Centre for Cultural Heritage Preservation, whose main activity was to follow up and supervise conservation projects initiated by the Committee. It later became a semi-governmental agency initiating and promoting cultural heritage, conservation and community outreach programmes, mainly in the area of Bethlehem, Beit Jala and Beit Sahur (Fig. 38).

The only city in the West Bank that witnessed conservation work for no apparent political or religious reasons was Nablus. Nablus Municipal Council was keen to upgrade the infrastructure in the Old City market (al-Qasaba) to attract local tourists,
especially Israeli Arabs, to shop in the most viable commercial centre in the West Bank. Unfortunately, infrastructural works which were meant to improve the living standards of the Old City often resulted in the destruction of archaeological sites older than two thousand years.

Nablus was also devastated by the Israeli military operation of 2002, resulting in the total or partial destruction of important historic areas and buildings. The loss was so massive that it will take the city a long time to recover, if it ever does (Fig. 39).

**RIWAQ: Centre of Architectural Conservation**

Unlike other agencies, Riwaq works on a national level. The majority of Riwaq’s projects are located in rural areas rather than major towns.

Through its Conservation Unit, Riwaq has renovated dozens of historical buildings. The main objectives of these projects are to set up technically and professionally good models of restoration and adaptation. They are intended to be model cases for the local communities to imitate or follow. Since these villages are not the scene of direct Arab-Israeli conflict, the short-term aim is professional rather than political.

In 2002, Riwaq initiated the *Job Creation through Restoration* projects (Fig. 40). This project aims at contributing to poverty alleviation through providing jobs for the unemployed. Due to the difficult political situation, specifically checkpoints, the unemployment rate had reached 50%. In addition to their economic value as job providers, undoubtedly the projects contribute to cultural heritage protection. The project that started in 2002 (with funding for another three years) restored more than thirty historic buildings, with a budget of some US$ 2.5 million and created more than 75,000 working days. Ironically, the deteriorating political and economic situation actually facilitated the always difficult mission of raising the necessary funds for cultural heritage restoration.

Riwaq has been organizing a number of workshops for architecture students, engineers and workers in the field of conservation. Its work also includes: the compilation of its National Registry of Historic Buildings which includes some 52,000 historic buildings; community awareness campaigns and community participation; facilitating a draft for a National Law for the protection of cultural and natural heritage in Palestine, associated with protection plans for major historic centres; and publishing a Monograph Series on the Architectural History of Palestine.

**Cultural heritage protection and cultural heritage development**

Even though the initial incentive for the conservation of the cultural heritage was politically motivated, as it stands today, there is a real interest in the protection and development of heritage for its own merits as
well as for the potential role that cultural heritage may play in the economic and social revitalization of the community.

It is important at this point to state that most, if not all, of the conservation and rehabilitation projects implemented by the cultural heritage agencies described here lie within the scope of protection rather than development of the cultural heritage. It is crucial to differentiate between the two complementary concepts of cultural heritage protection and of cultural heritage development (recovery). Although the two concepts are closely connected, they differ and are often implemented by different sectors of society.

Cultural heritage protection is mainly concerned with the protection of historic buildings/areas through mechanisms such as legislation and national and local planning (protection plans at the national level through the Higher Planning Council and/or at the local levels through municipal and village councils). Heritage protection is also achieved through the physical conservation (whether preventive or comprehensive) of monuments, group(s) of buildings, and archaeological and natural sites located within or around the clearly delineated and defined architectural fabric of historic centres.

Preventive conservation is certainly an effective method to prolong the life of a building until a comprehensive conservation and utilization becomes possible. Past experiences have illustrated that preventive conservation, combined with work on open spaces (streets and plazas, pavements, planting, lighting etc.) as well as infrastructure works, significantly improve the environment and act as an important catalyst in the process of development2. For example, it can change historic village centres from run-down areas into economically and socially viable areas.

It goes without saying that the protection of cultural heritage, particularly the physical conservation, is labour-intensive and hence results in the creation of many jobs, particularly for the local communities. The appropriate reuse of the renovated buildings also results in the partial economic and social development or revitalization of that particular building.

However, the economic and social development and revitalization of a town/village as a whole is a much more complex and challenging process. It entails the involvement of both public and private sectors since it requires an economically viable initiative.

Realizing that the development of the cultural heritage is the responsibility of the different sectors of society (complementing cultural heritage expertise), it is for cultural heritage agencies to play the role as a catalyst in identifying the different sectors of the society and in specifying or clarifying their potential roles.

This can be achieved through a number of economic initiatives, based on the idea of restoration as a substitute for new construction:

• Housing: the re-use of buildings for the same functions for which they were initially built (i.e., help the owners/residents both financially and technically to renovate their own houses). This could be done through developing financial incentives such as housing loans and/or grants etc.
• Community facilities: the re-use of buildings for new functions such as village councils, cultural centres, clinics, women’s centres, schools and kindergartens, etc. (Fig. 41).
• Educational facilities: renovate a whole town to be used by universities, accommodating certain departments as in the case of al-Qasem Palace in the village of Beit Wazan (renovated for al-Najah National University’s Department of Architecture).
• Tourist amenities: since tourism constitutes an important component of the Palestinian economy, tourist visits (cultural tourism) to cultural heritage places other than prominent religious monuments should be developed to include rural cultural heritage places and cultural activities.

FIGURE 41 Recovery under fire: community activity in the renovated building of Beit Reema Cultural Centre (photo: Maher Saleh/Riwaq Archive).

2 Good examples of this approach are the Qaytun and al Sheikh neighborhoods in Hebron, and the infrastructural and pavement works in Nablus Old City.
Conclusion

Despite its conflictual characteristics, cultural heritage in Palestine is being conceived, seen and acted upon (by government agencies and cultural heritage NGOs) as part of state-building, i.e. as part of the solution rather than as part of the conflict. Cultural heritage represents the hope for a viable state where tourism plays a major role in the development of the Palestinian economy. Being labor-intensive, cultural heritage could provide many jobs and hence help alleviate poverty.

In addition to its economic value in state/nation formation, in a rapidly changing environment and a violated landscape, the built heritage—particularly historic buildings—could be an important reminder of the past. Undoubtedly, the built heritage is expected to be the core of a collective narrative in the emerging Palestinian identity.

As to the conflictual aspect of heritage, the built heritage, regardless of its location, should be the responsibility of the opponents (Israelis and Palestinians) who, subject to a future political solution, are bound to become more conscious that heritage belongs to generations to come and should not be a hostage to a disputed past.

The nationalist and chauvinist approach (exhibiting exclusivity and selectivity) in the choice of what is to be restored is no longer accepted or justified in a globalized world which is increasingly characterized by objectivity and openness.

Biography

Suad Amiry is the founder and Director of Riwaq: Center for Architectural Conservation (1991) in Ramallah, Palestine. She studied architecture at the American University of Beirut and the Universities of Michigan and Edinburgh. She has been living in Ramallah since 1981 and taught at the Department of Architecture at Birzeit University. From 1991 to 1993 she was a member of the Palestinian delegation at the peace talks in Washington, D.C. and in 1996 was appointed deputy Minister of Culture in the first Palestinian Government. Her Ramallah diaries entitled Sharon and My Mother-in-Law have been translated into more than fifteen languages and won the Italian Viareggio-Versilia Prize.

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References

The internal armed conflict that erupted in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas in December 1994 has caused substantial culture change in a region that had long been relatively isolated and impoverished. The political goals of the EZLN (the Zapatista Army for National Liberation), in demanding a level of local autonomy, are placed within a historical and environmental context that includes the cultural and linguistic diversity of the indigenous peoples of Chiapas. The paper summarizes some of the adverse consequences of the armed conflict due to the displacement of people and the military presence, but also the benefits deriving from a greater degree of local autonomy and an improved standard of living. Finally, it considers the impact of the armed conflict on cultural heritage and identity among the indigenous groups, referring especially to the well-known Maya heritage sites.

Armed conflict and culture change in Chiapas, Mexico

On the first day of 1994, an internal armed conflict erupted in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas. It soon attracted attention at both national and international levels. Anyone familiar with the history of Chiapas could not have been completely surprised at such an outbreak, but its scale and consequences were certainly unexpected.

Chiapas covers a large area characterized by extremely varied topography, with a rich variety of ecosystems ranging from tropical forests at lower altitudes to temperate pine forests at higher ones. In the past, this wide territory served as the landscape for the development of Maya culture. The different Maya realms shared common beliefs and knowledge and similar governing systems, but with certain distinct cultural traits, including language variations, that persist until today. The different languages and traditions are the origin of the names of the different groups still living in the region.

Following the conquest by the Spanish in the sixteenth century, and during the following centuries, the region was continuously and increasingly targeted for its abundant natural resources, but access for outsiders was greatly limited due to the difficulty of reaching certain areas. The rugged topography, and the isolation that it promoted, created refuge zones for the indigenous communities, who kept little contact with the outside world. These traditional societies maintained a mixture of ancient pre-Hispanic traditions and new beliefs and systems introduced during the colonial period, which survived with few modifications until the twentieth century.

This paper comments on the effects on these communities of the armed conflict in Chiapas and, in particular, on those changes, still continuing, in the way that cultural heritage is used and perceived by the local communities. By way of background, the first part of the paper is an overview of the situation...
in Chiapas and of the armed conflict that erupted there. It is far from being a complete analysis of a situation which is extremely complex, as this would require much deeper research and, above all, the input of a variety of authors.

Much of the data provided in this paper is not new, given the wide dissemination that the Zapatista movement has had in different media. Nevertheless, it is important to recall some of the most relevant issues, so as to discuss what have been the direct and indirect consequences of the armed conflict on heritage and identity.

The armed conflict in Chiapas

The declaration of war by the EZLN

The conflict started early on 1 January 1994, with the invasion of the southern town of San Cristóbal de las Casas by the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN: the Zapatista Army for National Liberation), which declared war on the Federal Government. The date was significant, as it also marked the launch of NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) between the USA, Canada and Mexico.

This armed group, essentially consisting of members of local indigenous groups, claimed access to land and better health and education conditions for the indigenous groups in Chiapas. But it was accompanied by a clear message, Ya basta! (Enough is enough!), aimed at stopping decades of injustice, segregation, and corruption (General Command of the EZLN 2001), which have marginalized the indigenous groups in conditions of extreme poverty. Referring to the Mexican Constitution, the rebels appealed to the right to define their own forms and methods of government in the lands controlled by the EZLN. Saramago (2001: 21) has synthesised what is probably the key element of this armed conflict: ‘These men, women, and children of the present are only demanding respect for their rights, not just as human beings and as part of this humanity but also as the indigenous who want to continue being indigenous’.

The reaction by the Federal Government was immediate, in the form of a massive deployment of military troops and an indiscriminate shelling of the conflict area, in an attempt to suppress this embarrassing situation at a time that Mexico was being held up as a possible economic model for Latin America. Direct combat between the EZLN and the Mexican Army lasted for twelve days, after which a cease-fire was agreed. Two years later both parties signed agreements—the San Andrés Larráinzar Accords—in which the most salient point was the recognition of the right of different groups to have self-determination within autonomous districts. The Accords implied legal modifications to be made by the Federal Government. These, however, have not happened as the Government, after signing the Accords, did not honour them. A stalemate situation at the official level has persisted until today, now eleven years after the conflict began, with the real causes of the conflict still unresolved.
The failures in the negotiations, the non-fulfilment of the agreements, and the deployment of armed troops in Chiapas were the consequence of radically different perceptions of the nature of the conflict. While the government perceived the demands to be essentially symptoms of their poverty and marginalization, the Zapatistas were in fact proposing a profound restructuring of the political, legal and economic system, in order to recognize fully the rights of indigenous people within the Mexican nation.

For most of the twentieth century, Mexico was ruled by a single party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), with a highly centralized government and high levels of corruption. Demands for indigenous peoples’ rights were considered to be a nuisance such that, when negotiations failed, the government generally ignored the subject in official business, frequently omitting to mention them in the annual reports of the President to Congress.

In 2000, the government changed, with the new administration having promised to solve the Chiapas question in ‘fifteen minutes’. However, the new President, Vicente Fox, and his party, the National Action Party (PAN), did not have a majority in Parliament. A new law (the Ley Indígena) passed in April 2001 fell short of giving the indigenous groups the political autonomy that had been mentioned in the San Andrés Accords. The EZLN rejected this new law, and thus started a long period of silence on the topic lasting throughout most of Fox’s administration.

The unusual nature of the conflict

The Chiapas conflict has been quite different from other situations in Latin America or in previous Mexican history. It is a movement that has aimed neither at secession nor at taking over power. Instead, its aim is to reverse a situation of injustice, by way of demands for alternative means of autonomous government at the local level, and a general appeal for democracy to be respected.

Since the beginning, the EZLN also opted for an innovative, and much more effective, means of fighting and resistance, namely through using mass media. The numerous communiqués issued by Subcomandante Marcos (one of the best known insurgents and the only non-indigenous one) and the organization of mass meetings and demonstrations brought the existing conditions in Chiapas into public view. As a result, attention to the conflict at the national and international levels has been more or less constant.

The role played by the Internet has been fundamental in keeping the EZLN alive. Until a few years ago, a conflict of this type would have been unimaginable in Mexico, as the Federal Government would have done everything to crush it immediately, while denying its very existence to the outside world. But the Internet has allowed the Zapatistas to speak up freely and keep their movement active, providing information that is independent of government control. More importantly, it has allowed them to reach and involve a wide and varied audience, gaining sympathy and support from around the world:

On the other side of the heights of Chiapas lies not only the government of Mexico, but the whole world. No matter how much of an attempt has been made to reduce the question of Chiapas to merely a local conflict, whose solution should be found within the strict confines of an application of national law—hypocritically malleable and adjustable, as has been seen once again, according to the strategies and tactics of economic and political power to which they are surrogate—what is being played in the Chiapas mountains and the Lacandon Jungle reaches beyond the borders of Mexico to the heart of that portion of humanity that has not renounced and never will renounce dreams and hopes, the simple imperative of equal justice for all.

(SARAMAGO 2001: 21).
Chiapas: a neglected region before the conflict

But what exactly is happening in Chiapas, and what is this long-neglected distant region?

Cultural diversity in Chiapas

Chiapas is the south-westernmost state of Mexico, bordering Guatemala. It is a state of extreme paradoxes, with incredible natural resources and wealth and, at the same time, overwhelming conditions of poverty. Most of the state’s indigenous population live below the poverty line.

Indigenous groups represent approximately one tenth of the total population of Mexico, but in the state of Chiapas the proportion is considerably higher, reaching nearly one third of a population of approximately 3.2 million inhabitants. Nearly half of that third do not speak Spanish, the official language of Mexico. The indigenous communities, whose economy relies essentially on agriculture, consist of Tzeltals, Tzotziles, Choles, Lacandones, Zoques, Tojolabales, and Mames, each having their own language and specific traditions, with further variations within each community. The communities consciously reinforced their cultural differences throughout the colonial period and during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as a strategy to deal with the pressures from the outside. These arose mainly from non-indigenous people who had privileged access for exploiting the natural wealth of Chiapas, using the indigenous people as cheap labourers, often in conditions close to slavery.

In response, there was a strengthening over time within the indigenous communities of their social and political organization and their cultural traits, including clothing, rituals, festivities, beliefs as well as the settlement patterns characteristic of each group, and which are now considered traditional (Obregón, 2003: 14–15).

As concerns language, Tzotzil Maya is spoken in the western highland municipalities of Chiapas, while Tzeltal Maya is spoken in the eastern ones and further east into the lowlands. Zoque, the only non-Maya language, is spoken in the northwest of the State, while Chol Maya is heard in the northeast near Tabasco, and Tojolabal Maya in the southeast toward the border with Guatemala. Within each one of these groups, the different communities have further linguistic differences, and the members of each refer to themselves in relation to their town of origin. Rather than Tzotziles or Tzeltales, they refer to each other as Zinacantecans or Chamulans, for example.

Clothing has also been a customary marker of difference, nowadays mostly evident among women on a daily basis, but also among men on special occasions, such as celebrations and important gatherings (Obregón 2003: 15). The traditional clothing and particularly the huipiles (embroidered blouses) worn by the women reveal not only the specific village to which the wearer belongs but also their social and marital status (Turok 1991:144–6). This has fascinated and attracted anthropologists and historians, and Chiapas has been a favoured focus of research for a long time.

Official recognition of indigenous groups

Although a focus for research by anthropologists and historians, the status of indigenous groups vis-à-vis government recognition has been more problematic. Since the Independence of Mexico in 1810, the Government developed a national ideal of a unified Mexican nation, modelled on western societies, which glorified the pre-Hispanic past and all its antiquities, but forgot the fate and traditions of the descendants of those who had created that past. Confronted with the remains of the past, whether a pyramid or an ancient ceramic, and seeing indigenous groups barely making a living around archaeological sites, very few will reflect on the evident social contradictions that they convey (García Canclini 1990: 150).

The condition of indigenous groups in Chiapas was not much modified by Independence. The disparity between the conception of past indigenous groups prior to European contact and that of the contemporary Indians kept growing in alarming
ways. While the pre-Hispanic cultures were studied and used for political and economic purposes, ‘Indian groups drag their misery across the length and breadth of the nation’ (Matos Moctezuma 1999). The word indio for a long time had a negative and even pejorative connotation in spoken language (Antochiw, Arnauld and Breton 1991: 27).

‘Indigenous people’ in contrast to ‘Indians’ are part of Mexican history...there has never been a connection beyond the fact that neither had a face’ (Mejía Madrid 2000). Most indigenous groups were kept at the margin of society and development, their traditional practices in all fields, medicine, language, agriculture, building techniques, and justice systems, rejected for the sake of modernity. In a failed attempt to assimilate some of the communities into the national project (Bonfil Batalla 2004: 51), traditional practices were outlawed, sometimes with devastating results: in certain communities, medical clinics were established preaching the advantages of modern medicine, leading to an abandonment of traditional medicine. When the clinics were later unable to provide medicines due to budgetary problems within the government, much of the traditional knowledge of plants and treatments was already lost, leading to major health problems in the population. In 1949 a special institution was created to deal specifically with the indigenous communities, the INI (Indianist National Institute), which established policies alternating protection and assimilation, with aid often exchanged for the promise of votes for the official party, PRI (Antochiw, Arnauld and Breton 1991: 26).

Following the change in government in 2000, INI was transformed in 2003 into the National Commission for the Development of Indigenous Peoples. This new institution made an evaluation of the conditions of indigenous communities in terms of education, health services, levels of income and access to services such as water and electricity, using a census produced in 2000 (Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas 2004). Remarkably, the ongoing conflict in Chiapas is not directly mentioned on the Commission’s website. The study, however, did reveal the appalling conditions of most indigenous communities throughout Mexico.

Socioeconomic conditions in Chiapas
The case of Chiapas is unfortunately not the only one. In this State, however, the inequalities created during the colonial period, notably the question of land ownership, kept constantly worsening. Isolated due to their resistance to colonization, several indigenous groups were brought to extinction during the seven-teenth and eighteenth centuries, even if Chiapas was the scenario of tough resistance and several bloody rebellions. The remaining groups were progressively evicted from the best lands, as the enormous colonial haciendas (latifundios) expanded. There have been constant evictions and emigrations within this region ever since, having been particularly marked in the second half of the twentieth century. Beginning in the 1930s, and especially throughout the 1950s and 1960s, movement towards the northern region of Chiapas, now the current area of conflict, was increased. The Mexican government at that time encouraged the movement of numerous displaced indigenous groups towards that region. An estimated 500,000 people were persuaded to move to the virgin Lacandon jungle, as part of a programme of colonization for agricultural purposes. ‘The decision to hand over state lands evaded the problem of redistributing the land of the large estates, as mandated by law’ (Carrigan 2001: 423). The agrarian reform process in Chiapas was decades in arrears due to corruption and illegal non-compliance.

To make this situation worse, in the following decades tens of thousands of refugees from Central America also arrived, fleeing the bitter armed conflicts of that region. The population of the Lacandon jungle increased from a mere one thousand in 1950, to 40,000 in 1970, 91,000 in 1980, 200,000 in 1990 and 300,000 in 2000; nearly three-quarters of the tropical forest has been cleared and burned for agriculture and cattle pasture, and additional areas have been seized for oil and gas exploration. Today only 3,400 of the original 13,000 square kilometres of the tropical forest have survived, protected within the Biosphere Reserve of Montes Azules (Carrigan 2001: 423; Arizpe et al. 1995).

This government-promoted colonization of the jungle was undertaken without preparing any kind of infrastructure for it. Decades later, a large number of indigenous settlements were still lacking the most basic public services: at the beginning of the conflict 90% of the indigenous houses did not have running water, and 70% did not have electricity or gas, in spite of the fact that Chiapas produces 55% of the hydroelectric energy in Mexico. The standard of living of the indigenous people, already low, declined further with the massive drop in the price of coffee, the most important source of income, with a fall of 60% of its value since 1990.

Health services were almost non-existent in the rural areas of Chiapas. Infant mortality was over 10%, and deaths from curable diseases were estimated to be 15,000 each year. 60% of the population in Chiapas suffered from malnutrition, even though the State produces 28% of the beef in
Mexico, and is the second largest producer of corn, bananas, honey, avocados and cocoa, all sold for export (Carrigan 2001: 421).

The education services were also seriously deficient, with illiteracy reaching levels of between 40 and 70% (depending on the source), and levels of education that usually did not go beyond the first years of primary school. There were 217 primary schools for nearly 65,000 school-age children; in certain areas, more than one-third of the children never attended school (Carrigan 2001: 421). Additionally, the region had a high rate of child labour and extremely disadvantaged conditions for women (Antochiw, Arnauld and Breton 1991: 27).

Without denying these appalling statistics and their implications, one must note how the official categories used for population statistics do not acknowledge any of the traditions found within indigenous communities: for example, local languages are considered merely as dialects, the traditional oral transmission of knowledge and traditions is not considered at all, and indicators of wealth are based on western clothing (e.g. the use of shoes).

To this scenario must be added the local conflicts between different groups over the uneven distribution of land, which frequently led to serious confrontations in the recent past. This situation was exacerbated by increasing conflicts caused by the proportionate reduction of land with respect to demographic growth. Religion-based conflicts also increased with the introduction of other religions (mainly evangelical Protestantism) within the traditionally isolated Catholic groups, sometimes leading to violent confrontations and the displacement of large groups inside villages. A third source of pressure has been the government-promoted expropriation of land to exploit oil and uranium resources and to generate hydroelectric power, for which the presence of autonomous communities represents an obstacle.

In this scenario of a social and ecological nightmare, several changes were occurring within the indigenous communities. Traditional Catholic communities in the highlands remained loyal to the state government, in spite of internal conflicts, political divisions and ethnic conflicts; they did not sympathise with the Zapatista rebellion, even if it affected and changed their lives. In contrast, those who did not accept the situation turned to other forms of religion (liberation theology, Catholicism, and evangelical Protestantism) and changed their political affiliation (away from the PRI). As a consequence, they were frequently expelled from their villages and forced into exile towards the northern part of Chiapas. There they changed their traditional identities, mixing with different groups and accommodating to new lifestyles. Since the 1970s and 1980s these communities formed their own independent rural organizations, rejecting the traditional relationship between the Government and the indigenous groups.

To the many people not familiar with the situation in Chiapas, the Zapatista conflict came as a surprise. It raised important questions about the social and economic state of this region. It claimed attention and a re-appraisal of the serious existing disparities, not only in local and regional terms, but also at the national and international levels. These have had adverse consequences for the local communities, mostly in the form of violence and repression as a result of the conflict. But there have also been benefits in that Mexican society has been forced to reassess its too-long history of racism, and to adopt new attitudes towards cultural heritage.

Direct consequences of the armed conflict

The armed conflict has had direct consequences on the civilian communities living in and around the conflict area, both adverse and beneficial.

Adverse consequences

The major one has been the immediate and massive disruption of the rural communities through displacement of people, with numbers varying from 12,000 to 20,000 according to different sources, some fleeing into the areas controlled by the EZLN, others migrating towards San Cristobal de las Casas, and settling in new improvised neighbourhoods around it. This on its own is sufficient to cause severe changes in the identity of the indigenous groups, as was the case in the migrations of the previous decades, but exacerbated in this case because of the armed conflict and the massive presence of military troops in the region (estimated at 70,000 in 2000, equivalent to one third of the total armed forces of the Mexican Army). The troops have frequently used school buildings as permanent headquarters, disrupting the already impoverished educational infrastructure, and heavily affecting the daily life of the communities in other ways. A large number of military controls have been introduced in the area, severely limiting the movement of farmers in reaching their fields and selling their agricultural products in the neighbouring towns.

In spite of the peace accords, a low intensity war continued during the 1990s, with attacks on communities and constant surveillance of the region,
and with helicopters continuously patrolling the autonomous areas at low altitude, especially in the first years of the conflict.

The presence of military camps has also generated serious problems of prostitution and drug addiction, two phenomena that were hardly reported in Chiapas before 1994. Prostitution is also linked to an increase in the number of sexually transmitted diseases, unwanted pregnancies, and alcohol consumption. There has been constant harassment of indigenous women, who have been forced to limit their activities outside the immediate surrounding areas of their houses or villages. All these elements have contributed to destabilizing the indigenous families located in the vicinity of military camps.

After the cease-fire, there were also repeated searches of premises in indigenous localities, with no judicial orders, accompanied by threats, intimidation, thefts, arbitrary detentions, rapes and torture.

Another extremely serious problem was the proliferation of paramilitary gunmen, armed with military weapons such as AK47 rifles. It is widely believed that these groups are sponsored by the PRI. For young men for whom life seems devoid of all hope, joining a paramilitary group can be quite attractive, with a salary of roughly one hundred euros per month, which is more than they can earn as subsistence farmers. These gunmen have caused endless trouble, using intimidation frequently to the extent of murder. One of the most dramatic events was the massacre committed in the displaced Tzotzil community of Acteal in December 1997, with the killing of forty-five people, mostly women and children, who were gathered inside the church. These paramilitary groups have created a climate of terror and discord in the region, dividing families and further limiting mobility.

The conflict has also had an impact on the natural environment of Chiapas. The armed forces have cleared the jungle to gain a better view of the area, and are presumably responsible for setting the fires that are occurring in large areas of the tropical forest, notably within the biosphere reserve of Montes Azules.

The rural communities have been constantly demanding the withdrawal of the soldiers and the disbanding of the paramilitary gunmen, who have still not handed in their weapons even after the change of government in 2000. After the massacre of Acteal, the communities have taken more decisive action to counteract the excesses of the military and paramilitary, with women and children placing themselves in front of military convoys to prevent them from reaching their villages. Photographs of these events have circulated widely in the mass media, and have astonished viewers for the determination that these people show: ‘They’ve risen up most especially with a moral strength that only honour and dignity themselves are capable of bringing to birth and nursing in the spirit, even while the body suffers from hunger and the usual miseries’ (Saramago 2001: 21).

Beneficial consequences for the autonomous communities

After the cease-fire was decreed, the rebel groups settled in around thirty autonomous communities. Their aim was to implement the San Andrés Larráinzar Accords by creating regional governance structures and showing that alternative forms of government were possible: a blend of traditional means of governance with the requirements of modern societies. Since their establishment, these communities have been self-governed by the Zapatistas.

The first autonomous communities were represented by five Aguascalientes, created in 1995 and 1996, which were centres of civil resistance where cultural activities were organized. Other Aguascalientes followed later, created in different parts of Mexico but also in other cities abroad, such as one in Barcelona, in a solidarity demonstrated in twinning. These were essential focal points for national and international visitors and observers, whose constant presence was requested by the EZLN until early in 2005 as a security measure against counter-insurgency operations of the Federal government.

In 2003, Zapatistas created five Juntas de Buen Gobierno (Committees of Good Government), each serving from four to seven autonomous municipalities. They each had their headquarters in what would now be called Caracoles, in replacement of the Aguascalientes. The members of the Juntas de Buen Gobierno serve on a rotating basis, with each of the different autonomous municipalities being represented. Their aim is to coordinate and improve communication and to resolve conflicts between the autonomous communities. Another task was the coordination of all external support from civilian groups, since the Zapatistas have relied heavily on donations and external aid for the development of these communities.

While the military structure was retained to defend the Zapatista population, the Juntas de Buen Gobierno now assumed the role of organizing civilians within the autonomous municipalities, and also opened up towards the non-Zapatistas in the region, in order to try to avoid the tensions of the past. The autonomous municipalities have different internal structures, depending on the local needs and characteristics, to deal with education, health and justice.
In the autonomous territories, the Zapatistas have been active building and staffing schools and libraries, creating clinics and developing justice systems. Non-Zapatistas now sometimes refer to Zapatista justice systems to solve conflicts, often after frustrating experiences with the government legal system.

Education and health services seem to have improved in the Zapatista zone, but it is still in question whether they can reach the entire population in the autonomous municipalities. Nevertheless, these initiatives have particularly improved the standard of living and opportunities for indigenous women, who for the first time in centuries are playing a more active and visible role within their society, and now have a voice in decisions about their future. This will undoubtedly lead to profound changes within the indigenous communities, with effects still to be fully seen. One third of the soldiers and commanders in the Zapatista army are women, as are 55% of the support staff to the EZLN. When the EZLN addressed the Congress in Mexico City in 2000, it was a woman, Commandant Esther, who spoke first for the insurgent movement.

The Zapatista movement has also had important repercussions in other areas of Mexico, with a marked re-appraisal of indigenous traditions and beliefs, and a consequent resurgence of pride in different communities. This has in turn had an echo in the Chicano communities in the USA, among those Mexicans who have emigrated in search of a better standard of living. These communities now willingly speak of their origins, claiming their connection to the indigenous past.

As an example of the rapidity with which indigenous consciousness has spread, contemporary mural paintings which were originally created within the Zapatista communities have been quickly replicated in other parts of Mexico and elsewhere in the world. The most famous example is the mural painting from the locality of Taniperla which was destroyed by the Federal Army in 1998, but which was reproduced in a matter of months in different cities of Mexico, but also in Spain, Italy, Argentina, USA, Brazil, Belgium, Uruguay, Canada, Germany, France and so on.
The physical cultural heritage and indigenous identity

Unlike many other armed conflicts, this one has not seen the physical expressions of cultural heritage used as a target. For example, when the town of San Cristóbal de la Casas was taken over by the EZLN in January 1994, the municipal historical archive was specifically protected so that land titles could be searched for.

Historical and archaeological heritage has also been protected, but with a change in the focus of interest by some indigenous groups. Historically, there has been an almost total lack of involvement or link between the indigenous communities and archaeological sites, at least in terms of official recognition. The existence of a cultural break or discontinuity after the Conquest between the indigenous communities and the sites was usually taken for granted, given that many of the archaeological sites had already been abandoned for a long time when the Spanish arrived in the sixteenth century. Most monumental archaeological sites in Chiapas are physically separated from modern settlements, which is not the case in other cities throughout Mexico.

All archaeological heritage in Mexico is the property of the Federal Government. The current legislation for the protection of cultural heritage in Mexico does not mention at any point the indigenous communities (or any other members of society for that matter). There is a single official institution responsible for the protection, research, dissemination and presentation to the public of the archaeological and historical heritage, the National Institute of Anthropology and History (INAH). No formal provision exists for an active role by the local communities or by the public in general.

However, with the outbreak of the conflict, there developed in Chiapas a new interest and new claims, mostly with respect to the archaeological sites and especially the well-known sites open to the public, such as Bonampak, Palenque, Yaxchilan and Toniná. These sites have been the focus of continuous interest for explorers and researchers since their rediscovery in the eighteenth century.

Throughout the twentieth century, a succession of archaeological and conservation projects have ensured a constant presence of researchers in the region, in an attempt to solve the many mysteries of the Maya culture. Notably, in 1992, of the ten major archaeological research projects nationwide funded by the Federal government, three of them took place in Chiapas, at the sites of Palenque, Toniná, and Yaxchilan. These projects profoundly modified the economy of the region, with a large number of people from the local communities being employed on the projects for a period of four years.

By the time the projects ended, many of the indigenous families had become accustomed to the extra income generated by work on the projects and did not want to return to their previous way of life. As a result, there has been a steady migration towards the nearest towns, looking for alternative means of income. The traditional agricultural activities, and the associated knowledge, are being progressively abandoned as a consequence.

At the same time, opportunities for earning an income are presented by the steady increase in tourism, prompted by publicity campaigns for The Maya Route or the ‘mysteries’ of the Maya world. It is also stimulated by the visits of well-known figures, such as the Dalai Lama who at Palenque declared Maya sites to be sacred, thus encouraging new waves of visitors with entirely new profiles (Obregón 2003). The sale of craft items adapts accordingly; for instance, the traditional Tzeltal dolls sold in San

FIGURE 48
Palenque, Templo del Conde.
Cristobal de las Casas are transformed into Zapatista dolls which are much more in demand, especially during the massive meetings held by the EZLN when thousands of visitors pass through the region.

Accompanying such developments has been the slow but steady change in the way that the indigenous communities style themselves. Until ten years ago, they would proudly maintain the traditional distinctions between Choles, Tzeltales or Tzotziles. Now they adopt a generic Maya label, one that seems to be more in accordance with what both archaeologists and tourist guides expect of them (Obregón 2003).

Not only is a different identity being adopted in this post-conflict period but it is being asserted in new ways. The most visible one has been the claim to benefit either partially or fully from the income generated by visitors to sites. Sites open to the public by INAH charge an entrance fee, with the receipts being submitted to the central Federal Reserve. At large, well-known sites in or near the conflict area, different communities have expressed their interest in changing this system. Soon after the beginning of the conflict, the sites of Yaxchilan and Toniná were taken over by the neighbouring communities. The former was appropriated by a community of Choles living in a village upstream from the site, one of the many groups that had migrated from other parts of Chiapas and settled in the Lacandon Jungle in the 1970s. A similar situation exists at Bonampak where, following the opening of a road providing easy access to the site and a consequent dramatic increase in the number of visitors, the Lacandones started charging an entrance fee supplemental to that of INAH.

In no case have these claims been linked to the ways in which research is conducted or the site is displayed, only to a right to benefit directly from the sites, thereby contesting the hegemony of governmental institutions in the care and control of the past. They are therefore not so much a claim to ownership for cultural or religious reasons, but rather a claim to benefit economically from a cultural resource.

The armed conflict has had other direct impacts due to the rapid changes occurring in an already fragile and damaged environment. The landscape in the area of conflict has been profoundly modified in the last decades, endangering both flora and fauna, and threatening the archaeological sites. With less tree coverage, the intense precipitation in the tropical forest is no longer retained by the soil. The Usumacinta River now often overflows, representing a grave risk to the stability of monumental structures at Yaxchilan located nearby. The conflict caused new roads to be opened through the tropical forest, mainly for military purposes to allow for fast mobility of army troops. The impact on cultural heritage has been in the dramatic increase in the number of visitors to once remote archaeological sites, sometimes overloading their capacity, as in the case of Bonampak whose extraordinary mural paintings are now put at risk.

No studies have been made as to whether the conflict in Chiapas has had a beneficial or adverse impact on the illicit traffic of archaeological objects, for instance through increasing its protection or, conversely, through enhancing its value on the market. In an isolated incident that gained international attention, a foreign epigrapher’s well-intentioned, and officially sanctioned, attempt to remove to a museum for its better protection a Mayan altar from the archaeological site of El Cayo, near Yaxchilan, led to his group being attacked and robbed by members of another Chol village (Schuster 1997). Whether the incident was a result of a misunderstanding or a foiled attempt at looting, it led to research projects in that particular region being stopped.

In fact, the position of governmental institutions has been generally reactive, rather than proactive, in the face of the new situation. Some INAH projects have involved local communities in training and capacity-building for the care and conservation of cultural heritage, and encouraging activities that will provide alternative, sustainable means of subsistence (Noval 2005). In the case of Yaxchilan, the INAH project team organized workshops on such topics as traditional uses of local plants, knowledge that had
not been used in a long time, given that the local community had migrated to this region in the 1970s from higher altitudes. Conservators and architects also worked with local masons to reintroduce traditional building techniques, especially the use of lime which had almost disappeared in the local communities in favour of cement. It also introduced children to the archaeology and history of Yaxchilan, a site many of them had never visited (Orea 2003).

Thus, in the cultural sphere, an evident impact of the conflict and of the claims for equal rights has been an increased pride in indigenous identity, which is openly expressed. This seems to be encouraging a form of Maya revival, with a pan-Maya identity, whose consequences are still to be defined, depending on the future of the conflict. At any rate, there seems to be a potential re-appropriation by the indigenous communities of the meaning of the remains of the past.

Final considerations

The consequences of the armed conflict in the region are as complex as the nature of the multicultural society living there and the different interests in the resources of Chiapas. The direct negative impact of the conflict, especially with the enduring presence of armed forces, is evident in the profound disruption of social groups.

The presence of humanitarian organizations and national and international observers and supporters has also had a major influence, by permitting the exchange of different views of the world, and by offering aid in the construction of the autonomous communities. The most notable innovation has been in the organization of community groups within the autonomous territories, with an active role being openly played by women. This has shown the non-viability of the melting pot ideology of promoting a single national identity, and has suggested new avenues to the coexistence of different cultures in a society.

At the national level, the wide dissemination of the conflict achieved by the Zapatistas has stimulated a re-evaluation of the indigenous groups in Mexico. There is a perceptibly more open pride being expressed in their past roots and traditions, and a reinvigorated impulse to claim the material remains of the past. The motivations are varied, and certainly include an interest in sharing the economic benefits that may derive from it. Activities centred on archaeological sites, and especially the sale of crafts to the steadily increasing number of visitors, are seen as alternative economic roles. Craft production is directly aimed at the supposed interests of visitors, linked to the idea of a Maya past offered in tourist brochures, even if simultaneously diverging from its roots in traditional materials and meanings.

The role played by conservation professionals during the conflict has been hesitant, partly due to the lack of a clear position by the official institutions confronted with the Zapatista situation. Official institutions have tended to react slowly, and seem to find it difficult to grasp the benefits that could derive from a more decentralized responsibility for heritage that welcomed an active participation from sectors of the society that are asking to be involved (Florescano 2004). Initial results of projects involving local communities should encourage heritage professionals to adopt more proactive cultural policies, working more closely with local communities in protecting
heritage. Such policies would entail greater recognition of ethnic and linguistic minorities and of a multicultural society, one whose values do not necessarily coincide with Western stereotypes. Thus, innovative approaches would have to be developed to protect and benefit from cultural heritage, not from a defensive and reactive perspective, but within a broad view of how institutions and diverse cultural groups can work together in appropriating and managing the heritage.

Biography

Valerie Magar trained as a conservator in the national conservation centre (ENCRM) in Mexico City and as an archaeologist (doctorate from Université de Paris I–Sorbonne, Paris). From 1993 to 2003 she was a senior conservator at the CNCPC (Coordinación Nacional de Conservación del Patrimonio Cultural) specializing in the conservation and management of rock art and mural paintings, while also teaching specializing in the conservation and management of archaeological conservation and conservation theory. In 2004, she joined the staff of ICCROM as a conservation specialist. She is also a Managing Editor of the quarterly journal Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites (CMAS).

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References


The deliberate destruction of the Temple of the Tooth Relic in Sri Lanka (a World Heritage Site) in 1998 is seen as an attempt to destroy the identity of a group, the Singhalese Buddhist community. It is argued that the assault on group identity helped to justify the decision that was taken immediately to proceed to physical restoration of the shrine and its continuity as a place of worship. The author argues that the 'cultural content' of heritage lie in a place's function, its community connection and its continuity; it is these that give a society identity. He describes the significance of the temple, the role of the local monastic community and its expectations regarding restoration, which led to a negotiated solution that reconciled local aspirations with the principles of international conservation practice.

The deliberate destruction of the Temple of the Tooth Relic in Sri Lanka (a World Heritage Site; Fig. 52) destroyed by the LTTE1 in 1998 (Figs. 53-4), but it does not undervalue the significance of the second. The destruction of the temple is one of the most notable examples of heritage being deliberately targeted during a conflict in an attempt to destroy the identity of a group. It was an event of national as well as international significance, for the reasons described below, and called for the direct involvement of conservation professionals whose conventional roles were challenged.

The case-study is based on my personal experience2 of managing the conservation project of the Tooth Relic of Sri Lanka (a World Heritage Site; Fig. 52) destroyed by the LTTE1 in 1998 (Figs. 53-4), but it does not undervalue the significance of the second. The destruction of the temple is one of the most notable examples of heritage being deliberately targeted during a conflict in an attempt to destroy the identity of a group. It was an event of national as well as international significance, for the reasons described below, and called for the direct involvement of conservation professionals whose conventional roles were challenged.

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The restoration of the Temple of the Tooth Relic in Sri Lanka: a post-conflict cultural response to loss of identity

The debate continues about whether the preservation of damaged heritage sites following an armed conflict should receive any attention compared with the loss of human lives and the rebuilding of social and economic infrastructure. It is accepted that coping with the loss of heritage, sacred sites and even national pride is often a formidable obstacle for the survivors. The meaning and value of heritage vary within societies and as a consequence may result in different commitments and engagements at the post-conflict recovery stage.

The ICCROM Forum could not have been more timely. It drew attention to two fundamental issues: the implications of the recovery of heritage damaged due to conflict, and the potential role of heritage in the social recovery process. This paper deals primarily with the first issue, using as a case-study post-conflict recovery operations at the Temple of

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1 The LTTE, or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam, is an organization fighting for a separate state in Sri Lanka.
2 Recovery work started immediately under the patronage of the highest political office of the country. The Department of Archaeology of Sri Lanka (established in 1890), as
Cultural Heritage in Postwar Recovery

The Temple of the Tooth Relic from its inception to the end (I explain later how I consider restoration to be a specific process within the overall conservation field). An earlier article (Wijesuriya 2000) focused on the issues of reconciling the significance of a living religious place with current conservation practice. During the management phase of the project, these issues were more challenging than the technical aspects, particularly because Sri Lanka is a country with deep-rooted conventional conservation practices which have been heavily influenced by the western school for more than a century and which are backed by a strong legislative and institutional framework (Wijesuriya 2003b). Elsewhere I have briefly discussed restoration as a culturally determined endeavour (Wijesuriya 2003a; see also Wijesuriya 2004, 2005).

Those papers are relevant to the first issue identified earlier (the recovery of heritage damaged due to conflict) and more specifically to the subtheme of physical restoration of tangible heritage that had been proposed by the organizers of the Forum. The hypothesis I wish to test in this paper is that it is the impact on identity that underlies the argument for and justifies a physical restoration of tangible heritage at the recovery stage.

Societies derive identities by various means; here, I refer to that identity which is derived from heritage. Heritage gives identity to a society through two major components: the cultural and the physical. I argue that anything we consider as heritage has its origin in a particular function; it is therefore connected to a particular community and is characterized by continuity. These three elements (function, community connection and continuity) form the cultural content of heritage: this is the primary component of heritage and the one that gives a society its identity. The second component is the physical content of heritage. Of these two, the first has the greater influence on identity and thus determines the destiny of heritage. I believe that identity is strongest when all three elements of the cultural content are present, and that, therefore, this aspect heavily influences the process of recovering heritage.

The first part of the paper explains the cultural context of the temple, illustrating its importance to the community. It then examines the response of the community in terms of their commitment to recovery, their perception of heritage and their expectations as to the nature of the heritage once restored. It also discusses the conservation process within the framework within which the professionals were required to operate. The second part analyses the outcome of the conservation process and then reviews the hypothesis as to the importance of cultural content. It argues for the importance of cultural content as key to the identity of a society and as a factor governing the recovery process. The paper ends by calling for a re-examination of our views on heritage and conservation principles, with a view to assisting those conservators who have the challenging job of reconciling theory with practice when working under pressure for recovery of cultural heritage post-conflict.

The case is a particular one, in being concerned not only with a site of living religious heritage, which raises its own issues (Stanley-Price 2004; Stovel et al. 2005) but one that is of exceptional importance to its community. Thus, the extent to which the conclusions of this case study may be generalized more widely may be limited.

Community role in the recovery work

Cultural significance of the temple

The Temple of the Tooth Relic is the most powerful national, religious and cultural symbol of the identity of Singhalese Buddhists, who form the majority (69%)
of the population in Sri Lanka. Since the arrival of the sacred Tooth Relic of the Buddha from India in the fourth century AD, the rulers of the country have accorded it the utmost care and protected it as an object of veneration. Its significance was manifested in the belief that the one who owned the Tooth Relic was the king of the country.

It was first deposited in a special building built in Anuradhapura, the first capital of the country (from the sixth century BC to the twelfth century AD). During subsequent relocations of the capital, the rulers ensured the safe transfer of the relic at all times. It finally arrived at its present location when King Vimaladharmasuriya 1 (1592–1602 AD) established Kandy as the administrative capital of the country. Since then, the relic has been deposited in a special building erected in close proximity to the palace. In 1815, when the country fell into the hands of the British, the Temple of the Tooth Relic retained its significance as a major place of worship for the majority of the people. It is perhaps the most sacred place of worship to Buddhists in any part of the world.

At present, the chief Buddhist priests of the two main sects (known as Malwatta and Asgiriya) in the country and a lay custodian (known as Diyawadana Nilame), appointed for a period of ten years, manage the temple and are required to follow a myriad of traditional customs, rituals and practices, including the annual procession. Since the two high priests are also the most influential religious leaders in the society, the power symbolized by the temple continues at the highest level. Nearly one million devotees a day gather to view the annual procession that is one of the most characteristic cultural pageants of the country, a tradition continued for centuries. The successful end of this pageant is officially reported to the head of the state, in accordance with the ancient traditions.

The first (unofficial) duty of a newly appointed politician or a bureaucrat promoted to a higher position is to pay homage to the Tooth Relic and to the two high priests mentioned above. A newly elected Executive President takes his or her oath at the temple premises, a tradition revived recently. To ordinary Buddhists, it is a place of worship and pilgrimage and a link to their lives in many ways; for instance, the first outing for a newborn child in the region is to the temple. Among other things, this is an important place to offer alms to the Buddha, a very important religious practice among Buddhists.

The Temple of the Tooth Relic and its associated customs, rituals, festivals and architecture, have evolved over the centuries and have been the subject of numerous literary works. While the modest structure built in the seventeenth century was retained with its own character and has continued to house the sacred Tooth Relic, the complex as a place of worship has evolved considerably over the last three centuries through the addition of new buildings. In 1988, the temple, together with the ancient city centre of Kandy, was inscribed on the World Heritage List of UNESCO.

Commitment to restoration by the community
A political analysis based on all major national newspapers published in the week following the
destruction of the temple concluded that ‘the timing, target and fallout from the bombing of the Dalada Maligawa (the Sinhalese term for the Temple of the Tooth Relic)—the country’s most venerated Buddhist shrine—affect Singhalese Buddhist sensibilities to such a degree that it resulted in unprecedented news coverage—greater even than bomb attacks with a much higher human or economic toll’ (other incidents had included the bombing of the Central Bank and a passenger train which had cost hundreds of human lives) (Ubayasiri and Brady 2003). As could have been expected, the vast media coverage of the incident included references to a possible restoration of the temple; in fact, on the very first day after the bombing, papers announced that the restoration would begin immediately. Indeed, the restoration of the temple became one of the top priorities of all concerned (Wijesuriya 2000).

One indicator of the strength of public support was the overwhelming financial contributions towards restoration of the temple. It was announced on the second day after the bombing that Rupees two million had been made available by the Government towards the restoration process. This was followed by the creation of fundraising campaigns by both the Government and the lay custodian of the temple. Interestingly, the total public donations exceeded 100 million rupees (about one million dollars) whereas our estimate for the necessary restoration work was only a third of that sum! Undoubtedly, the Buddhist concept of contributions to temple construction as a meritorious act would also have motivated many people to donate money.

Political support for recovery was not only offered but actually demanded in the strongest terms. One of the chief monks stated ‘only pious and intelligent men who are capable of protecting the tooth relic are fit to rule the country’ (quoted in Ubayasiri and Brady 2003). One of the strongest political statements made by the Government was the banning of the LTTE (after more than nineteen years of civil war and over two hundred suicide bombs, etc.) immediately following the attack on the temple. The establishment of a Presidential Task Force chaired by the President herself to facilitate and monitor restoration of the temple symbolized the highest political support.

All this commitment contributed towards the smooth implementation of the restoration work in the shortest possible time (Wijesuriya 2000). The Department of Archaeology immediately made available its professional services to the temple authorities. Its long years of experience in dealing with the restoration of religious buildings helped it to draw up plans and implement the recovery work. The World Heritage status of the temple complex had very little impact on the recovery process but would have been a useful tool if outside professional and financial help had been required.

**The community’s expectations of restoration**

First and foremost, the community wanted to see the revival of the function of the temple. As mentioned above, the temple relates to the modern life of the

3 Mobilization of the professional staff of the Department helped to rescue most of the fragments of the paintings that had collapsed, the broken pieces of sculptures and other historic materials which otherwise would have been cleared out by the army team that had been mobilized to clean the place. In the absence of a disaster preparedness action plan in place, the mobilization of professionals was a very useful act.

4 However, I noted the following reference in the international media: ‘Conservation and restoration work on the damaged buildings started immediately, and is being carried out by a number of teams under the guidance and supervision of the temple authorities and Sri Lankan archaeological agencies and experts in consultation with world bodies such as UNESCO, ICOMOS, ICCROM and ICOM’. <http://www.spur.asn.au/dalada3.htm>. Accessed 24 March 2005.
community in numerous ways. Most importantly, it is a place of worship for Buddhists and thus there was a heavy demand for public access. The loss of national pride was another reason for the demand for a quick recovery.

In the building complex, there were many historic constructions dating from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries, most of which had been damaged in the explosion. Some specialists proposed that certain buildings in the complex, as late additions in foreign style, should be removed, but such ideas were not accepted as the additions had already become familiar features of the complex. The religious leaders, politicians, administrative authorities and the representatives of the community, to whom I refer to in this paper collectively as the community, even agreed to replace clay roof tiles with copper tiles\(^5\) of similar design, for easy maintenance in order to prevent the constant damage to tiles of clay caused by monkeys living in large numbers in the neighbouring forest reserve.

There were several issues to be resolved prior to initiation of the restoration process. For instance, the religious community demanded that local craftsmen be employed for making new stone carvings, although the tradition had almost disappeared in the country. The lack of craftsmen in stone carving moved the Department of Archaeology to contact its counterpart in India for help. However, the monks and many sections of the public vehemently opposed the idea. In addition, timber was a scarce resource for restoration work and the country had already established the practice of importing quality timber from countries such as Burma. The monks again opposed this idea and insisted on the use of local timber. Other issues that were discussed included the use of traditional skills for the application of gold on brass elements of the temple and mythical conceptions of the use of colour on the exterior surfaces (Wijesuriya 2000).

The task for the conservation professionals was to translate the above requirements into action. But continuous dialogue with the religious community posed more challenging issues for it was evident that the decision-making powers remained in their hands. I have already mentioned that the professional services of the Department of Archaeology had been made available to the temple authorities with instructions from the highest political office in the country. Paradoxically, however, the final conservation decision-making power did not rest with the professionals. It was reported in the media that the government had sought professional advice

\(^5\) Buddhist traditions respect materials but place less importance on them in cases of restoration where spiritual values predominate (Wijesuriya 2004).

FIGURES 56 and 57 Stone carving of an elephant before and after the bombing.
FIGURE 58 Newly carved stone sculpture of the same elephant.
and would do the job properly but with the full consent of the temple’s custodians and the chief monks (Udayasiri and Brady 2003). This principle was conveyed to us as a strict instruction at the first meeting of the Presidential Task Force at which the two chief priests in charge of the temple and the lay custodian were present. The implications of this decision were that all major conservation decisions had to be approved by them or their representatives. This paved the way for a dialogue, both formal and informal (one that was also opened to the media), on the expectations of the Buddhist community and on how to reach consensus.

The conservation process developed within these constraints, adopting a working philosophy of recreating the situation closely similar to that which existed immediately prior to the bombing, with a view to providing the atmosphere for the temple to perform its original function, to recreate associated arts and crafts and to ensure a revival of the traditions. The obvious policy to follow, in line with conventional conservation practice, was one of restoration (i.e. a physical restoration of the tangible elements) of the damaged buildings and their elements, but as they were in the contemporary and most familiar phase of history of the temple. Conventional activities were carried out such as detailed documentation, diagnosis, analysis and preparation of plans for the approval of the temple authorities and the Presidential Task Force. The final result was a restored building complex demonstrating a close resemblance to that which existed prior to the destruction, with damaged elements replaced with new materials. All damaged stone sculptures were made new (Figs. 56-8). In the case of paintings on lime plaster that had shattered into pieces, these were carefully reassembled and the missing parts re-integrated (Fig. 55) (Wijesuriya 2000).

To conclude this section we can surmise that, because the Singhalese Buddhist community, who are strongly connected to the Temple of the Tooth Relic and for whom it was originally built, considered the destruction as a moment of great tragedy and one that seriously affected their identity, its recovery became one of the top priorities. In fact, the destruction of the temple acted as an impetus for the Singhalese Buddhists to demonstrate their deep sense of affection towards their heritage and their strong craving to see its continuity. This also helped to mobilize political and public support, funding, and the professional services required for the recovery stage.

By demanding that the original function be retrieved, the community expected that the continuity of the place could be maintained. The aim of continuity, which I will further elaborate below, was realized by accepting that changes to the building, both tangible and intangible, had occurred over time (rather than restoring it to a particular historical phase of the building); and by insisting on retaining the craftsmen even for new work. Thus, the conventional conservation approach had to be modified. Instead of the common top-down process of conservation decision-making, a bottom-up, flexible approach was adopted to achieve a result that would satisfy the community (Wijesuriya 2000).

6 One important outcome of this process was the revival of the almost extinct tradition of stone carving in Sri Lanka. A long process followed by the Department helped to identify several families who were engaged in stone carving but who had no means to sustain it. They were first given the opportunity to make large samples before being assigned the task of making full-scale replicas of all the damaged sculptures. Excellent performance by the craftsmen led to the revival of the age-old tradition and became an income source for otherwise unemployed groups of traditional craftsmen. Interestingly, their work was well publicized and there is evidence that they have now found a livelihood as stone carvers.

7 The Forum noted that deliberate attacks on heritage places during conflict have a long history but rarely succeed in destroying enemy morale or identity (see Ascherson, this volume). The case of the temple of the Tooth indirectly supports this argument. Targeting the identity of a group can have a boomerang effect in that the strength of identity derived from heritage can act as an impetus to recovery at an unprecedented speed and at any cost.
The regeneration of heritage and identity

There is little doubt that the destruction of the temple was an attempt to damage the identity and national pride of the Sinhalese Buddhist community. Thus, this case-study provides an opportunity to understand the nature of identity derived from heritage and its impact on the recovery process in situations of conflict. I return to my proposal that identity is derived through the three components of the cultural content of heritage (the original function, the community connection, and continuity) to assess their impact on the degree of priority given to a heritage site at the recovery stage. Furthermore, I argue that this cultural content plays a more influential role in the recovery process than the physical content or fabric of heritage; when the three components are present, the invariable result is the demand for a full restoration of tangible elements whenever such a heritage site is destroyed.

Function

Function is the first component I wish to discuss. The familiar perception among the conservation community is that people (usually experts?) attribute values to heritage and that they are constructs. Nowadays the most familiar construct is the Outstanding Universal Value on which is based the value that was present at its birth (Wijesuriya 2005) deserves primary consideration while those values attributed by people (whether experts or not) may be considered secondary.

The temple was built to house the Tooth Relic of the Buddha and to function as a place of worship and pilgrimage. To retain this function, there had been many buildings erected in different locations over the last 2000 years (Sri Dalada Maligawa 2001). Furthermore, when it came to recovery, it was clear that the function of the temple was the most crucial element that the community expected to recover. This is not to say, however, that secondary values cannot be attributed to the temple. In fact, Outstanding Universal Value has been ascribed to this Temple when it was included in the World Heritage List.

Community connection

Similarly, I maintain that heritage always has a connection to a community (I previously called them the associated community; see Wijesuriya 2004) which will continually perform particular functions at a given place. Referring to management, the Nara Document on Authenticity, Article 8, has acknowledged that the responsibility for cultural heritage and the management of it belongs, in the first place, to the cultural community that has generated it. I argue for a broader definition for the cultural community that has generated heritage, which is also the second component of my cultural content. The Tooth Relic

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8 The Special Expert Meeting of the World Heritage Convention held in Kazan in April 2005 concluded that “outstanding universal value like all values is attributed by people and through human appreciation”.

9 This is true of heritage places whose functions have changed over time.
The Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara is one of the most important respected Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara statues (of the regime in Mongolia destroyed one of its most cited in support of this argument. The communist influence on the conservation process and the final cultural content that govern identity had a direct as an impetus to facilitate the recovery process. The impact on identity acted as the recovery stage. The impact on identity acted as an impetus to facilitate the recovery process. The cultural content that govern identity had a direct influence on the conservation process and the final result, more so than the physical content of the temple as heritage.

Other examples from around the world can be cited in support of this argument. The communist regime in Mongolia destroyed one of its most respected Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara statues (of the Buddha faith in this region), which had been erected to a height of 26 m. in 1911, following independence from China, Mongolians believe that the Bodhisattva concept, to which they are strongly connected and which they continue to worship, brings a sense of security and posterity to their country. The Bodhisattva statues form part of their cultural identity, which they believed to have been lost with the destruction of one of the most important statues. After independence, there was a move to rebuild the statue. This proposal came as a surprise to international donor agencies which believed that their funds should be devoted as a priority to development projects. The Mongolians went ahead however, and rebuilt the twenty-six metre high statue with their own money; the donor and NGO community later conceded that this act was indeed justifiable (Palmer and Finlay 2003: 11-12).

If my argument of the importance of the three components of cultural content is valid, then the converse should also be true. When the function, community connection and continuity are no longer present or, for various reasons, are weak (as in many heritage places), the impact on identity is different and the level of engagement with recovery is either low or of low priority. The Bamian Buddha statues are a good example. They had been carved with a primary function of worship and with a community connection with Buddhists. Over the centuries both these components diminished in importance, as did their continuity. The international community has recognized that the statues are important to Buddhists but, for the contemporary Afghan community, these statues represented different meanings and values. It was and is the physical content that is more important, as expressed in local and national views.

The Afghan government formed after the end of Taliban rule declared that the statues would be and must be rebuilt for their historical, not religious, value. The values of the statues to the Afghan community are further evident in the following statement: ‘Reconstruction won’t have the same historical value...But it’s a positive step for the country and could bring thousands of tourists’ (Statement of the Deputy Minister of Culture, quoted from Dehghanpisheh 2001). Due to the absence of the three cultural elements, the destruction of the statues had little or no impact on the contemporary

10 As indicated by the inclusion in the inscriptions of a carved sun and moon.

11 The Bodhisattav Avalokitesvara is one of the most important deities known to the Mahayana Buddhists. Avalokitesvara is the Lord of Compassion, the active and most powerful manifestation of Amitabha, the celestial Buddha who presides over the present age as the symbol of Universal Buddhahood and salvation. Avalokitesvara functions as the saviour of Mankind.


13 Sadeq, a 24-year old local resident of Bamiyan, is quoted as saying ‘the Taliban did a very bad thing destroying the Buddhas...they thought people worshipped them. But it wasn’t a holy site, it was a historic site’ (quoted in Dehghanpisheh 2001).
The restoration of the Temple of the Tooth Relic in Sri Lanka

Afghan community and as a result the recovery work received low priority within the country. On the other hand, the affected Buddhist community in countries like Sri Lanka, Thailand and Japan expressed deep interest in protecting the statues before destruction and also at the recovery stage.

The demand for full regeneration after conflict

The restoration of the Temple of the Tooth suggests that the community demands a full recovery of a destroyed heritage site when its identity is affected, in this case amounting to a full restoration of the physical fabric. In the process, however, it was only possible to regenerate the most recent and familiar tangible and intangible expressions of the temple. An alternative response in places destroyed by conflicts has sometimes been the creation of memorials such as peace parks. These can bring new identities to a place that may then have a significant role in society;

but it is not comparable to the total regeneration of the lost identity of a community and the place of heritage within their life.

Restoration is usually considered an intervention concerned with the materials of the past. It is underpinned by the concept of authenticity, which also places heavy emphasis on materials. Alternative terms borrowed from the building industry, such as reconstruction, have been used to help enforce a strict interpretation of restoration. In the recent past, however, the interpretation has been broadened to include restoration as an attempt to recover the cultural meaning. But practitioners still find it difficult to achieve so long as heavy emphasis is placed on the importance of original materials.

In the case of the Temple of the Tooth Relic, I argue that restoration is the valid term, provided we accept that the process is governed by the three components of cultural content that I have identified, and not by the physical content or fabric of the place. Thus restoration must have a broader definition to accommodate the cultural dimensions of conservation. When, ten days after the bombing of the temple, HRH Prince Charles, the Prince of Wales, speaking on behalf of the foreign dignitaries who participated in the 50th Independence Anniversary Celebrations in Colombo, said ‘So all your foreign guests wish you well in the long and painstaking task of restoring the temple to its original splendour’, I understood his sentiment as the natural one to be expected of anyone.

The meaning of restoration should be broad enough to be understood as a means of regenerating lost heritage. In the past restoration has been viewed as an intervention to protect ancient fabric, reasonable enough when it was the conservation professionals who defined the values of heritage, and made the decisions to conserve materials based on their historic and aesthetic values. Now, by means of a broader interpretation of restoration, we should be prepared to provide adequate professional services to the community who retain the decision-making power but who wish to regenerate their lost heritage in a way that includes continuous interpretations and expressions of the past.

Conclusions

I have argued that when, as in the case of the temple of the Sacred Tooth, the community demands a full recovery, restoration is governed by the three components of cultural content that I identified. In engaging with the community for assistance during the restoration process, the conservation profession-
als were confronted with several issues, in particular the meaning of heritage, and the appropriate conservation principles, process and products.

Despite being proud of the long history of the Temple of the Tooth Relic, the main interest of the community at the post-conflict recovery stage was in the regeneration of its primary function and its continuity (i.e. in its cultural content rather than its physical content). People were willing to accept the contemporary expressions of the past, in the tangible and intangible forms most familiar to them, rather than any particular historic structure. These included buildings no longer extant, their elements, and even craftsmanship and traditional skills. They were willing to accommodate changes and even the addition of new materials. This brings new dimensions to our understanding of heritage. It is evident that heritage should be understood not as a static entity belonging to the past but as a dynamic concept which accommodates both evolutionary phases of the past and relevance to modern life.

The conservation professionals translated the community needs and expectations into action. In this context, conservation can be viewed as a vehicle for capturing and nurturing the way that people understand and connect to heritage and eventually contribute to the continuity (through conservation). Since interpretations of the past vary, people should be given the opportunity to practice what they believe is their right, for instance, ‘the right of aboriginal communities to repaint their rock art motifs’ (Layton, Stone and Thomas 2003: 17). Thus ‘diverse ranges of motivations are demonstrated for preserving or destroying monuments and artifacts, simply because different communities maintain very different relationships with their own pasts. We suggest that this indicates that any set of universal principles for the conservation of cultural property must be problematic...We advocate a celebration of the diversity of the human past(s), and the increasing empowerment of communities to investigate and elaborate their own pasts’ (ibid.: 12).

Empowering the community has been identified as a key component in heritage conservation today, representing a departure from the insistence on materials and their authenticity (for which the Nara Document has already introduced a certain flexibility). This can only be achieved by bringing community concerns into conservation; restoration as described here can be a useful tool in the process. There are also other definitions of authenticity that focus on community concerns: ‘what makes an artifact or monument authentic is the way in which people use it in order to establish a form of life’ (Layton, Stone and Thomas 2003: 18-19).

Conservation is a subject of debate and controversy. I believe that more attempts should be made to achieve objectivity and some level of scientific vigour, not an easy task since conservation is often embroiled with social, political and financial issues. In addition, it has taken time for the conservation community to understand cultural context and the social role of conservation, reflecting some reluctance to move in new directions. The theme of this Forum suggests the need to do so, reiterating the message that we are concerned not only with materials of the past but also the relevance of the past to the people of the present and that we must act accordingly.

In developing conservation principles, I propose we should give due recognition to the cultural content and their role in defining the final destiny of heritage before constructing secondary values. Secondary values such as Outstanding Universal Value can still be ascribed where appropriate in developing conservation principles accordingly.

Previously, I concluded that the restoration process of the Temple of the Tooth Relic ‘proves that the practice of local culture may override internationally set conservation guidelines’ (Wijesuriya 2000), a conclusion even more relevant in post-conflict recovery activities. A bottom-up approach to heritage conservation (Stovel 2004: 16-17; Wijesuriya 2005), when the decision-making power is vested in the community, does not preclude professionals from playing a role in reconciling community expectations with modern conservation needs. But they can offer options with reference to a given cultural context, rather than appealing to universal principles.

Therefore, the decision whether or not to restore a damaged heritage site must be heavily influenced by the communities and the cultural contexts of the heritage site. Thus, if the conservation professionals are to retain a credible role in the recovery process, they must provide tools for the community in their efforts to regenerate their lost heritage that are appropriate, flexible and applicable within the given cultural context.

Biography

Gamini Wijesuriya holds qualifications in architecture (MSc), heritage management (MA) and archaeology (MA, PhD). As Director of Conservation of the Department of Archaeology of Sri Lanka (1983 - 2000) he was responsible for managing the country’s
heritage conservation programme. He was then a Principal Regional Scientist of the Department of Conservation of New Zealand (2001–4), developing science and research strategies for conservation. He has published widely in conservation. Since 2004 he has been on the staff of ICCROM as Project Manager in its Sites Unit.

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References


The West Africa Museums Programme (WAMP) founded in Abidjan in 1982, has set as a priority the raising of awareness about the loss of cultural and natural heritage due to war. A workshop that it organized in Conakry in May 2003 brought together cultural heritage specialists from eight affected countries: Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Senegal. The paper summarizes the extensive damage to cultural heritage caused by armed conflict in those countries, and the steps taken towards recovery. WAMP has identified particular needs in technician training, in the reconstitution of collections, and in provision of adequate storage facilities. At the same time, political stability and free movement of people are essential for establishing better conditions for cultural heritage preservation.

Armed conflicts, peace culture and protection of cultural heritage in West Africa

Given the numerous conflicts in West Africa that have led to not only significant loss of human life but also the destruction and disappearance of cultural and natural resources, an enormous loss for African and world cultural heritage, the West African Museums Programme (WAMP) thought it necessary to take urgent preventive measures to raise awareness of the importance of protecting the cultural heritage of the subregion.

Therefore, as part of its mission for the preservation of cultural heritage and the development of museums, and especially the promotion of the return of peace to countries in conflict, WAMP organized study missions in Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone in 2001 and 2003 to assess the scale of damage caused to the cultural heritage of these countries. These missions were followed by an international workshop held in Conakry from 19 to 21 May 2003, with the theme ‘Armed Conflicts, Peace Culture, and Protection of Cultural Heritage in West Africa’. The workshop brought together thirty participants from eight West African countries—Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Senegal—as well as representatives of subregional and international organizations.

The papers presented during the Conakry workshop enabled us to evaluate museums and cultural heritage before, during and after the armed conflicts and civil wars in the countries in question. The participants also outlined the difficulties encountered in the implementation of programmes for the protection of cultural property before and during conflicts.

In this paper, I will first introduce WAMP; then discuss the situation of conflicts in the region;
the impact of conflicts on cultural heritage; and finally actions taken and yet to be taken to help in the promotion of cultural heritage in post-conflict countries.

The West African Museums Programme (WAMP)

The West African Museums programme (WAMP), based in Dakar, Senegal is a non-governmental organisation established in 1982 in Abidjan, with the mission to contribute to building institutional capacities and providing services to museums and related institutions in West Africa beyond linguistic and geographical barriers. WAMP collaborates with over two hundred museums and cultural institutions in West Africa and has an observer status at the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), based in Abuja, Nigeria.

Since its inception in 1982, WAMP has efficiently and effectively promoted museum development in West Africa. The cumulative effects of this twenty-three year effort have had a major impact on the professional museum community in West Africa and Africa as a whole.

WAMP is an active partner in major African and global cultural initiatives. It has acquired a worldwide reputation as a knowledge institution, a leader in museum support systems in the region, and a reliable collaborator. Its successes over the past twenty-three years include twenty-seven national projects and eighteen regional workshops and seminars.

The situation of conflicts in West Africa

Background

In the course of its activities WAMP noticed that, after the independence of many African countries, a number of armed conflicts broke out in West African countries as a result of political, ethnic, and religious tensions, and land occupation. Not only have these new types of conflicts had an impact on human lives, but they have also led to the destruction of cultural and natural resources, causing an enormous loss of cultural heritage in Africa.

These wars have had direct negative effects on the development of museums and cultural heritage in Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone, which have led to a real struggle for the very survival of these institutions. Objects and collections have disappeared partially or entirely. Collections, infrastructure and equipment have also been damaged.

In addition to these three countries, religious and ethnic conflicts have broken out in Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal, and recently in Côte d’Ivoire (see Zagbayou, this volume). Whatever the nature of the conflicts, museums and historical sites and sacred forests have often been privileged targets for the belligerents.

Generally, the causes of civil and ethnic conflicts in West Africa have been due mainly to religious intolerance, ethnic cohabitation, poverty, land ownership conflict, the inheritance of chiefs from one clan to another, and especially the injustice practiced by leaders and, in short, poor governance.

These conflicts have led to many violent acts and atrocities committed against civilians, victims, refugees, internally displaced persons, and those captured or imprisoned. In addition to these crimes, there has been looting and destruction of cultural property, as well as the occupation of historic sites.

These conflicts in Africa have become a determining factor in the tendency towards the weakening of national societies, which have owed their cohesion and stability to the commonality of cultural values forged by history and to the common desire to live together. The region, in a crisis situation, is no longer protected from the gradual erosion of the cultural texture that, until the recent past, was responsible for its relative cohesiveness. A structure based on such a precarious foundation remains under threat. In our young countries, still in the process of nation-building, and where populations were forced to live together and adopt the same nationality as a result of colonization, communities need mortar and bricks and bridges to strengthen the intermixing of people which will lead to increasing unity.

Impact on cultural heritage

During the Conakry workshop, representatives of the invited countries presented the impact of war on the museums and other cultural heritage in their respective countries as below.

Guinea-Bissau

In Guinea-Bissau, the war had a major impact on the National Institute of Studies and Research (INEP), whose buildings were occupied by soldiers from the expeditionary force from Senegal. Its archives were almost totally destroyed and the library was sacked and pillaged (Figs. 62–4). The Ethnography Museum in Bissau lost significant collections, and its equipment was destroyed or stolen.

From the economic point of view, tourism infrastructure was occupied and damaged by military personnel. Furthermore, because of the war, all
cultural events, and the strengthening of syncretism of cultural unions for promoting cultural identity, were prohibited. Finally, the most important effect of the armed conflict for the independence of the country was that national unity was thrown into question and replaced by an unprecedented tribalism (Leonardo Cardoso, personal communication 2003).

After the armed conflict, the condition of the museum is still alarming. On the one hand, the economic crisis in which the country is mired has diverted priorities to other sectors. Cultural institutions, including the museum, were simply forgotten. On the other hand, the political and social crisis has led international organizations to have little interest in the country because of the insecurity.

Liberia
According to Kennedy Newan, after the renovation and upgrading of the Museum in 1987, each of the Museum’s three floors, designated to function as the historical, ethnographical and contemporary galleries, were filled with artefacts, antiquities and archival materials numbering about 3–5,000 objects, placed in temporary and permanent exhibitions, while others were stored in well-ventilated and secured facilities.

In 1990, the country experienced one of the world’s most devastating civil wars, lasting for seven years and destroying the very fabric of Liberia’s society, not to mention infrastructures and their contents, thus decimating almost everything that had made the Museum second to none. During this time, the Museum building was hit by indiscriminate shelling, scars from which are still visible today, coupled with the massive looting and vandalizing of artefacts (Figs. 65–6).
Because of the physical deterioration of the building’s wooden components, roof, walls and floors, and the lack of funding for conservation work on the building, the remaining artefacts are gradually deteriorating from the harsh climate despite limited attempts to minimize the problems. At the time of the war, the staff was drastically reduced as some of them fled for their lives to other countries, while others decided to seek better paying jobs and never returned to the museum.

**Sierra Leone**
Sierra Leone has also experienced the crueller atrocities inflicted on women, children and young adults (Celia Nicols, personal communication 2003). The internal conflict in Sierra Leone has disrupted the development process through the massive destruction of material, human and socio-economic resources and activities (Fig. 67). Through the civil war, out of a population of 4.5 million, about 2 million became internally displaced persons and refugees, over ninety per cent of these casualties being civilians. Hundreds of thousands of children have lost their opportunity for education and the acquisition of productive skills. Many have been physically and emotionally traumatised by the war. In addition many were maimed, raped, amputated or made to be child soldiers, pressured to take drugs and to commit acts of violence (Fig. 68).

The war also had devastating effects on cultural heritage and posed a serious challenge. The Museum buildings were severely damaged on two occasions, when the rebels entered Freetown in 1997 and 1999 respectively. The doors, windows and windowpanes were shattered, and the roofs also damaged. As it was the rainy season, water poured into the buildings and destroyed some of the artefacts, some of which even had bullet holes.

**Côte d’Ivoire**
The armed conflict has been raging in Côte d’Ivoire since September 2002 and has led to the temporary partition of the country into two (see Zagbayou, this volume). According to a paper delivered at the workshop by Mrs Aminata Barro, Inspector for Cultural Heritage in the Ministry of Culture in Côte
d’Ivoire, national cultural heritage has been the object of particular attention by the cultural heritage services and by the national committees of ICOM and ICOMOS. The action taken has been multifaceted and directed both to rebel-occupied zones and those under government control.

In the occupied zones the permanent task of inventorying which started at the beginning of the 1980s has enabled the cultural heritage services to locate the major monuments and cultural areas of interest. For the north and northeastern part of the country, reports state that the New Forces (FN) have adopted exemplary conduct vis-à-vis property and other cultural sites, which have remained intact until now. For the most part the FN, who are nationalists from the northern part of the country, act in agreement with the holders of sacred power who, in turn, spare no effort to make available their knowledge and skills to the resistance by the rebels, whom they consider as their children.

If the condition of cultural property is stable in the north and the east of the country and not a cause for concern, this is not the case for the central and greater western areas, where cases of theft and pillage of cultural property have been reported, mainly because of the back-up Liberian rebel forces which have come to assist both the government and the FN troops.

**Senegal**

The frequent armed conflicts that occur between the Senegalese army and the Casamance MFDC also have an impact on the populations. This insurrection movement, which calls for independence, has taken on the form of an armed separatist conflict, plunging the southern part of Senegal into permanent conflict. There have been innumerable violent acts carried out against the population.

According to Nouha Cissé, principal of the Ziguinchor secondary school, the intensity of the armed conflict as well as the enlargement of the areas of confrontation have not spared religious sites such as mosques and churches, which have served as places of refuge or fallback positions for combatants and civilian populations. This is true of churches, for example, the church in Mandina Mancangne near Ziguinchor, capital of the eponymous region, was attacked in August 1997, as was the mosque in Mandina Thierno in 1998 (Nouha Cissé personal communication, 2003).

Furthermore, sacred forests said to host meetings or the mystical preparation of combatants have been desecrated by security forces. Sometimes this is necessary to hunt down independence fighters. Moreover, the very first bloody confrontations came after the ‘violation’ of the sacred forest in Daibri, an area just outside Ziguinchor, by security agents who went to spy on units that were organizing. Sacred forests are suspected of providing cover for clandestine meetings of a political rather than religious nature, hence the propensity of security forces to shell them.

**Nigeria**

Nigeria experienced a severe Civil War in the late 1960s. In the past few decades, the country has again witnessed religious, inter-ethnic and community-based conflicts, which include the religious conflicts in Kano and Kaduna (northern Nigeria), inter-ethnic violence in Ife/Modakeke (southwestern Nigeria), and communal clashes in the Niger Delta area.

Riots, the pillage of churches and mosques, violent strikes, police and military abuses and general disorder continue to affect the daily life of Nigerians. In October 2002, the Nigerian army massacred at least two hundred unarmed civilians in the central state of Benue, in the region torn apart by constant ethnic conflicts (Antonia Fatunsin personal communication, 2003).

According to Fatunsin, when the Nigerian civil war broke out in 1967, there were very few functional museums in Nigeria—those in Esie, Jos, Ife and Oran. Of these, only the Oran museum was located in the eastern part of the country in the war zone. Opened in 1959, the museum housed 661 out of the 800 Oran Kepi ancestral figures that were known. During the war, the museum was occupied by troops and in 1967 the collection was removed for safety to Umuahia. When the museum was bombed and destroyed and Umuahia threatened, the objects were again moved to Orlu. At the end of hostilities, Orlu became a refuge and the inhabitants, unaware of the importance of these wooden objects, used them as firewood. Many were stolen and some were looted. A very lucrative business in cultural materials sprang up between the Oran people and their neighbours, the Cameroonianis. When the war eventually ended, only 116 carvings survived and these were poor examples of what were originally in the collections (Nicklin 1977). Even the stone monoliths in shrines were uprooted and removed.

As a more recent example, Nana Palace Museum in Koko is both a museum and a monument. All the personal and household goods used by King Nana were on exhibit in the museum, opened in 1995 through the efforts of Dr. Joseph Eboreime, the then Curator of the Benin Museum.

Koko—a symbol of the Itsekiri identity—was attacked in 2003 by Ijaw youths in the restive Niger Delta. The palace was an attraction to the
Ijaw nationalists, who feel deprived of political and economic benefits stemming from the wealth in the Niger Delta. These Ijaws invaded Koko town and burned the houses of prominent Itshekiri chiefs. They headed for the museum and, but for the timely intervention of security agents and some daring Itshekiri youths, Koko Palace Museum might have been burnt together with all the objects, which have now been evacuated to the Benin Museum. This notwithstanding, the Ijaw youth are allegedly still threatening to burn down the monument (Joseph Eboereime personal communication, 2003).

Impact on society of the armed conflicts

Armed conflicts have had, and continue to have, disastrous consequences for economic and sociocultural development.

From the cultural standpoint, we are seeing a slowdown in the movement of people, obstacles to relations between communities, lack of integration of populations, and distrust among people. Cultural identity is also threatened by the destruction of cultural symbols, the outward cultural signs of the ‘other’ community, and the dislocation of the traditional core and values that make up identity.

Moreover, populations are searching for a certain stability, a foundation on which to preserve an identity which can protect them from serious consequences coming from the outside. The risk of the dilution of identity into a uniform social base presents a real danger which could lead to fragility in the face of trials and tribulations, inevitable in a world of competitiveness on all fronts.

Cultural diversity should be seen as a sign of the richness of the society, the possibility for each individual to find fulfillment in the nurturing values of his or her culture. In times of conflict, this diversity is shaken.

Conflicts in the subregion have forced hundreds of civilians to leave their homes and villages for refugee camps where they are cut off from their traditions, roots and their raison d’être. Furthermore, the groupings of populations in the camps fail to take into account ethnic groups or family ties. Many children are separated from their parents, husbands from wives, thus creating a void in the children’s education and familiarity with their traditions. This separation is exterminating some clans which are unable to regroup. The return of peace brings a chance for some people to reconstruct their villages and try to regain their identity.

In addition, during conflicts natural heritage is subjected to degradation with incalculable consequences; the subregional ecosystem is in serious danger. Already the effects of almost twenty years of drought in Sahelian Africa continue to spread ‘Sahelisation’ to a large part of the countries of the subregion. Because of conflicts in these countries, human intervention is accelerating the process, and the immense wealth of nature is being annihilated. Thousands of refugees located in the forests and savannahs are destroying the flora and fauna to provide for their health and nutritional needs.

The WAMP workshop in 2003

Topics and recommendations of the workshop

Following a fact-finding mission in post-conflict countries, WAMP found the conditions to be very serious and decided to take urgent action to remedy the precarious situation in the cultural institutions that it visited.

One of the first actions taken by WAMP was the organization of a regional workshop on the theme ‘Armed Conflicts, Peace Culture and Protection of Cultural Heritage in West Africa’, which was held in May 2003 in Conakry.

The main objective of the workshop was to bring together cultural heritage professionals from eight countries in the subregion and conflict resolution experts in order to: (1) discuss and suggest alternative solutions for minimizing the impact of armed conflict on cultural and natural heritage; (2) reflect on the role of museums and cultural associations in the preservation of cultural and natural heritage in the event of armed conflict; and (3) begin awareness programmes on the importance of peace, tolerance, and respect for cultural heritage based on traditional values.

WAMP also hoped that this workshop would draw the attention of the international community, political leaders, military leaders, civil society and leaders (young, religious, traditional chiefs) to the impact of armed conflicts on the cultural and natural heritage in the subregion, in order to identify cultural assets to be used for prevention and conflict resolution, and the promotion of a culture of peace.

The papers allowed participants to understand the state of museums and cultural heritage after armed conflict and civil war in the various countries under discussion. The speakers described the difficulties encountered in the implementation of programmes aimed at protecting cultural heritage before and during armed conflicts.

Most of the papers mentioned the insufficiency, if not the absence, of systematic inventories of
cultural property in most West African countries and the need to implement training programmes for museum staff and the rehabilitation of cultural heritage services which have fallen victim to the war in the subregion.

During the ensuing discussions, the participants emphasized the need to see humanitarian organizations in Africa intervene also in the protection of cultural heritage and during their reconstruction work to support those in charge of cultural heritage.

The papers stressed the following points:

1. The tendency for cultural and natural heritage in West Africa, as elsewhere in Africa, to be a victim of destruction and looting during armed conflict and civil war;
2. the inadequacy of institutions in charge of heritage as regards the absence of human, material and financial means;
3. the lack of use of certain cultural values (alliances and parenté à plaisanterie—good-natured teasing) in the management and resolution of conflicts;
4. the lack of awareness in communities of the importance of cultural heritage;
5. the misreading of different conventions and national legislations concerning cultural heritage;
6. the inadequacy of inventories in most countries in West Africa; and
7. the lack of synergy between different cultural institutions not only on a national level but regionally.

Following the discussion, two committees were created to define an African strategy for the protection of cultural heritage in the event of armed conflict and to formulate recommendations. The workshop participants addressed suggestions to:

1. Young people
   - Introduce knowledge about cultural heritage into school curricula; and
   - Introduce awareness programmes targeting young people.
2. Museum professionals
   - Systematically inventory cultural heritage;
   - Make known the laws protecting national heritage;
   - Create a West African professional network concerned with protection of cultural heritage within ECOWAS;
   - Inventory living heritage, mechanisms of prevention and traditional means of conflict resolution;
   - Mark the Blue Shield symbol on museums, monuments and cultural heritage sites; and
   - Create national and regional committees of the Blue Shield.
3. Women, religious leaders and soldiers
   - Advocate the importance of and the need to protect cultural heritage.
4. WAMP and other cultural institutions
   - Establish professional training in management of cultural heritage to build greater expertise in prevention and risk-management; and
   - Organize an awareness and information seminar for military personnel, journalists and community leaders.
5. Journalists
   - Train journalists in the protection of cultural heritage; and
   - Encourage balanced reporting on cultural heritage issues.

The participants made additional recommendations.

1. to WAMP:
   - Organize training sessions for museum professionals and military personnel on protecting museums and cultural heritage before, during and after armed conflict and catastrophes;
   - Develop a training programme on application of conventions on the protection of cultural heritage;
   - Develop with ECOWAS an African convention on the looting of museums and illicit traffic of cultural heritage in conflict zones;
   - Support national museums in collecting objects from all ethnic groups in their countries and in presenting them in a permanent exhibition;
   - Encourage neighbouring countries to sign agreements for the repatriation of objects removed in the event of armed conflict;
   - Establish in collaboration with AFRICOM an African Heritage Day; and
   - Continue collaboration efforts with cultural institutions such as AFRICOM, EPA, PMDA, ICCROM and AFRICA 2009.
2. African States:
   - Ratify conventions related to the protection of cultural heritage; and
   - Create a chair of cultural heritage in a West African University.
3. UNESCO:
   - Establish a fund for safeguarding African heritage.
4. to civil society:
   - Combat the dichotomy between modernity and tradition in the management of cultural heritage.
Furthermore, it was noted that preventive approaches to armed conflict have become crucial, given the human and material toll that these wars are taking on the Western African subregion, already impoverished by the weak economic situation. Preventive actions against acts of vandalism and pillage should be taken at the grassroots level, getting the local population, and especially young people, involved.

**Follow-up by WAMP after the workshop**

In order to implement these recommendations, WAMP has undertaken a number of activities for the promotion of cultural heritage in post-conflict countries. The most difficult problems remain the training of technicians, the reconstitution of collections, the search for and collection of cultural heritage artefacts to further enrich exhibitions, and the fitting-out of structures as storerooms.

Nevertheless, as follow-up, WAMP has:

- Designed posters for the awareness-raising campaign;
- Created a directory of West African museum professionals;
- Organized a travelling photographic exhibition in Guinea to raise public awareness of the harmful effects of armed conflicts;
- Submitted to UNESCO a proposal for the training of museum professionals from post-conflict countries;
- Financed a storeroom for the Ethnographic Museum of Guinea-Bissau for the conservation of objects collected from different regions, April 2004;
- Trained museum professionals from Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d’Ivoire;
- Provided a grant to Liberia for the renovation of the National Museum, and sent a consultant to prepare a strategic plan for culture, April 2005;
- Participated in two conferences of the ECOWAS parliament to increase the awareness among parliamentarians in the subregion, November 2003 and April 2005.

**Future plans of WAMP**

WAMP in its 2006–10 strategic plan of activities has proposed a special project on cultural heritage and armed conflict in West Africa. The aim is to effectively organize an awareness-raising campaign for populations, political players, the military, and to help train cultural heritage professionals for prevention and the protection of cultural heritage in the case of armed conflict.

WAMP would also like to collaborate with other regional and international institutions to implement local structures for awareness-raising and prevention, such as establishing national committees of the International Committee of the Blue Shield (ICBS), and to develop a lobbying strategy to be used with opinion leaders.

**Conclusion**

The 2003 workshop was very necessary because it provided a chance to establish the basis for concerted action and to raise awareness in regional and international opinion, particularly through the contacts with UNESCO, ECOWAS and ICCROM. It recognized that there already exists a whole series of preventive legislative measures established by the Hague Convention of 1954 for the protection of cultural heritage. But some countries where armed conflicts are raging have not ratified the Convention. Moreover, for those who have, there are obstacles related to its applicability in Africa in the absence of the economic means to enforce its principles. Furthermore, preventive measures advocated at high levels such as in the United Nations and UNESCO, far removed from local and traditional authorities, can prove to be incompatible with African realities on the ground.

The problem of cultural heritage in post-conflict countries is one of WAMP’s major concerns: there can be no protection and development without stability and the free movement of persons and property. Given that the conflicts in the subregion are long-term, rigorous awareness-raising activities must be undertaken with the help of the international community and of African states, which should begin by ratifying the existing Conventions. The support of the Blue Shield and other organizations is also needed to help WAMP set up national committees and monitor the evolution of the programme.

Conflict of any sort, where it is of a civil, ethnic, and religious nature and/or armed, is never a positive situation. It seriously affects the cultural heritage of a people as well as the people themselves. Insofar as possible, it should be prevented and, when it does break out, it should be extinguished quickly before it gets out of hand. The best action is to educate people on the evil impact of conflict on society and cultural heritage so that, if it cannot be avoided, then at least their cultural property might be spared. Dialogue is the only panacea for all conflict situations.
Biography

Boureima Diamitani trained as an architect, and has a Ph.D from the School of Art and Art History, University of Iowa, USA. Formerly Director of the National Museum in Burkina Faso, he has published a monograph (1999) on the culture of the Tagwa-Senufo people of his native Burkina Faso. For several years he has been the Executive Director of the West African Museums Project (WAMP), an NGO founded in Abidjan in 1982 to promote museums and related institutions. He was a member of the Africom Board of Directors, 2003–6. www.wamponline.org

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The impact on cultural heritage of the continuing armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire is reviewed from the perspective of the Musée des Civilisations de Côte d’Ivoire in Abidjan. After placing the armed conflict in its socio-cultural and political context, the author describes the principal assets of the national cultural heritage and the negligence and the damage to which it has been subject. The Musée des Civilisations (considered the national museum) has taken the lead in facilitating post-war co-existence and reconciliation by promoting exhibitions, both in the capital and in the regional museums, that are inclusive of Côte d’Ivoire’s ethnic and religious diversity. The author argues that museums have an important role to play in encouraging reconciliation in culturally diverse societies.

Promoting cultural heritage in a post-war environment: the Côte d’Ivoire

The following paper is contributed by the Musée des Civilisations de Côte d’Ivoire, Abidjan Plateau, and is concerned with the promotion of cultural heritage in a post-war environment. It consists of six sections: the first places the armed conflict in its socio-cultural and political context; the second provides a current assessment of the nation’s cultural heritage while the third describes the negligence and the damage sustained by this national cultural heritage. The museum’s experience in facilitating post-war coexistence and reconciliation forms the subject of the fourth part and the fifth reviews the impact of the museum’s activities. The paper concludes with my personal view of the role of museums in reconciliation.

The socio-cultural and political background of Côte d’Ivoire

Located in West Africa to the north of the Gulf of Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire has been independent since 7 August 1960. It covers an area of 322,462 sq. km and has a population of 16 million, of which 26% are foreigners. Native Ivorians can be divided into approximately sixty ethnic groups (Fig. 69). From an ethno-cultural viewpoint, these groups belong to four great linguistic areas, which spread beyond the Côte d’Ivoire to its neighbouring countries. These four linguistic areas are inhabited by: the Akan, who live in the centre, the south and east with neighbouring
Ghana to the east; the Gur in the north with neighbouring Burkina Faso and Mali to the north; the Mande, who live in the northwest and centre-west with Guinea bordering to the west; and the Krou of the west and centre-west, along with Liberia to the west.

This ethnic diversity, coupled with the spread of Ivorian society and culture beyond its borders, constitutes a factor of national cultural wealth and vitality. Côte d’Ivoire thus benefits from the neighbouring cultures of Ghana, Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea and Liberia, which themselves consist of diverse societies and cultures.

In terms of politics, the country had been considered a haven of peace and stability from 1960 to 1990. In 1990, Côte d’Ivoire, feeling the winds of change blowing from the east, launched a democratic multiparty system. A coup d’État, the first in the nation’s history, took place on 24 December 1999. A second uprising broke out during the night of 18 September 2002. Although the attempted coup was aborted, the rebellion continues, this date marking the beginning of the nation’s most serious crisis. The country is now divided in two (Figure 70).

The rebel forces now hold the northern half of the country, which they have divided into zones, each zone being ruled by a warlord known as a ‘Com-zone’. The southern half of the country is still ruled by the constitutional state and its republican laws. The partition of the country has led also to a socio-cultural partition. Consequently, the situation of the cultural heritage is also of a dual nature, depending whether one is in the zone under rebel control or in the zone under state control. So, what is the situation of conservation of cultural heritage in Côte d’Ivoire, now that the armed conflict affecting the country has lasted nearly three years? But first, what was the situation of cultural heritage and its conservation before the outbreak of the rebellion that led to the armed conflict?

The state of national cultural heritage and conservation

It is difficult to assess the state of cultural heritage and conservation in Côte d’Ivoire. There are two problems to take into account. The first is structural and concerns the information and documentation systems relating to the conservation and the promotion of the nation’s cultural heritage.
Information management (data collection, storage, and circulation) lacks funds and sometimes expert knowledge. Information management also suffers from increased specialization, meaning that each administrative branch has its own rules and way of doing things which prevents the centralization of information, making it impossible to have a complete understanding of the field. As a result there is an absence of reliable databases on the national cultural heritage and its conservation.

The second problem is socio-cultural and is inherently linked to the perception of heritage and of cultural property among Africans in general and specifically in this case among Ivorians. In fact, for the African in general, and especially among rural people who are the owners of much of it, the importance attached to objects or property is not always the same as that which modern society ascribes to it. If the property or object in question is not directly linked to a cult, a sacred ritual or the community’s everyday life, its damaged state or disappearance will not worry anyone.

Add to this an inaccurate conception of modernism and Christianity that tends to consider any object or social practice that is integral to the land as either satanic or savage. With such conceptions, cultural objects and practices can be abandoned, sold off, badly maintained or not even counted nor considered part of the undamaged national cultural heritage. Nevertheless, these problems should not constitute obstacles to the existence of a cultural heritage and its conservation in Côte d’Ivoire.

Furthermore, in the eyes of the Cultural Heritage Department of the Ministry of Culture and Francophonie, there exist museums, sites and monuments, arts and traditions and cultural practices in Côte d’Ivoire, in other words a heritage, both tangible and intangible, as anywhere else in the world. On the eve of the armed conflict that the country has been undergoing since the events of September 18–19 September 2002, the state of the cultural heritage conservation was as follows.

### Tangible cultural heritage prior to 2002

Tangible cultural heritage could be found in Côte d’Ivoire’s eight recognized museums, one of which is located in rebel territory (the Péléforo Gbon Coulibaly Regional Museum in Korhoro (Sorba district)); and in various sites and monuments: Mount Korglogo, in the picturesque caverns of the Sahelian-type Mosques (Niofouin, Boundiali, Korhogo, M’Bengué, Kong); the Weavers of Waraniéré (Korhogo); the grapevine rope bridges of Man, including the bridge of Lieupleu (Danané); the Man natural waterfalls and the Dent de Man; and the hundred year-old kapok trees of Toubra, whose circumference is more than ten metres; and so on.

### Intangible cultural heritage prior to 2002

Côte d’Ivoire’s intangible cultural heritage is vast, of a wealth and diversity in line with the ethnic diversity of the country, making an exhaustive list of the national intangible heritage impossible. Therefore, I will indicate only the most expressive and formal aspects that are well-known on a national level.

These include the rituals such as the Kouroubi (in Bondoukou, Dabakala, Séguéla, Toubra and Bouna); the Brego in Bouna; the Poro ritual (in the Sénoufo region of the north); the Dipri ritual (in Abidji in the south); the Abissa ritual of the N’Zima country in the southern lake region; the Blahun or the initiation ceremony for the panther-men in Niéboudoua, in the region of Vavoua; the Adjanou or sacred ritual of elderly women of the Baoulé region, located in the centre of Côte d’Ivoire; the Otchandji ritual, which honours the male centenarians of Wè in Bangolo; generation festivities (in Faukwé, Eb-Eb, Lowou etc.) in the Akan lake district of the south; the yam festivals in the east, centre and south; and the Gba or rice harvest ritual of Facobly (Wè country).

Other rituals relate to royalty and chiefdoms, and involve the use of objects such as royal and/or hallowed chairs, or talking tom-toms which have a sacred element to them. In addition to these sacred rituals one must not forget the carnival-like festive events, such as the Gueheva (a festival with masks and traditional dances of Dan and Wè, in Man); the Awale festival of traditional Bété songs and dances that are celebrated in Gagnoa; the Paquinou (an event that recalls the Christian Easter in the Baoulé region, particularly in Bouaké and the surrounding area); and the mask festival of the Guiglo country, in the Gueré region, and so on.

The national cultural heritage also includes modern and traditional arts such as literature, traditional and modern music, painting and sculpture, film, fashion and design.

In conclusion, while the cultural heritage of Côte d’Ivoire is rich and abundant, it suffers from structural problems to do with inventory, documentation, conservation, promotion, and socio-cultural attitudes.

Moreover, this richness and diversity of Côte d’Ivoire’s national heritage has sustained damage since the start of the armed rebellion, which paved the way for conflict, abuse, rape, violations and pillaging.
Damage to Côte d’Ivoire’s national heritage suffered during the armed conflict

In the rebel-held zone

Damage to the national cultural heritage suffered during the conflict has been recorded mostly in rebel territory and falls into two categories: on the one hand, cases involving the destruction of objects and the pillaging of cultural property; and, on the other hand, cultural activities that have ceased due to the breakdown of social networks.

Cases of destruction and pillaging of objects and cultural property

During the armed conflict, numerous cases of destruction and pillaging of objects and cultural goods occurred in rebel territory.

In Korhogo in the north of the country, the regional Museum of Péléforo Gbon Coulibaly closed and ceased all activities. The museum’s staff had to flee due to the insecurity of the area, and to this day nobody knows whether the collection has been secured from destruction or looting.

In the west, in the regions of Dan and Wê (Man, Danané, Fakobly, Guiglo, Bangolo, etc.), the keeping places for masks have been destroyed and sometimes even set on fire. Sacred and secular masks have been stolen. In 2003, the local press reported the interception of a truck full of masks and other cultural objects that was heading north towards rebel territory. Recently, the daily L’Inter reported (Issue 2093, 4–5 May 2005: 14) the illicit trafficking of Ivorian cultural property. The following is an extract of the article, signed Eben B.:

Mr Oumarou Nao, Burkinabé’s director of cultural heritage, addressed his Ivorian counterpart, M. Fernand Sékongo, on the issue of fraudulent exports of Ivorian cultural goods. The letter, sent at the beginning of April 2005, mentions eight works of art, four masks from the central region, and four Senouko chairs, which were intercepted at Ouagadougou’s train station in Burkina Faso.

In the central region of Bouaké, cultural heritage suffered serious damage, including the theft of the Klin Kpli or sacred talking tom-tom of the Baoulé people, from the royal court of Sakassou. This event was reported by the press. The following is an extract of an article signed Paulin N. Zobo, and published by Fraternité Matin (Issue 11500, 10 March 2003: 15):

Kidnappings, executions, and pillaging continue to occur in the zones occupied by the rebel forces of the Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI). On Thursday March 6, rebels stormed into the Walebo district, where the King of Sakassou resides. Six people were arrested...But the rebels did not stop there. They stole a number of sacred masks and the royal talking tom-tom, the Klin Kpli.

The royal court of the Baoulé people is located in Sakassou and the sacred tom-tom, inherited from the Queen Abla Pokou, is the symbol of royalty and of the socio-cultural unity of the Baoulé.

Activities that have ceased due to the breakdown of social networks

In the rebel occupied zone, many people (both native and non-native) have fled the lawless state, and its exactions and summary executions. This has led to a breakdown of the social fabric. The flight of populations who were the owners of the heritage, much of which is traditional, affects also its conservation and maintenance. As from now, many customary and ritual practices have had to cease, such as the annual festival of Gueheva in Man. This event has not been scheduled since 2002, because of the insecurity that compelled many Dan and Wê people to leave.

The most blatant case of violence was the kidnapping, in December 2002, of twelve elderly female Adjanou dancers in the village of Sakassou, in the Baoulé region. Accused of organizing an Adjanou ritual to ensure the military victory of the President of the Republic, they were raped and beaten. Some died from the blows, while others were simply executed by the rebels. In Sakassou, where members of the royal court were raped, the king had to seek refuge in Abidjan where he now remains. For this reason, the daily rituals and cultural practices that revolve around the monarchy and belong to Ivorian cultural heritage have been either seriously disturbed or have ceased altogether. Many custodians of traditional rites are among the many victims of rebel executions and have thus disappeared. Thus the continuation of such practices is now compromised.

The Côte d’Ivoire’s rich cultural diversity and pride have been severely tested by the rebellion, which has destroyed its foundations. For example, when the rebellion broke out, people who were not natives of the zones under rebel control were threatened and some executed. Rebel propaganda spoke about bringing justice to the people of the northern and western regions, inciting them against the people of the south who had allegedly treated them badly since Independence. This fallacious ideology continues to fuel the rebellion that led to armed conflict and makes problematic the nation’s socio-cultural cohesion that was once a source of pride.
So far, there is no reliable data on the extent of damage inflicted on the nation’s cultural heritage, nor of that sustained by the country as a whole. Zones under rebel rule continue to suffer from the departure of the civil servants of the Administration who were not originally from that zone and who were bullied or given death threats. In such conditions, one can only expect the worst. The whole nation is at risk, and Ivorian society is threatened by war.

**Cultural heritage in the government-controlled zone**

In the government-controlled zone, damage to the national cultural heritage takes a different form. There it is not a question of destruction or looting by rebels or as a result of the war. It is rather due to a lack of maintenance and promotion of the heritage. Already before the conflict, culture in general suffered from a lack of serious consideration in the country. No coherent cultural policy appears to have been put into effect by the successive governments of the Côte d’Ivoire since Independence, neither at an overall level nor for specific topics.

The subject of museums is no exception. Only a few isolated or ad hoc actions allowed the national cultural institutions to exist and survive. By way of consequence, this absence of a global or long-term vision engendered in its turn an incoherence or breakdown in the cultural industries, among them heritage conservation.

By way of example, the Costume Museum of Grand-Bassam, some thirty kilometres southwest of Abidjan, had been closed for more than two years. The Museum exhibits the dress and environments of all regions of the country. Recently, it was re-opened to the public.

Another example is the National Library of Côte d’Ivoire, situated on the Plateau, and a gift from Canada during the 1970s. The library building had deteriorated to the point at which the lack of weatherproofing has threatened the very existence of the building. In 2001, in order to protest the advanced state of degradation of the national heritage and to draw the attention of the authorities to it, the then Director undertook a hunger strike.

In a general way, this lack of maintenance can be attributed to the African’s conception of culture (as proposed above). The very modest annual budget allocated to the Department of Culture, and consequently to the different specialised services in charge of the conservation of cultural heritage, is another factor which—linked to the previous one—result in the precarious state of the conservation of this national cultural heritage.

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**The contribution of Côte d’Ivoire’s Museum of Civilizations to the promotion of post-war coexistence and reconciliation**

Côte d’Ivoire’s Museum of Civilizations (which is considered also the national museum), undertakes various activities aimed at raising awareness, and maintaining and preserving the unity and uniqueness of the Ivorian nation. The concept of Ivorian unity is threefold: socio-cultural unity that embraces its rich diversity, political unity, and economic unity. Its activities are classified into two groups: exhibitions and outreach activities.

**Exhibitions**

Exhibitions revolve around ethnographical and archaeological collections. Permanent museum exhibitions are to be distinguished from a temporary exhibition or one related to an event.

**Permanent exhibition**

Open every workday from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., its aim is to enable all visitors (residents and non-residents) to discover Côte d’Ivoire’s cultural diversity. This exhibition, on the theme of ‘national unity’, is made up of four components and has been in existence for many years. The central theme, whose aim is to promote unity and cultural blending, is divided into four sub-themes located in four separate areas: from left to right one can look at Everyday Life, then The World of Statues in the centre, Attributes of Power to the right, ending with The World of Masks at the back. Since this exhibition attempts to show Ivorian society in its diversity, each theme in every block or section of the museum displays objects from each region, in a way that the visitor feels he is moving from north to south and east to west in Côte d’Ivoire. Despite their diversity the visitor is immediately struck by the similarities between the cultures. This discovery can raise awareness about national unity, which itself leads to tolerance. By maintaining this exhibition at a time when the country is undergoing a crisis that threatens its unity, the Museum of Civilizations intends to reinforce the notion of the blending of cultures and unity in diversity that has always been a source of pride in Côte d’Ivoire.
Temporary and event-related exhibitions
These occur at specific times, with specific goals, as is the case with the Museum of Civilizations Week (Semaine du Musée des Civilisations) which has been held since 2001. The second edition of this event was scheduled during the week of 18–24 May 2004, in the midst of the armed conflict. Four Ivorian museums participated in the event: the Charles Combés Museum of Bingerville, in the suburbs of Abidjan; the Museum of Zaranou, located more than 300 km from Abidjan, in the Abengourou region; the Grand-Bassam Museum of Costumes, in the suburbs of Abidjan; and Côte d’Ivoire’s Museum of Civilizations. The theme explored by the Museum of Civilizations was: A look at the daily lives of our ancestors.

Introducing Islamic heritage in the Museum of Civilizations
One of the pretexts that the rebels used to justify their acts against the Ivorian State was the alleged clash between a Moslem-majority north and a Christian-majority south. Even if this does not reflect reality, the argument was used. The Museum of Civilizations contributes to post-war national reconciliation by hosting an exhibition promoting the introduction of Islamic cultural heritage to Ivorian museum institutions, in the framework of an ISESCO (Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) project. The aim is to facilitate the collection of tangible and intangible evidence of the Islamic heritage in order to help organize future exhibitions and to contribute to the Museum of Civilizations’ collections.

The Museum has already held meetings aimed at raising public awareness and enabling cultural exchanges with people who possess objects pertaining to the country’s Islamic heritage. The collection of cultural artifacts started in August 2005.

Outreach and educational activities
Aside from these exhibitions, other activities initiated by the Museum of Civilizations concern the preservation of national unity and contribute to the coexistence and reconciliation of the peoples of Côte d’Ivoire. These are activities of outreach and education. While contributing to the life and outreach of the institution, these activities aim also—during this period of war—to encourage dialogue among Ivorians, helping them to tolerate and accept each other.

Outreach activities
During the second edition of Museum Week (Semaine du Musée), the outreach activities consisted of discovering the different national ethnic communities. Each day of the week, two or three communities were invited to make their culture known to visitors: the Ebrie and the Attié people from the south; the Gouro and the Bété people from the centre-west; the Sénoufo people from the north, the Wé from the west, the Baoulé from the central regions; and the Abron from the east. These communities were invited to let others discover their traditional culture through their gastronomy, their songs and their traditional dances.

Cultural and educational activities
Activities for children
Since 2001, the Museum of Civilizations has programmed cultural and educational activities for children, aged eight to sixteen, during the summer vacations. From July to August, children of various socio-cultural backgrounds are brought together on the museum’s premises, which are turned into a summer camp for the occasion and where they can play and learn together. The activities include painting, playing traditional musical instruments, traditional and modern dancing, moral and civic education, drama, learning about infant and childcare, visits to sights, etc.

The theme and slogan of these activities change every year. In 2004, it was ‘Museums and Peace’; the theme for the 2005 vacation period was ‘Culture, Tolerance, and Solidarity’.

Activities for adults
So far, activities for adults have consisted in public lectures and debates, especially during Museum Week. Three lectures tackling the theme of the conflict situation in Côte d’Ivoire led to debates. The first lecture, entitled ‘Museums and Reconciliation’, was delivered by Dr Kassoro Gnaboua, socio-anthropologist and President of the NGO ‘Parlé’ (Speak); the second lecture, entitled ‘Inter-ethnic Alliances: bringing communities together’, was delivered by Professor Amoa Urbain, President of the Université des Temps Libres; while ‘The Museum: a melting pot of national identity and social cohesion’ was delivered by Mr. Alain Godonou, historian, museum conservator, and Director of the School of African Heritage (Ecole du Patrimoine Africain) in Porto Novo, Benin.

Through these activities, the Museum of Civilizations makes its own contribution to promoting dialogue between cultures and national communities. Their reconciliation and interpenetration as a means to preserve national unity on emerging from the conflict are the goals of our activities.
The impact of the Museum’s contribution

The Museum of Civilizations in the Côte d’Ivoire has carried out activities aimed at reconciliation and national equilibrium in the post-war period. Nevertheless, at this point, it is still difficult to measure or quantify the impact of these activities on the national situation. However, the Museum has been recording more and more regular visits by Islamic communities and organizations by means of exhibitions and working sessions in connection with the continuing project for introducing Islamic heritage.

Moreover, the level of participation in these activities, their audiences and the resultant intermingling of people of different ethnic and religious origins indicate that there has been a certain interest among the target populations. By way of example, the second edition of the Museum Week of the Museum of Civilizations of the Côte d’Ivoire recorded 2,895 visitors in one week. This enthusiasm for our activities is already an indicator of a positive reaction by the people. That is to say that they felt involved and shared our goals.

That is why we believe the Museums have a role to play in the processes of reconciliation in countries in conflict.

The role of museums in the reconciliation process

The museum is an institution whose role is to serve society and contribute to its development. For this reason, it cannot remain marginal in its environment. Furthermore, it must take current events into account in order to better respond to people’s needs. In terms of contributing to the reconciliation process, the museum, in our societies, must serve as an instrument that enables communities to connect with each other, by pointing out the age-old relationships that link societies together and the factors that facilitate the mixing of peoples through cultural, educational, social and economic activities.

Museums should adapt to the evolution of society and be able to provide stepping-stones that bring communities together in times of conflict. Thanks to their collections, museums can become excellent tools for reunification. They serve as a reminder that peaceful coexistence between peoples has existed for centuries and has been possible thanks to mechanisms of fraternisation and managing conflicts between individuals and between communities. This also applies to inter-ethnic alliances, which undoubtedly constitute a factor in establishing friendly relations and non-aggression pacts.

Finally, museums must be able to cater to people of all socio-cultural backgrounds and of all communities. Museums must bring people together on mobilizing themes like peace, tolerance, love and national unity. They must organize community-minded programme that effectively involve those concerned while avoiding being partisan. The museum’s role is to raise awareness, providing educational opportunities, travelling exhibitions, cultural activities, lectures and debates. Its programmes should disseminate information objectively and local media should be encouraged to promote the museum’s activities in order to get its message across to the masses.

Conclusion

The ongoing armed conflict that started in Côte d’Ivoire on 18–19 September 2002 has caused serious damage to the national cultural heritage. The pillaging and destruction of cultural property and values have been recorded, as have the names of the missing custodians of Ivorian cultural customs and practices. In spite of the conflict and of the damages wrought, Côte d’Ivoire’s Museum of Civilizations, which is considered also the national museum of Côte d’Ivoire, has initiated various activities aimed at bringing peoples together and promoting cohesion and national reconciliation after the war. In such circumstances, the museum has a prominent role to play.

Biography

Hortense Zagbayou Bekouan was for several years, until 2006, Director of the Musée des Civilizations de Côte D’Ivoire. After publishing a study on museum policy in the Côte D’Ivoire, she participated in 1991–2 in the PREMA (Prevention in Museums in Africa) programme of ICCROM and the Université de la Sorbonne, completing a dissertation on the security of collections in the Musée des Civilizations that was published by the Centre d’Animation et de Formation à l’Action Culturelle (CAFAC) in Abidjan. She has also published a treatise on La conservation des collections en bois au musée des civilisations de Côte d’Ivoire : réalités et perspectives, published by the successor of CAFAC, the Ecole Formation à l’Action Culturelle (EFAC) in 1995–7. She was elected member of ICCROM’s Council for the period 2000–5.

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Editor’s note: I am grateful to Baba Keita (ICCROM) for his help in ensuring publication of this text.
The civil war in El Salvador (1980–1992) caused profound displacement of people, both internally within the country and in the form of emigration abroad. With the return of many emigrants and the re-population of villages, many of which had been completely abandoned, efforts have been made to revive cultural heritage. Customs and crafts that were obsolescent prior to the war have been revived, and a Special Law for Protection of Cultural Heritage was approved in 1993. A number of examples are given of the revival or restoration of cultural heritage, both tangible and intangible, in the towns of El Salvador, as a result of national and international initiatives.

Introduction: armed conflict and population displacement

El Salvador was affected by an armed conflict between the years 1980 and 1992 (Figure 71). This conflict provoked profound social changes which caused intense emigration away from the zones of heaviest conflict, in the provinces of Morazán, Chalatenango, Cuscatlán, Cabañas, San Vicente and San Miguel. Except for San Miguel, all of them lost population, ranging from a 40% loss to total depopulation, as happened in San José Las Flores, Cinquera, Arambala, San Cayetano, Torola, San Ignacio, and so on.

In 1985, immigration to the large towns was caused by the violent and powerful confrontations between the national army and the guerrilla group called Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Martí Front for National Freedom), which had been built up as an army with the support of Mexico and France in 1981. People moved to San Salvador, the capital, and to other towns such as Santa Ana, Chalchuapa, Ahuachapán and San Miguel. It is estimated that at least one million Salvadorans moved away from their original homes.

The people abandoned their towns and cities, mostly after hostile attacks that left severe damage and large numbers of dead and wounded people. Some places were left completely uninhabited, others with very little population. Individual and social identities were strongly affected or totally doomed.

The other direction of migration was external, mainly to the United States of America. Between 1980 and 1990 two million Salvadorans moved to the USA, at an average of 200,000 each year. This massive emigration caused social upheaval since entire families emigrated, for example, or it led to family disintegration because only the father or the mother emigrated and the children were left in El Salvador, or vice versa. Nevertheless, the remittances sent back to their families by these people...
who left the country have propped up the Salvadoran economy for some twenty years.

The emigration also took 160,000 Salvadorans to Canada; 40,000 to Australia; 10,000 each to Sweden and Italy; 5,000 to Spain, and half a million to other, neighbouring Central American countries. Of the 2,700,000 emigrants, only 30% have since returned to El Salvador, that is to say about 810,000. Those who returned found a very different nation. Even though they felt uprooted, having lost relatives, houses, and jobs, little by little they blended in again in El Salvador. Many of them had studied in the countries where they had lived, and so they were employed in technical positions (above all, the agricultural industry had been severely damaged). Although they brought back different manners and ways of thinking, it was fortunate that this did not affect much other people.

Of the hundreds of thousands of immigrants, some 80% returned to their places of origin in the country. They tried to integrate and many of them succeeded (the recovery of the national heritage was also strengthened thanks to international support, as will be explained later).

The adaptation and readaptation problems were overcome with hard work and with the will to do it. The recovery of tangible and intangible heritage created a new sense of belonging. Some traditions, customs and crafts were already at some risk of surviving before the civil war, but the peace agreement and the world’s support have helped substantially to recover that heritage. This great achievement can be appreciated today.

In 1993, the Assembly for Legislation finally approved a Special Law for Cultural Heritage Protection of El Salvador, together with its associated regulations. Thus there is a legal basis for the protection, diffusion and recovery of Salvadoran cultural heritage which has helped the different communities recover those cultural and social values that are very important to the Salvadoran people.

Nowadays, thirteen years after the armed conflict ended, work for the recovery of the cultural heritage, both the built tangible and the intangible heritage, is very advanced, although the destruction caused by the most recent earthquakes and by previous ones has been completely devastating.

**Armed conflict and recovery: some examples**

The peace agreement signed in 1992 included questions of recovery and economic, political and social development. The Government of El Salvador committed itself to their resolution and also created the necessary legal conditions. Nevertheless, most
of this work of recovery has been carried out by the citizens, with the support of international organizations, the central and local governments, the Catholic Church and the National Council for Arts and Culture (CONCULTURA).

The following examples illustrate the recovery of cultural heritage post-conflict in El Salvador.

**Suchitoto**
Suchitoto is a small town in the north of El Salvador that was bombarded during the armed conflict and whose population was almost exterminated. This bombardment provoked the deterioration of all types of buildings in the town. Of the 35,000 inhabitants that Suchitoto had in 1980, only 2,000 of them stayed until 1990. Amidst the violence of the war many people died, as did the local traditions.

When the conflict ended, Suchitoto regained population, but three-quarters of the original inhabitants now lived in the United States and Canada. People from other nearby and distant towns and cities moved to Suchitoto, even foreigners.

The Salvadoran government, the Spanish Cooperation Agency, UNESCO, CONCULTURA and the municipal government of Suchitoto have restored the built architectural heritage. Tourism has arrived and local traditions have been brought to life again.

The wooden crafts, such as furniture, doors and decorative elements for furniture; work in iron, such as balconies, verandas, candelabrum, Spanish colonial-style lanterns; and plaster work for architectural decoration and restoration have all been promoted by training the craftsmen and craftswomen in the School of Arts of Suchitoto. This is an educational project supported by the Spanish Co-operation Agency and CONCULTURA. This school is now an institution providing much help to the people of the town, and it also offers job opportunities to many people who are otherwise excluded locally and nationally.

The built architectural and the intangible heritages have been recovered so as to preserve the whole cultural heritage of a town that has many traditions, crafts and a delicious gastronomy. The current inhabitants have a strong sense of belonging, too, and they have blended with the original inhabitants.

**The Route of Peace**
The Ministry of Tourism and people coming from the focal war zones have created, with international support, the so-called Ruta de la Paz (the Route of Peace; Figure 72). This region in the north of El Salvador consists of the towns of Perquin, Arambala, Villa Rosario, Joateca, Cacaopera, Corinto and Guatajiagua, all of them in the province of Morazán, which was one of those most affected by the civil war. It is a wonderful area, a natural paradise, a place full of traditions and customs that were almost extinguished by the confrontations of the war.

Morazán is a province far distant from San Salvador, the capital, and was practically isolated during the war. Many people were killed, others left the area, and many others joined the guerrilla forces.

Of the surviving towns, two are particularly outstanding. Cacaopera is full of traditions, notably native pre-Columbian dances that have been inherited from the Ulua tribe. The indigenous population has made a great effort after the armed conflict to blend in with the new inhabitants in the local dances and other activities. They have also worked to recover the manufacturing processes of the craft that uses fibres of henequen for different types of hammocks and ropes, a craft that had almost disappeared.

The other municipality is Guatajiagua, composed of people descended from the Lenca tribes. There, the process of active preservation of the craft heritage has the support of the National Direction of Cultural Heritage of CONCULTURA, the local government and the Museo de Oriente (Museum of the East), located in the town of San Miguel near Guatajiagua.

In particular, the town has a tradition of producing black pottery of different kinds, both utilitarian and decorative, made mostly by women.
FIGURE 73 (top left)
Blackening of comales (flat ceramic dishes) in the kiln, an activity carried out by men.

FIGURE 74 (above)
Comales, typical of San Miguel near Guatajiagua, are burnished by hand. The black colour is given by an essence obtained from the nacascol tree.

FIGURE 75 (center)
The restored church of San Sebastian Martir in Guatajiagua, Department of Morazán.

FIGURE 76 (bottom)
Postwar improvements to buildings in Guatajiagua, for instance replacement of bahareque (wattle-and-daub) with adobe bricks or with concrete.
Its forms are very diverse, including frying pans, pots, vessels, and comales (flat, thin, round-shaped discs used for cooking corn tortillas). All these are made of clay covered with an essence obtained from the nacascol tree, and this gives the peculiar black colour to these ceramics (Figures 73-4).

The project will allow the distribution of these ceramics throughout the country and the opportunity to export them. Thus, people will recover the totality of their heritage, while also improving their standard of living.

Following the armed conflict, the rebuilding of roads and the reconstruction of buildings have helped Cacaopera and Guatajagua recover quite rapidly their traditions and handicrafts in these circumstances (Figures 75-6).

**Tecoluca (San Vicente), San José Las Flores (Chalatenango) and Moncagua (San Miguel)**

There is now a system of 176 Cultural Houses in municipalities throughout the country. These houses represent the main government through CONCULTURA. They have worked for more than seven years on promoting heritage issues and have recovered some of the cultural expressions that help to integrate the different social groups. In these places, the Feasts of the local patron saint have been reintroduced after having been lost as a custom due to the depopulation caused by the armed conflict.

The patron saint feasts are Catholic and cultural events that bring communities together. They provide a common and exciting occasion to preserve and participate in religious traditions, and to eat and dance in the streets. Vendors offer all kind of local food specialities and drinks. These festivals also include the exhibition and selling of crafts from the region, local dances and rituals, religious processions, carnivals, and so on (Figures 77-8).

For instance, the municipality of Moncagua, with the support of the Cultural House, reintroduced in 1993 the dance of Moors and Christians, which mixes themes from pre-Columbian religious life with Catholic tradition. People celebrate and dedicate this dance to the Virgin of Candelaria (Figures 79-80). In this way, people preserve not only the cultural physical structures, but also the intangible heritage that they have acquired. Such processes help preserve in every region the cultural heritage of El Salvador.

**Conclusions**

It is impossible to mention all the projects that a nation develops in order to recover its cultural heritage. Only the most relevant to the theme of this volume have been selected here.

For the Salvadoran people who survived the armed conflict, which lasted twelve years and left 100,000 people dead, the postwar trauma has been gradually diminished. The people from the war zones have received, and still receive, technical support to regain their social interaction, their cultural heritage and their personal and social self-esteem.
The return of emigrants from abroad has caused more impact economically than culturally. Contrary to what may be imagined, Salvadorans today enjoy very much their traditions, crafts and traditional food.

The cultural heritage is the basis for national identity. Both the physical built heritage and the intangible heritage create the various elements of the foundations for the history of the different societies that make up a nation.

With the Special Law for Cultural Heritage Protection and its regulations, approved in 1993, the protection of traditions and craft development has reversed the decline that was evident before and during the conflict. Traditions that had been lost since the middle of the twentieth century have been recovered or are in the process of recovery.

Without wanting to appear excessively optimistic, in El Salvador we have achieved much in the recovery of cultural heritage during the last twelve years, and we feel proud to share what we have done with other nations.

Biography

Héctor Ismael Sermeño, author, film and theatre critic in his native El Salvador, was recently appointed Director Nacional de Patrimonio Cultural within the Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y el Arte (CONCULTURA). He is also founding President (in 2003) of the Fundación Cultural Alkimia, an organization dedicated to the promotion of performing arts, literature, and El Salvadoran culture. He has recently published La otra mirada (2006), a collection of critical essays on cinema, and Acercamientos, a series of profiles of leading figures in Salvadoran culture.

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